Bowles v. SUNSHINE PACKING CORPORATION, ETC.

• Decision Date: 07 February 1945
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 2869.
• Citation: 59 F. Supp. 164
• Parties: BOWLES, Adm'r, Office of Price Administration, v. SUNSHINE PACKING CORPORATION OF PENNSYLVANIA, NORTHEAST PENNSYLVANIA.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Pennsylvania

59 F. Supp. 164

BOWLES, Adm'r, Office of Price Administration, v. SUNSHINE PACKING CORPORATION OF PENNSYLVANIA, NORTHEAST PENNSYLVANIA.

Civil Action No. 2869.

District Court, W. D. Pennsylvania.

February 7, 1945.

John A. Metz, Dist. Enf. Atty., of Pittsburgh, for plaintiff.

S. Y. Rossiter and Robert H. Chase, both of Erie, Pa., for defendant.

SCHOONMAKER, District Judge.

This is an action in which plaintiff seeks treble damages for the sale by defendant of certain fruit juices over and above the prices fixed pursuant to the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, Section 205(e), 50 U.S.C.A.Appendix, § 925(e): i.e., the General Maximum Price Regulation (7 F.R. 3153), establishing the maximum prices for canned crab-apple juice and canned grape juice; Maximum Price Regulation No. 185 (7 F. R. 5772), establishing the maximum prices for canned strawberry juice and canned black raspberry juice; Maximum Price Regulation No. 207 (7 F. R. 6599), establishing the maximum prices for frozen fruits, berries and vegetables for packers; and Maximum Price Regulation No. 409 (8 F. R. 8358), establishing the maximum prices for frozen fruits, berries and vegetables (1943 pack).

Defendant, by his answer in nature of a demurrer, asserts that the Emergency Price Control Act is unconstitutional as a whole; that even if it is not unconstitutional as a whole, Section 205(e) thereof is unconstitutional with respect to treble damages; that the Act itself does not vest the right to treble damages either in plaintiff or in the United States; that so far as concerns sales for 1943 from the 1943 pack, they do not come within the Regulation promulgated in 1942 for the 1942 pack; that the evidence on which plaintiff relies for this suit was obtained from defendant by duress, and in violation of defendant's constitutional rights; and that this action cannot be maintained, because there is no showing that the Secretary of Agriculture consented to the bringing of this suit.

In view of the decisions of the Supreme Court in Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 64 S.Ct. 660, and Bowles v. Willingham, 321 U.S. 503, 64 S.Ct. 641, defendant has abandoned its contention that the Emergency Price Control Act is unconstitutional, and is pressing only the following contentions, towit: (1) The Emergency Price Control Act does not vest any right in the Administrator to recover treble damages; (2) that as to the items claimed in Exhibit III attached to the Complaint, there was no ceiling price or regulation in force at the time of these transactions for the year 1943; (3) that the evidence on which this suit is based was obtained from defendant's books by compulsion, and therefore cannot be used against the defendant; and (4) that plaintiff has no right to sue without the consent of the Secretary of Agriculture, because the commodities involved are agricultural commodities.

As to defendant's first contention, we are of the opinion that it is without merit. Section 205(e), Title 50 U.S.C.A. Appendix, § 925(e) of the Act, so far as relevant to this issue, reads as follows:

"If any person selling a commodity violates a regulation, order, or price schedule prescribing a maximum price or maximum prices, the person who buys such commodity for use or consumption other than in the course of trade or business may, within one year from the date of the occurrence of the violation, except as hereinafter provided, bring an action against the seller on account of the overcharge. * * * If any person selling a commodity violates a regulation, order, or price schedule prescribing a maximum price or maximum prices, and the buyer either fails to institute an action under this subsection within thirty days from the date of the occurrence of the violation or is not entitled for any reason to bring the action, the Administrator may institute such action on behalf of the United States within such one-year period. If such action is instituted by the Administrator, the buyer shall thereafter be barred from bringing an action for the same violation or violations. Any action under this subsection by either the buyer or the Administrator, as the case may be, may be brought in any court of competent jurisdiction. * * *"

As we construe this section, it provides that where a person buys a commodity for use or consumption other than in the course of trade, he may bring action for damages against the overcharging seller; but that in all other cases the Administrator may bring the action against such seller.

Section 6 of the Complaint, in its allegation that "None of the purchases referred to in Paragraph 5 were made for use or consumption other than in the course of trade or business," brings this case clearly within the class of cases where the Administrator alone has the right to sue for treble damages.

This view is supported by the decision of Judge Delehant in Bowles v. Rock, D.C., 55 F.Supp. 865. To the same effect is the decision of the New York Court of Appeals in Lightbody...