Bowman v. Little

• Decision Date: 21 June 1905
• Citation: 61 A. 223,101 Md. 273
• Parties: BOWMAN v. LITTLE et al. *
• Court: Maryland Court of Appeals

61 A. 223

101 Md. 273

BOWMAN v. LITTLE et al. *

Court of Appeals of Maryland

June 21, 1905

Appeal from Circuit Court, Carroll County; Wm.H. Thomas, Judge.

Proceeding by Catharine E. Bowman against Charles A. Little and others to establish a right to a widow's share in the estate of G. Walter Bowman, deceased. From a judgment for defendants plaintiff appeals. Affirmed.

Argued before McSHERRY, C.J., and FOWLER, BRISCOE, BOYD, PEARCE, and SCHMUCKER, JJ.

J Clarence Lane and F. Neal Parke, for appellant.

A.C Strite and Chas.D. Wagaman, for appellees.

McSHERRY C.J.

G. Walter Bowman, late of Washington county, died intestate on March 4, 1903. The administrators of his personal estate filed in the orphans' court a petition asking that a day be assigned for the distribution of his assets. Due notice of this was given, and later on a person claiming that she was the widow of the deceased, to whom she asserted she had been married on July 12, 1887, at Camden, N.J., and giving her name as Catharine E. Bowman, appeared to the proceedings, and asked that the share of the estate rightfully belonging to a widow should be turned over to her. Subsequently a certain Lettie E. Bowman, also claiming to be the widow of the deceased, to whom she was married on January 18, 1900, set up a similar claim. After other proceedings were had, issues were finally framed and transmitted to the circuit court for trial. In the order sending the issues to the law court, Catharine E. Bowman was made plaintiff, and Lettie E. Bowman and the administrators were made defendants. Upon the suggestion and affidavit of the plaintiff, the record of the issues was removed to the circuit court for Carroll county, where a jury was impaneled, and the questions were tried. The issues were as follows: "(1) Was Catharine E. Bowman, at the time of the death of G. Walter Bowman, the lawful wife of G. Walter Bowman? (2) Was Lettie E. Bowman, at the time of the death of G. Walter Bowman, the lawful wife of G. Walter Bowman?" During the progress of the trial, 18 exceptions were reserved, of which 17 relate to rulings on the admissibility of evidence, and the last concerns the action of the court on the numerous prayers presented by both sides for instructions to the jury. The verdict was in favor of the defendants, or, to be more precise, the jury answered the first issue in the negative, and the second in the affirmative. From the rulings set forth in the bills of exception, the plaintiff has appealed.

It is obvious from this outline of the case that the single question before the jury was which of these two women is the lawful widow of the decedent. Around that question all the subordinate inquiries presented by the record revolve. There is not the slightest reason to doubt that Lettie E. Bowman (formerly Lettie E. Eakel) was in a formal manner married to G. Walter Bowman in January, 1900, by a regularly ordained minister of the gospel. That fact is beyond controversy. The fruit of that marriage is one child, Walter E. Bowman, who, by his guardian, is also a party to these proceedings.

