Bowman v. Parks (In re Parks' Estate)

Citation166 Iowa 403,147 N.W. 850
Decision Date22 June 1914
Docket NumberNo. 29058.,29058.
PartiesIN RE PARKS' ESTATE. BOWMAN v. PARKS (PARKS, INTERVENER).
CourtUnited States State Supreme Court of Iowa

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Appeal from District Court, Monroe County; C. W. Vermillion, Judge.

Action by the plaintiff against the administratrix of the estate of Oliver A. Parks, to recover an amount equal to the full net value of the estate over and above the claims of creditors and the costs of administration. The claim is based upon an alleged verbal contract, whereby the decedent, for a consideration, agreed to devise and bequeath to plaintiff all of his property. It is averred that the net value of the personal property is $1,440.65, and of the real estate is $1,000. The amount demanded in the petition is $2,440.65. One of the defenses pleaded by defendant is a prior adjudication in a former suit wherein the plaintiff asserted the same contract against the same defendant in her individual capacity; she being the sole heir of the decedent. The trial court sustained the plea of prior adjudication, and the plaintiff appeals. Affirmed.J. C. Mitchell, of Ottumwa, and J. R. Price, of Albia, for appellant.

Tisdale & Heindale, of Ottumwa, and Mabray & Hickenlooper, of Albia, for appellee.

EVANS, J.

[1] The decedent, Oliver A. Parks, died unmarried and intestate, and leaving no issue. He was survived by his mother, Millie Jane Parks, as his sole heir. She was duly appointed administratrix of his estate. He left personal property of the net value of $1,440.65 over and above all debts and charges, and real estate of the value of $1,000. Prior to the filing of this claim in probate, or the beginning of this action, the plaintiff instituted a suit against Mrs. Parks, the mother, in her individual capacity, to recover the real estate left by the decedent. That suit resulted in a decree adverse to the plaintiff, wherein it was held that she had failed to establish her alleged contract. Her petition was accordingly dismissed on the merits. Her claim for the personal property was not litigated in that suit. The alleged verbal contract presented in the former suit by the plaintiff as the basis of her cause of action was the same contract as is now presented in support of the present claim. In the former suit, the defendant was not a party in her capacity as administratrix but was a party in her individual capacity only. In the present suit she was made defendant in her capacity as administratrix only. As such defendant, in such capacity, she pleaded the former adjudication as a bar. She also intervened as a defendant in her individual capacity and as the sole beneficiary of the estate and pleaded such former adjudication as a bar.

The argument for appellant is that the former adjudication was not a bar for the reason: (1) That the former suit was not against the same defendant in that it was not against Mrs. Parks in her capacity as administratrix; and (2) because the former suit involved the real estate only and none of the personal property.

It may be conceded that theoretically the former suit against Mrs. Parks individually was not against the same defendant as is the present suit against her as administratrix of an estate. Under the facts of this case, however, such theoretical distinction loses its application and is without practical value to the appellant. As administratrix, she is representative of all the beneficiary interests of the estate. If there were any persons beneficially interested in such estate other than herself individually, a somewhat...

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