Boxley v. State
| Decision Date | 08 October 2015 |
| Docket Number | No. 49A02–1503–CR–171.,49A02–1503–CR–171. |
| Citation | 40 N.E.3d 1283 (Table) |
| Parties | Cortez BOXLEY, Appellant–Defendant v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee–Plaintiff. |
| Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
Patricia Caress McMath, Marion County Public Defender, Indianapolis, IN, Attorney for Appellant.
Gregory F. Zoeller, Attorney General of Indiana, Katherine Modesitt Cooper, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Appellee.
BARTEAU
, Senior Judge.
[1] Cortez Boxley appeals from his conviction after a bench trial of one count of attempted residential entry1 charged as a Level 6 felony. We reverse and remand for a new trial.
[2] Boxley presents the following dispositive issue for our review: whether the trial court erred by failing to consider Boxley's mistake-of-fact defense believing that residential entry was a strict liability offense for which there is no specific intent required.
[3] On November 5, 2014, at approximately 6:00 p.m., Laura Peak and her ten-year-old daughter were inside the living room of their townhouse in the Churchill Ranch Apartment complex in Marion County. They heard someone jiggling the doorknob in an attempt to enter the front door. Peak opened the front door because she guessed there might be children playing outside her door. However, when she opened the front door, she encountered Boxley, a man she did not know.
[4] When Boxley placed his foot inside Peak's doorway, she yelled at him, asked him what he was doing, pushed him out of the doorway, and closed and locked the front door. Peak immediately dialed 911. Boxley remained outside Peak's door jiggling the doorknob while Peak and her daughter retreated upstairs. Peak was frightened by Boxley's actions, called 911 a second time, and asked the police officers to hurry.
[5] Officer John Clark of the Lawrence Police Department responded to the dispatch and observed Boxley, who was bent over at Peak's door “trying to mess with the door handle.” Tr. p. 28. Officer Clark ordered Boxley to step away from the door, but Boxley did not respond to that command. Officer Clark thought he observed Boxley attempt to insert a key into the lock of the front door. Officer Clark informed Boxley several times that if he did not step away from the front door, the officer would use a taser. Officer Clark repeated his command several more times to no avail. Instead, Boxley continued to try to get in the front door. In the end, Officer Clark used his taser thereby allowing another officer to handcuff Boxley. Officer Clark observed that Boxley seemed “completely out of it” and “appeared to be on something.” Id. at 32. Officer Clark called the medics for assistance.
[6] As a result of those events, the State charged Boxley with attempted residential entry. The charging information stated as follows:
On or about November 5, 2014, [Boxley] did attempt to commit the crime of Residential Entry, by engaging in conduct which constitutes a substantial step toward the commission of said crime of Residential Entry, that is: pushed the door open and attempted to push his way past Laura Peak when she cracked the door open.
Appellant's Appendix p. 15. At trial, Boxley testified that his sister lived in a townhouse in the same apartment complex. He had a key to her townhouse which he had been to multiple times. Boxley testified that earlier on that date he had smoked a cigarette that contained embalming fluid and “hit the drink one time, a couple of times.” Tr. pp. 35–36. He claimed that the only thing he could remember was bending down to the door with the key. He did not recall talking to Peak and stated he “was at the wrong address, the wrong door.” Id. at 38.
[7] During closing argument, Boxley's counsel argued that Boxley was “in a blackout state” and did not see Peak or anything else when she opened the door. Id. at 42. While conceding that intoxication was not a valid defense to the charged crime, Boxley's counsel argued as follows:
I do believe that [Boxley's] intoxication led him to make a mistake about where he was. [Boxley] did not intend to enter Ms. Peak's address. He was intending to go to his sister's house who [sic] lived in a townhouse in the same apartment complex. Anybody who has ever been to an apartment complex knows that everything looks the same. And if you are in some state of intoxication—you know, there are jokes about that all the time. There have commercials about people who live in those cookie cutter neighborhoods and, you know, you have a drink and you go home and you can't find your house.
Id. at 43. Boxley's counsel explained that Id. at 44. The State argued that Boxley admitted he put himself in an intoxicated state and, therefore, could not use the mistake-of-fact defense to negate his culpability for the crime.
[8] The trial court stated the following:
With all of that said, I will say that misapprehension of one's circumstances is not a defense and intoxication as is set forth by both the case law as well [as] the statute is also not a defense. Certainly it might be considered [a] mitigating circumstances [sic] if this was, say, the first time the gentleman had ever engaged in smoking—I can't even believe I'm saying this—embalming fluid, but it is, in fact, not a defense.
Tr. p. 45. The trial court then found Boxley guilty of attempted residential entry as a Level 6 felony. The abstract of judgment states under the crime charged “35–43–2–1.5/F6: Residential Entry break and enter dwelling NOTE—this does not require any intent.” Appellant's Appendix p. 12. Boxley now appeals.
[9] Boxley challenges his conviction for attempted residential entry, contending that the trial court erred by failing to consider his mistake-of-fact defense.
[10] In order to establish that Boxley committed the offense of attempted residential entry, the State was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Boxley knowingly or intentionally broke and entered Peak's townhome. Ind.Code § 35–43–2–1.5
. Because the crime was charged as an attempt, the State was required to prove that Boxley acted with the culpability required for the commission of the crime and engaged in conduct constituting a substantial step toward the commission of that crime. Ind.Code § 35–41–5–1. In addition, breaking is established by showing that even slight force was used to gain unauthorized entry. Carson v. State, ...
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