Bown v. Gwinnett County School Dist.

Decision Date31 July 1995
Docket NumberCiv. A. No. 1:94-CV-2224-FMH.
PartiesBrian Gillespie BOWN, Plaintiff, v. GWINNETT COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT; George G. Thompson, in his official capacity as Superintendent and in his individual capacity; Zell Miller, in his official capacity as Governor of the State of Georgia; and Michael Bowers, in his official capacity as Attorney General of the State of Georgia, Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — Northern District of Georgia

Bruce S. Harvey, W. Sander Callahan, Steven Keith Leibel, David C. Ates, Atlanta, GA, for plaintiff.

E.L. Victoria Sweeny, Paul Eric Andrew, Jorgia C. Northrup, Lawrenceville, GA, Phillip L. Hartley, Martha M. Pearson, Gainesville, GA, for defendants.

ORDER

HULL, District Judge.

This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff's challenge to the constitutionality of Georgia's Moment of Quiet Reflection in Schools Act ("the Act"), Act No. 770, 1994 Ga.Laws 256 (1994) (codified at O.C.G.A. § 20-2-1050 (Supp.1995)). Plaintiff Brian Gillespie Bown ("Bown"), a school teacher at South Gwinnett High School, filed this declaratory judgment action seeking a declaration that the Act is unconstitutional in its entirety and requesting the Court to enjoin its enforcement.

At the beginning of the school day on August 22, 1994, the Principal of South Gwinnett High School announced over the intercom: "As we begin another school day, let us take a few moments to reflect quietly on our day, our activities and what we hope to accomplish." Plaintiff's deposition ("Plaintiff's dep.") at 239; Exhibit C to Plaintiff's Brief. At the conclusion of the announcement, Plaintiff Bown advised his class: "You may do as you wish. That's your option. But I am going to continue with my lesson." Plaintiff's dep. at 239. Plaintiff Bown continued to talk through the moment of silence.

The Principal gave Plaintiff Bown overnight to reconsider his position and to advise if he could be silent during the moment of silence. The next day on August 23, 1994, Plaintiff Bown told the Principal "the answer is no," and left the school. Plaintiff's dep. at 284. Later that day, Plaintiff Bown was suspended with pay.

The next day on August 24, 1994, Plaintiff Bown filed a Complaint in this Court, claiming that he was terminated from employment without procedural due process. Plaintiff Bown requested reinstatement to his position as a teacher in the Gwinnett County School System, and sought relief from compliance with Georgia's Moment of Quiet Reflection in Schools Act. After a hearing on August 26, 1994, this Court denied preliminary injunctive relief and Plaintiff's request for reinstatement, finding that Plaintiff had not been terminated, but given only notice of a termination hearing in September, 1994, and that Plaintiff had failed to demonstrate a substantial likelihood of success on the merits of his claim. See Aug. 26, 1994 Order 5-1. Subsequently, Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint and a Second Amended Complaint adding claims for declaratory and injunctive relief and specifically requesting this Court to declare the Act unconstitutional and to enjoin its enforcement.

All parties expedited discovery regarding the constitutionality of the Act and filed various depositions, affidavits, transcripts, and briefs. Plaintiff Bown requested the Court to declare the Act unconstitutional and enjoin its enforcement. The American Civil Liberties Union filed an amicus brief in support of Plaintiff's request.

In addition, Defendants Zell Miller, in his official capacity as Governor of the State of Georgia, and Michael Bowers, in his official capacity as Attorney General (the "State Defendants"), filed a Motion to Dismiss or, in the alternative, a Motion for Summary Judgment contending that the Act is constitutional and that the Governor and Attorney General should be dismissed from this action. Defendants Gwinnett County School District and Superintendent Thompson also filed a brief asserting that the Act is constitutional.

On February 27, 1995, this Court held a final evidentiary hearing on the issue of the constitutionality of the Act. All parties stipulate that the record is complete as to the constitutional issue and that the Court may issue final judgment on Plaintiff Bown's request for declaratory and injunctive relief regarding the constitutionality of the Act.1

I. FINDINGS OF FACT
A. Legislative History of Georgia's Moment of Quiet Reflection in Schools Act in 1994

The 1994 Georgia General Assembly passed the Moment of Quiet Reflection in Schools Act. O.C.G.A. § 20-2-1050 (Supp. 1995). The Act provides for a brief period of quiet reflection for not more than 60 seconds at the beginning of every school day. This 1994 Act repealed the prior statute,2 enacted in 1969. The 1994 Act, as codified, provides as follows:

(a) In each public school classroom, the teacher in charge shall, at the opening of school upon every school day, conduct a brief period of quiet reflection for not more than 60 seconds with the participation of all the pupils therein assembled.
(b) The moment of quiet reflection authorized by subsection (a) of this Code section is not intended to be and shall not be conducted as a religious service or exercise but shall be considered as an opportunity for a moment of silent reflection on the anticipated activities of the day.
(c) The provisions of subsections (a) and (b) of this Code section shall not prevent student initiated voluntary school prayers at schools or school related events which are nonsectarian and nonproselytizing in nature.

