Bowsher v. Synar United States Senate v. Synar Neill v. Synar 85 1379, No. 85-1377

CourtUnited States Supreme Court
Writing for the CourtBURGER, C.J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BRENNAN, POWELL, REHNQUIST, and O'CONNOR, JJ., joined. STEVENS, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which MARSHALL
Citation92 L.Ed.2d 583,106 S.Ct. 3181,478 U.S. 714
Decision Date07 July 1986
Docket NumberNo. 85-1377
PartiesCharles A. BOWSHER, Comptroller General of the United States, Appellant, v. Mike SYNAR, Member of Congress, et al. UNITED STATES SENATE, Appellant, v. Mike SYNAR, Member of Congress, et al. Thomas P. O'NEILL, Jr., Speaker of the United States House of Representatives, et al., Appellants, v. Mike SYNAR, Member of Congress, et al. to 85-1379

478 U.S. 714
106 S.Ct. 3181
92 L.Ed.2d 583
Charles A. BOWSHER, Comptroller General of the United States, Appellant,

v.

Mike SYNAR, Member of Congress, et al. UNITED STATES SENATE, Appellant, v. Mike SYNAR, Member of Congress, et al. Thomas P. O'NEILL, Jr., Speaker of the United States House of Representatives, et al., Appellants, v. Mike SYNAR, Member of Congress, et al.

No. 85-1377 to 85-1379.
Argued April 23, 1986.
Decided July 7, 1986.
Syllabus

In order to eliminate the federal budget deficit, Congress enacted the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985 (Act), popularly known as the "Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act," which sets a maximum deficit amount for federal spending for each of the fiscal years 1986 through 1991 (progressively reducing the deficit amount to zero in 1991). If in any fiscal year the budget deficit exceeds the prescribed maximum by more than a specified sum, the Act requires basically across-the-board cuts in federal spending to reach the targeted deficit level. These reductions are accomplished under the "reporting provisions" spelled out in § 251 of the Act, which requires the Directors of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) to submit their deficit estimates and program-by-program budget reduction calculations to the Comptroller General who, after reviewing the Directors' joint report, then reports his conclusions to the President. The President in turn must issue a "sequestration" order mandating the spending reductions specified by the Comptroller General, and the sequestration order becomes effective unless, within a specified time, Congress legislates reductions to obviate the need for the sequestration order. The Act also contains in § 274(f) a "fallback" deficit reduction process (eliminating the Comptroller General's participation) to take effect if § 251's reporting provisions are invalidated. In consolidated actions in the Federal District Court, individual Congressmen and the National Treasury Employees Union (Union) (who, along with one of the Union's members, are appellees here) challenged the Act's constitutionality. The court held, inter alia, that the Comptroller General's role in exercising executive functions under the Act's deficit reduction process violated the constitutionally imposed doctrine of separation of powers because the Comptroller General is removable only by a congressional

Page 715

joint resolution or by impeachment, and Congress may not retain the power of removal over an officer performing executive powers.

Held:

1. The fact that members of the Union, one of whom is an appellee here, will sustain injury because the Act suspends certain scheduled cost-of-living benefit increases to the members, is sufficient to create standing under a provision of the Act and Article III to challenge the Act's constitutionality. Therefore, the standing issue as to the Union itself or Members of Congress need not be considered. Pp. 721.

2. The powers vested in the Comptroller General under § 251 violate the Constitution's command that Congress play no direct role in the execution of the laws. Pp. 721-734.

(a) Under the constitutional principle of separation of powers, Congress cannot reserve for itself the power of removal of an officer charged with the execution of the laws except by impeachment. To permit the execution of the laws to be vested in an officer answerable only to Congress would, in practical terms, reserve in Congress control of the execution of the laws. The structure of the Constitution does not permit Congress to execute the laws; it follows that Congress cannot grant to an officer under its control what it does not possess. Cf. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919. Pp. 721-727.

(b) There is no merit to the contention that the Comptroller General performs his duties independently and is not subservient to Congress. Although nominated by the President and confirmed by the Senate, the Comptroller General is removable only at the initiative of Congress. Under controlling statutes, he may be removed not only by impeachment but also by joint resolution of Congress "at any time" for specified causes, including "inefficiency," "neglect of duty," and "malfeasance." The quoted terms, as interpreted by Congress, could sustain removal of a Comptroller General for any number of actual or perceived transgressions of the legislative will. Moreover, the political realities do not reveal that the Comptroller General is free from Congress' influence. He heads the General Accounting Office, which under pertinent statutes is "an instrumentality of the United States Government independent of the executive departments," and Congress has consistently viewed the Comptroller General as an officer of the Legislative Branch. Over the years, the Comptrollers General have also viewed themselves as part of the Legislative Branch. Thus, because Congress has retained removal authority over the Comptroller General, he may not be entrusted with executive powers. Pp. 727-732.

