Bowles v. United States

• Decision Date: 19 November 1934
• Docket Number: No. 3733.,3733.
• Citation: 73 F.2d 772
• Parties: BOWLES v. UNITED STATES.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fourth Circuit

73 F.2d 772 (1934)

BOWLES v. UNITED STATES.

No. 3733.

Circuit Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

November 19, 1934.

Norman S. Bowles, in pro. per.

Bernard J. Flynn, U. S. Atty., of Baltimore, Md., and Cornelius Mundy, Sp. Asst. to Atty. Gen., for the United States.

Before PARKER and NORTHCOTT, Circuit Judges, and WATKINS, District Judge.

NORTHCOTT, Circuit Judge.

The appellant, hereinafter referred to as the defendant, was convicted in the District Court of the United States for the District of Maryland in May, 1934, on the charge of violating the income tax law of the United States. The indictment against the defendant contained four counts; the first charging willful failure to make an income tax return for the year 1930; the second count charging the defendant with feloniously attempting to evade the payment of his income tax for the year 1930 by means of failing to make a return; the third and fourth counts charging a willful attempt to defeat and evade a payment of income tax for the year 1931, by means of filing a false and fraudulent return for that year. The judgment of the court, upon the verdict of guilty returned by the jury, was a fine of $1,000 and costs, on the first count; fine of $1,000, and costs and sentence of imprisonment for three years in the penitentiary on the second count; and fine of $1,000 and costs, on the third count. No sentence was given on the fourth count. The fines were cumulative.

The prosecution was based upon USCA, tit. 26, § 2146, which provides:

"(a) Any person required under this title to pay any tax, or required by law or regulations made under authority thereof to make a return, keep any records, or supply any information, for the purposes of the computation, assessment, or collection of any tax imposed by this title, who willfully fails to pay such tax, make such return, keep such records, or supply such information, at the time or times required by law or regulations, shall, in addition to other penalties provided by law, be guilty of a misdemeanor and, upon conviction thereof, be fined not more than $10,000, or imprisoned for not more than one year, or both, together with the costs of prosecution.

"(b) Any person required under this title to collect, account for, and pay over any tax imposed by this title, who willfully fails to collect or truthfully account for and pay over such tax, and any person who willfully attempts in any manner to evade or defeat any tax imposed by this title or the payment thereof, shall, in addition to other penalties provided by law, be guilty of a felony and, upon conviction thereof, be fined not more than $10,000, or imprisoned for not more than five years, or both, together with the costs of prosecution.

A number of questions are raised on this appeal, the first being on a plea entered by the defendant to the jurisdiction of the trial court. The defendant was a resident of the District of Columbia, and the government conceded that he was not personally in the state of Maryland at any time with relation to the counts of the indictment charging offenses with regard to his income tax for the year 1930, and that the income tax return prepared and filed by the defendant for the year 1931 was filed by him with the person in charge of the local or branch office of the Collector situated in the city of Washington and was in due course transmitted to the principal office of the Collector at Baltimore.

In pursuance of Congressional authority, codified as USCA, tit. 26, § 12, the President was empowered to establish "convenient collection districts." That act provides as follows:

"For the purpose of assessing, levying, and collecting the taxes provided by the internal revenue laws, the President may establish convenient collection districts, and for that purpose he may subdivide any State, Territory, or the District of Columbia, or may unite two or more States or Territories into one district, and may from time to time alter said districts. The whole number of collection districts for the collection of internal revenue shall not exceed sixty-five."

In pursuance of this act, a Presidential Proclamation was promulgated by President Arthur under date of June 25, 1883, which established the District of Columbia as part of the Revenue Collection District of Maryland. The pertinent part of the Proclamation provides:

"I, Chester A. Arthur, President of the United States, by virtue of the authority vested in me by Sections 3141 and 3142 Revised Statutes, approved June 22, 1874, hereby order that the Internal Revenue Collection Districts within the United States hereinafter named be altered and united as follows: and Collectors are designated for the new districts as hereinafter set forth.

"This order to take effect, July 1st, 1883, or as soon thereafter as practicable.

"Maryland

"The Counties of Allegany, Carroll, Frederick, Garrett and Washington of the present Fourth District of Maryland are hereby consolidated with the counties of Baltimore (including the City of Baltimore), Harford, Calvert, Anne Arundel, Charles, Howard, Montgomery, Prince George's and St. Mary's, and the District of Columbia of the present Third District of Maryland, the consolidated district to be known as the District of Maryland, and John Henry Sellman is hereby designated as Collector of the consolidated district."

It was early settled that such a delegation of authority by Congress was constitutional. In Wayman v. Southard, 10 Wheat. 1, 42, 6 L. Ed. 253, Chief Justice Marshall said:

"It will not be contended, that congress can delegate to the courts, or to any other tribunals, powers which are strictly and exclusively legislative. But congress may certainly delegate to others, powers which the legislature may rightfully exercise itself."

See, also, Wisconsin v. Illinois, 278 U. S. 367, 49 S. Ct. 163, 73 L. Ed. 426; Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States, 276 U. S. 394, 48 S. Ct. 348, 72 L. Ed. 624; United States v. Chemical Foundation, 272 U. S. 1, 47 S. Ct. 1, 71 L. Ed. 131; Mahler v. Eby, 264 U. S. 32, 44 S. Ct. 283, 68 L. Ed. 549; First National Bank v. Fellows ex rel. Union Trust Co., 244 U. S. 416, 37 S. Ct. 734, 61 L. Ed. 1233, L. R. A. 1918C, 283, Ann. Cas. 1918D, 1169; Mutual Film Corp. v. Ohio Industrial Commission, 236 U. S. 230, 35 S. Ct. 387, 59 L. Ed. 552; Red "C" Oil Mfg. Co. v. Board of Agriculture, 222 U. S. 380, 32 S. Ct. 152, 56 L. Ed. 240.

Under the Income Tax Law, USCA, tit. 26, § 2053(b)(1), the taxpayer is required to make his return to the Collector for the district in which is located his legal residence or principal place of business. Said section 2053(b)(1) reads as follows:

"(b) To Whom Return Made. — (1) Individuals. Returns (other than corporation returns) shall be made to the collector for the district in which is located the legal residence or principal place of business of the person making the return, or, if he has no legal residence or principal place of business in the United States, then to the collector at Baltimore, Maryland."

The defendant being a resident of the District of Columbia, it became his duty to make his income tax return to the Collector at Baltimore, Md., and failure to make such return constituted an offense within the District of Maryland. In United States v. Lombardo, 241 U. S. 73, 36 S. Ct. 508, 60 L. Ed. 897, it was held that a resident of the state of Washington was guilty of an offense in the city of Washington, District of Columbia, for failing to file with the Commissioner General of Immigration, in the District of Columbia, a statement in writing required by an Act of Congress. In Rumely v. McCarthy, 250 U. S. 283, 39 S. Ct. 483, 486, 63 L. Ed. 983, the court said:

"It is contended, indeed, that there was no probable cause to believe that the offense charged in the Washington indictment was committed within the District of Columbia, and this upon the ground that appellant was not personally present in the District at the time of the alleged offense, and that he was under no duty to make report there to the Alien Property Custodian. The commissioner, however, found as a matter of fact that the Custodian's office was in the District of Columbia, and as the finding was supported by competent evidence the District Court properly held that it was not...