Bowles v. United States
Decision Date | 17 June 1931 |
Docket Number | No. 3149.,3149. |
Citation | 50 F.2d 848 |
Parties | BOWLES v. UNITED STATES. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Fourth Circuit |
John Philip Hill, of Washington, D. C. (Hill, Ross & Hill, of Washington, D. C., on the brief), for appellant.
Wm. Baxter, Asst. U. S. Atty., and Simon E. Sobeloff, U. S. Atty., both of Baltimore, Md.
Before PARKER and NORTHCOTT, Circuit Judges, and ERNEST F. COCHRAN, District Judge.
This is the second appeal in this cause, the first opinion, which sets forth the facts very fully, being reported in (C. C. A.) 44 F.(2d) 115. We there held that the contempts charged against the respondent, Bowles, were not of the class punishable summarily, and that there was error in imposing punishment without giving him opportunity to answer or to produce witnesses in his defense. The case was remanded in order that he might be given this opportunity and that the charges might be then passed upon in the light of all of the evidence, including the knowledge of the judge below of the acts committed in his presence and the statements made to him, as well as any evidence which the respondent might offer in explanation or contradiction of the charges.
After the mandate of this court was received, the court below entered an order and issued a rule against respondent, reciting the charge against him, and directing that he appear before the court on December 20, 1930, and show cause why he should not be attached for contempt. The recitals of the order are substantially the same as those of the order of December 3, 1929, set forth in full at (C. C. A.) 44 F.(2d) 115, 116, except that they omit the charge that respondent failed to comply with the order of court to appear and explain his conduct. The order recites, however, just as did the former order, that he falsely represented himself to the court to be a practicing attorney of the District of Columbia, whereas the truth was that he had been disbarred, and that, by making this false representation, he obtained permission to represent a prisoner at the bar of the court.
The order was served on respondent on November 22d. On December 16th, he filed an affidavit of prejudice against the judge and also a motion that the cause be certified to another judge for hearing. On December 20th, the return day of the rule, this motion was denied, and the affidavit of prejudice was ordered stricken from the record. Respondent then moved to dismiss the rule on the ground, among others, that it failed to charge any act constituting contempt. This was overruled, as was also a motion for a bill of particulars. The respondent then filed answer to the rule in which he denied under oath making the representations charged, but admitted that he had been disbarred in the District of Columbia. He demanded a jury trial, which was denied, and then moved for a continuance on the ground that he desired to produce witnesses, but without showing what the witnesses would testify, why they were not present, or how they would be material to his defense. This motion also was denied. The court gave respondent the opportunity to offer evidence, but he neither took the stand himself to explain his conduct, nor did he offer other testimony to explain it. He was then adjudged in contempt, and punishment was imposed upon him.
The assignments of error raise seven questions, viz.: (1) whether there was error in striking from the record the affidavit of prejudice and refusing to certify the cause to another judge for hearing; (2) whether the charge against respondent constituted contempt; (3) whether the answer of respondent purged the contempt charged; (4) whether there was error in denying the bill of particulars asked; (5) whether respondent was entitled to a jury trial; (6) whether it constituted error to proceed with the hearing on the return day of the rule instead of setting the cause down for hearing in the future; and (7) whether the court was justified in adjudging the respondent guilty of contempt and imposing punishment without hearing additional evidence. We think that all of these questions must be answered against respondent.
There is much doubt as to whether section 21 of the Judicial Code (28 USCA § 25), under which the affidavit of prejudice was filed, has any application to contempt proceedings, particularly where, as here, the contempt is committed in the presence of the court. The affidavit there provided for is allowed in any action or proceeding, "civil or criminal," whereas contempt proceedings are sui generis, being neither civil actions nor prosecutions for offenses within the ordinary meaning of those terms. Myers v. U. S., 264 U. S. 95, 103, 44 S. Ct. 272, 68 L. Ed. 577; Bessette v. W. B. Conkey Co., 194 U. S. 324, 326, 24 S. Ct. 665, 48 L. Ed. 997. And there is strong reason to think that Congress did not intend by the section relied on to require the judge of a court which has been affronted by a contempt to pass over the trial of the question to some other court or judicial officer. As said by Judge Killits in the case of In re Ulmer (D. C.) 208 F. 461, 466:
But, without deciding that the section does not apply, we think that it cannot avail the respondent here, because the affidavit upon which he relies was not filed in time. The statute requires that it be filed not less than ten days before the beginning of the term of court. In Chafin v. U. S. (C. C. A. 4th) 5 F.(2d) 592, 595, we held that: "When the indictment is found less than ten days before such term begins, the affidavit must be filed as soon as practicable before the term begins or good cause shown for the delay; when the indictment is found after the term has begun, the affidavit must be filed as soon as the disqualifying facts are known or good cause shown for delay."
The respondent here failed to comply with the provisions of the statute or the rule laid down by this court in the Chafin Case. The rule was served upon him on November 22d, just ten days before the commencement of the December term of court. He did not file his affidavit until December 16th, four days before the return day of the rule. It thus appears that he did not file it either ten days before the term or ten days before the return day of the rule, whichever be taken as the crucial date. To apply the rule of the Chafin Case, he did not file it as soon as practicable or as soon as the disqualifying facts became known to him, and he did not show any cause whatever for the delay in so doing.
On the second question, we think there can be no doubt that the rule or order served upon respondent sufficiently charged a contempt of court...
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