At the close of the evidence the defendants, amongst other prayers, presented the following: "(1) That the verdict of the jury must be against the plaintiff upon the first issue, and their answer to said first issue must be 'No,' because the plaintiff has offered no legally sufficient evidence to prove that George Walter Bowman, referred to in the record of a marriage in Camden, N.J., offered in evidence, is the same George Walter Bowman upon whose estate letters of administration have been granted to the defendant administrators in this case. (2) That the verdict of the jury must be against the plaintiff upon the first issue, and their answer to said first issue must be 'No,' because the plaintiff has offered no legally sufficient evidence to prove that the Catharine McGranagan referred to in the record of a marriage in Camden, N.J., offered in evidence, is the same person as the plaintiff in this case." They were rejected. If they ought to have been granted, there is an end of the plaintiff's case, even though there may have been errors in other rulings found in the record. Proof of the marriage of G. Walter Bowman, the decedent, to the plaintiff at the time and place alleged by her was absolutely indispensable. No one can contravene that proposition. But what kind of evidence is necessary to establish that status or relation, and of what probative value should it be, when the consequences incident to the sustentation of the alleged marriage of July, 1887, must inevitably be the branding of the deceased with the crime of bigamy, and the bastardizing of the innocent offspring of the marriage of 1900? Let us first see what measure of evidence the law requires in such circumstances, and upon what presumptions it relies. In Taylor v. Taylor, 1 Lee, 571, 5 Eng.Ecc.Rep. 454, where two women severally claimed administration of the effects of a decedent as being his widow, which was twice before the ecclesiastical court in England, it was said there must be "strict proof" of the alleged antecedent marriage "as an actual fact." And this was cited with approval by this court in Jones v. Jones, 45 Md. 159, and in the same case, 48 Md. 398, 30 Am.Rep. 466. The reason upon which the doctrine that there must be strict proof of the first marriage rests is apparent. When the presumption of a lawful marriage is met by a counter presumption of innocence, the former must yield to the force of the latter. After it has been shown that there was an actual marriage, solemnized in the method which the law prescribes, and followed by the birth of issue, every inference is invoked in support of its validity and against an alleged antecedent marriage, because the presumptions of the law are always in favor of innocence and of legitimacy. "The law presumes morality and not immorality, marriage and not concubinage, legitimacy and not bastardy." Teter v. Teter, 101 Ind. 129, 51 Am.Rep. 742, cited in note 3, page 1202, 19 Am. & Eng.Ency.L. (2d Ed.); Rooney v. Rooney, 54 N.J.Eq. 246, 34 A. 682; Patterson v. Gainse, 6 How. 550, 12 L.Ed. 553. In King v. Inhabitants of Twyning, 2 Bar. & Ald. 386, a very strong illustration of the predominance of the presumption of innocence over other presumptions is furnished. The case involved merely the settlement of a pauper. A woman had married a soldier, who soon afterwards left for the East Indies. Within 12 months she married again, and the question turned upon the validity of the second marriage, and it was upheld. Bailey, J., said: "The facts of the case are that there is a marriage of the pauper with Francis Burns, which is prima facie valid, but the year before that took place she was the wife of Richard Winter; and, if he was alive at the time of the second marriage, it was illegal, and she was guilty of bigamy. But are we to presume that Winter was then alive? If the pauper had been indicted for bigamy, it would clearly not be sufficient. In that case Winter must have been proved to have been alive at the time of the second marriage. It is contended that his death ought to have been proved, but the answer is that the presumption of law is that he was not alive, when the consequence of his being so is that another person has committed a criminal act." This is quoted with approval and adopted in Jones v. Jones, 48 Md. 399, 30 Am.Rep. 466, and the case is cited as an authority in Le Brun v. Le Brun, 55 Md. 504. In Piers v. Piers, 2 H.L.Cas. 331, it was held that the question of the validity of a marriage cannot be tried like any other question of fact which is independent of presumptions, for the law will presume in favor of marriage, and that this presumption must be met by strong, distinct, and satisfactory disproof. It is not denied that in this country there is some conflict of decisions and of Judicial opinion on this subject, as was admitted in Jones v. Jones, 48 Md. 399; "but it cannot, we think [observed this court in that case], be said that the preponderance of authority is the other way." The law in this state is undoubtedly as the Maryland cases above cited have announced it. Now let us see whether the evidence adduced by the plaintiff measured up to these requirements, and overthrew the presumptions to which we have alluded.

The evidence admitted consists of three distinct items of proof, and that which was offered and rejected comprises two others. These will be separately dealt with. It must not be forgotten that the burden of proof is on the plaintiff to establish by "strict proof" the prior marriage as a ground for the annulment of the second one, which otherwise is confessedly valid. To discharge that burden, there were adduced a marriage certificate, the testimony of a witness to certain occurrences in Harrisburg, Pa., and the testimony of a witness as to some things which transpired in Hagerstown. As the certificate is the most important feature of the plaintiff's evidence, it will now be transcribed.

"State of New Jersey. Marriage Certificate. Full name of husband George W. Bowman. Place of residence, Haleystown, Md. (If in the city, give name and street number; if in a township, give name of county.)

"Age 25 years, months, Number of his marriage, First. Occupation Confectioner. Country of birth, U.S.A. Name of father, George R. Country of Birth, U.S.A. Full maiden name of wife, Catharine McGranagan. Country of birth, U.S.A. Place of residence, E. Harrisburg, Pa. (If in a city, give name and street number; if in a township, give name and county.) Age nearest birthday, 24. (If any trade or business, so state.) Last name, if a widow, _______. Number of bride's marriage, 1st. Name of father, John. Country of birth, U.S.A. Maiden name of mother, Sarah...