O.C.G.A. § 20-2-1050 (Supp.1995).

The preamble in Section 1 of the 1994 Act explains a secular purpose for the Act, as follows:

The General Assembly finds that in today's hectic society, all too few of our citizens are able to experience even a moment of quiet reflection before plunging headlong into the day's activities. Our young citizens are particularly affected by this absence of an opportunity for a moment of quiet reflection. The General Assembly finds that our young, and society as a whole, would be well served if students were afforded a moment of quiet reflection at the beginning of each day in the public schools.

Moment of Quiet Reflection in Schools Act, Act No. 770, § 1, 1994 Ga.Laws 256, 256 (1994). Section 2 of the Act contains subsections (a) and (b), while Section 3 contains subsection (c). Id., §§ 2, 3, 1994 Ga.Laws at 256-57. In addition, the Act contains a severability provision in Section 4, and a standard repealer provision in Section 5. Id., §§ 4, 5, 1994 Ga.Laws at 256-57.

On January 11, 1994, Georgia State Senators David Scott, Walter Ray and Charles Clay introduced the Act as Senate Bill 396. The principal sponsor of the Act, however, was Senator David Scott, a State Senator for twelve years representing an urban district in Atlanta, Georgia. Senator Scott previously had served eight years in the Georgia House of Representatives. At his deposition, Senator Scott testified that he had served as Chairman of the Senate Education Committee, Chairman of the Youth, Aging and Human Ecology Committee, and member of the State Violence Task Force Committee to prevent violence in schools. In those capacities, Senator Scott had observed that after a series of killings on school campuses, students often came together to have a moment of quiet reflection. Senator Scott testified to his belief that if a moment of internal reflection is of value after a death, then it surely would be beneficial at the beginning of each school day, as follows:

This was an effort from an individual out here who sees the dying and the killing everyday with young people. Where guns and violence now are the leading cause of death. Children killing children. And particularly with African-American youngsters now, teenagers, the leading cause of death.
My own feeling is that by having that moment of quiet reflection at the beginning of the day will provide our youngsters with an opportunity to connect with what I say is their inner self, that inner guidance, that compass that is within us all.

Scott deposition ("Scott dep.") at 16.

Senator Scott also testified that the Act was "not an effort to bring prayer back into the schools," but "was one of three bills I introduced to deal with the violence among our young people."3 Scott dep. at 16-17, 28, 31. Senator Scott had a secular purpose in mind when he introduced the legislation and did not intend for prayer to be reintroduced to public school classrooms during the moment of silence. Instead, Senator Scott envisioned this period of time as a bridge between the school environment and the considerable chaos in the lives of the many students who arrive at school each day unprepared to concentrate in the structured classroom setting. Scott explained his concern about the violent environment with which many students must contend before coming to school. His proposed moment of silence was a part of his overall legislative strategy to combat juvenile violence.

Senator Scott met with legislative counsel and specifically attempted to make sure that his Senate Bill 396 did not bring prayer into the schools but that it provided only a moment of silence and complied with Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 91 S.Ct. 2105, 29 L.Ed.2d 745 (1971), and Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 105 S.Ct. 2479, 86 L.Ed.2d 29 (1985). Scott dep. at 27-28, 36-37, 42, 68-70. Senator Scott concluded that the purpose of his moment of silence bill was to give the students "a moment of silence of up to 60 seconds at the beginning of each school day for that individual student to use as he or she sees fit, and they are free to do so." Id. at 71.

The legislative history reveals that the Act was introduced first as Senate Bill 396. As originally introduced, Senate Bill 396 contained a preamble and subsections (a) and (b) in the same form as they presently appear in the Act. The Senate passed Senate Bill 396 by a vote of 51 to 2. There...

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1 cases
  • Chandler v. James
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Middle District of Alabama
    • March 12, 1997
    ...defendant, to be relevant to the question of legislative purpose. 23. The instant case is distinguishable from Bown v. Gwinnett County Sch. Dist., 895 F.Supp. 1564 (N.D.Ga.1995), where the court found that a statute which provided for a moment of silence at the beginning of the school day, ......

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