(c) Under § 251 of the Act, the Comptroller General has been improperly assigned executive powers. Although he is to have "due regard" for the estimates and reductions contained in the joint report of

Page 716

the Directors of the CBO and the OMB, the Act clearly contemplates that in preparing his report the Comptroller General will exercise his independent judgment and evaluation with respect to those estimates and will make decisions of the kind that are made by officers charged with executing a statute. The Act's provisions give him, not the President, the ultimate authority in determining what budget cuts are to be made. By placing the responsibility for execution of the Act in the hands of an officer who is subject to removal only by itself, Congress in effect has retained control over the Act's execution and has unconstitutionally intruded into the executive function. Pp. 732-735.

3. It is not necessary to consider whether the appropriate remedy is to nullify the 1921 statutory provisions that authorize Congress to remove the Comptroller General, rather than to invalidate § 251 of the Act. In § 274(f), Congress has explicitly provided "fallback" provisions that take effect if any of the reporting procedures described in § 251 are invalidated. Assuming that the question of the appropriate remedy must be resolved on the basis of congressional intent, the intent appears to have been for § 274(f) to be given effect as written. Pp. 734-736.

626 F.Supp. 1374, affirmed.

BURGER, C.J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BRENNAN, POWELL, REHNQUIST, and O'CONNOR, JJ., joined. STEVENS, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which MARSHALL, J., joined, post, p. 736. WHITE, J., post, p. 759, and BLACKMUN, J., post, p. 776 filed dissenting opinions.

Lloyd N. Cutler, Washington , D.C., for appellant.

Comptroller Gen. by Mr. Steven R. Ross, Washington, D.C., for appellants, O'Neill, et al.

Michael Davidson, Washington, D.C., for appellant, U.S. Senate.

Sol. Gen. Charles Fried, for appellee, U.S.

Alan B. Morrison, Washington, D.C., for appellees, Synar, et al.

Lois G. Williams, Washington, D.C.,

Page 717

for appellees, Nat. Treasury Employees, et al.

Chief Justice BURGER delivered the opinion of the Court.

The question presented by these appeals is whether the assignment by Congress to the Comptroller General of the United States of certain functions under the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985 violates the doctrine of separation of powers.

I
A.

On December 12, 1985, the President signed into law the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, Pub.L. 99-177, 99 Stat. 1038, 2 U.S.C. § 901 et seq. (1982 ed., Supp. III), popularly known as the "Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act." The purpose of the Act is to eliminate the federal budget deficit. To that end, the Act sets a "maximum deficit amount" for federal spending for each of fiscal years 1986 through 1991. The size of that maximum deficit amount progressively reduces to zero in fiscal year 1991. If in any fiscal year the federal budget deficit exceeds the maxi-

Page 718

mum deficit amount by more than a specified sum, the Act requires across-the-board cuts in federal spending to reach the targeted deficit level, with half of the cuts made to defense programs and the other half made to nondefense programs. The Act exempts certain priority programs from these cuts. § 255.

These "automatic" reductions are accomplished through a rather complicated procedure, spelled out in § 251, the so-called "reporting provisions" of the Act. Each year, the Directors of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) independently estimate the amount of the federal budget deficit for the upcoming fiscal year. If that deficit exceeds the maximum targeted deficit amount for that fiscal year by more than a specified amount, the Directors of OMB and CBO independently calculate, on a program-by-program basis, the budget reductions necessary to ensure that the deficit does not exceed the maximum deficit amount. The Act then requires the Directors to report jointly their deficit estimates and budget reduction calculations to the Comptroller General.

The Comptroller General, after reviewing the Directors' reports, then reports his conclusions to the President. § 251(b). The President in turn must issue a "sequestration" order mandating the spending reductions specified by the Comptroller General. § 252. There follows a period during which Congress may by legislation reduce spending to obviate, in whole or in part, the need for the sequestration order. If such reductions are not enacted, the sequestration order becomes effective and the spending reductions included in that order are made.

Anticipating constitutional challenge to these procedures, the Act also contains a "fallback" deficit...

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629 practice notes
  • General Accounting Office; Department of Justice; Department of Treasury,
    • United States
    • Federal Register November 22, 2000
    • November 22, 2000
    ...and related issues, they are not binding upon departments, agencies, or officers of the executive branch. See e.g., Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 727-32 NPRM Sec. 904.3--Preservation of Evidence NPRM Sec. 904.3 requires agencies to provide original documents immediately upon request by DO......
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    • United States
    • United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (6th Circuit)
    • January 14, 2010
    ...v. Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 52 n. 2, 126 S.Ct. 1297, 164 L.Ed.2d 156 (2006); Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 721, 106 S.Ct. 3181, 92 L.Ed.2d 583 (1986). In order to demonstrate Article III standing, a plaintiff "must show that (1) he or she has suffere......
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    • United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (6th Circuit)
    • August 21, 2019
    ...to "thousands ... in the 50 States," who "are left to implement the program without meaningful Presidential control"); Bowsher v. Synar , 478 U.S. 714, 726, 106 S.Ct. 3181, 92 L.Ed.2d 583 (1986) (holding that Congress cannot reserve unto itself "control over the execution of the laws" becau......
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