Boyce v. Alizaduh

• Decision Date: 02 April 1979
• Docket Number: No. 77-2242,77-2242
• Citation: Boyce v. Alizaduh, 595 F.2d 948 (4th Cir. 1979)
• Parties: James A. BOYCE, Appellant, v. Dr. ALIZADUH, and his Insurance Company, c/o Washington County Detention Center, Hagerstown, Md. and "Dick" Ford, Sheriff, Washington County, Maryland, Hagerstown, Md. 21740 and Carl Frick, Director, Washington County Detention Center, Hagerstown, Md. and Spurrier, U. S. Marshall for the District of Maryland and Dr. Kolakowski, USPHS Hospital, Baltimore, Maryland, Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fourth Circuit

Page 948

595 F.2d 948

James A. BOYCE, Appellant, v.Dr. ALIZADUH, and his Insurance Company, c/o Washington County Detention Center, Hagerstown, Md. and "Dick" FordSheriff, Washington County, Maryland, Hagerstown, Md. 21740 and Carl Frick, Director, Washington County Detention Center, Hagerstown, Md. and Spurrier, U. S. Marshall for the District of Maryland and Dr. Kolakowski, USPHS Hospital Baltimore, Maryland, Appellees.

No. 77-2242.

United States Court of Appeals Fourth Circuit.

Argued Jan. 8, 1979.

Decided April 2, 1979.

Jerrold B. Pinsker, Rockville, Md., for appellant.

Michael A. Anselmi, Asst. Atty. Gen., Baltimore, Md. (Francis B. Burch, Atty. Gen. of Md., Clarence W. Sharp, Asst. Atty. Gen., Chief, Crim. Div., Baltimore, Md., on brief), for appellees.

Before BUTZNER and RUSSELL, Circuit Judges, and FIELD, Senior Circuit Judge.

DONALD RUSSELL, Circuit Judge:

The plaintiff, a federal prisoner, incarcerated in a State Detention Center, has filed Pro se a § 1983,42 U.S.C. action, charging a constitutional violation of his right to medical attention and care.He accompanied his complaint with a motion for leave to proceed in Forma pauperis.The district court permitted the docketing of the action but later dismissed the complaint without the issuance of a summons, ruling that "it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim that would entitle him to relief."The plaintiff has appealed that dismissal.

The district court rested its authority to dismiss on § 1915(d).¹The exercise of this statutory authority as a basis for dismissal of an action, particularly in connection with a Forma pauperis suit by prison inmates, has long been approved in this Circuit.Graham v. Riddle(4th Cir.1977)554 F.2d 133, 134-5;Caviness v. Somers(4th Cir.1956)235 F.2d 455, 456;Fletcher v. Young(4th Cir.1955)222 F.2d 222, 224, Cert. denied 350 U.S. 916, 76 S.Ct. 201, 100 L.Ed. 802;Mann v. Leeke(D.S.C.1974)73 F.R.D. 264, 265, Aff'd.551 F.2d 307;Hawkins v. Elliott(D.S.C.1974)385 F.Supp. 354, 357;Spears v. United States(S.D.W.Va.1967)266 F.Supp. 22, 25;Farley v. Skeen(N.D.W.Va.1953)113 F.Supp. 736, 737, appeal dismissed for want of exhaustion of state remedies, with the statement that "(w)e would * * * affirm the decision below if the case were properly before us."208 F.2d 791, 792.The procedure to be followed in its exercise was outlined in the first case in this circuit to consider the question:

"Where a petition for habeas corpus by a poor person is meritless, the court may permit the filing of such petition and then dismiss it as frivolous, and in a patently frivolous proceeding respondent will not be called upon to make a return or answer."113 F.Supp. at 737.

The two-step procedure followed in Skeen, whereby the district court determines whether the plaintiff qualifies by economic status under § 1915(a), and then, after allowing the complaint to be docketed upon a finding of economic justification, proceeds to the next step of determining whether the action stated in the complaint is "frivolous or malicious" within § 1915(d) before permitting the issuance of process, is the very procedure followed by the district court in this case and is the very procedure recommended by Judge Aldisert's committee in its "Recommended Procedures For Handling Prisoner Civil Rights Cases In the Federal Courts "(Federal Judicial Center, Tentative ReportNo. 2, 1977).This is, also, the procedure followed in the district court in Gamble v. Estelle(5th Cir.1977)554 F.2d 653(on remand from the Supreme Court, 429 U.S. 97, 97 S.Ct. 285, 50 L.Ed.2d 251), Cert. denied 434 U.S. 974, ²98 S.Ct. 530, 54 L.Ed.2d 465.

In its Report, Judge Aldisert's committee declared:

"Some courts have blurred the distinction between § 1915(a)and§ 1915(d) by approving the practice of denying leave to proceed in forma pauperis on the ground that the complaint is frivolous or malicious.The practice observed by most courts is to consider only the petitioner's economic status in making the decision whether to grant leave to proceed in forma pauperis.Once leave has been granted, the complaint should be filed and the court should consider whether to dismiss pursuant to § 1915(d).See commentary following standard D, Infra."³

The language of the commentary following Standard D is:⁴

"The committee recommends that the decision whether to dismiss pursuant to § 1915(d) be made prior to the issuance of process.In this way the defendant will be spared the expense and inconvenience of answering a frivolous complaint.

"The committee recommends dismissal with no opportunity to respond when the complaint is irreparably frivolous or malicious.If the defect in the complaint is reparable, the court should issue an order to show cause, permitting the plaintiff to respond and to amend.If there are multiple defendants, the complaint should be dismissed as to those defendants against whom a frivolous or malicious cause of action is alleged and should be allowed to continue against the other defendants.In borderline cases, the court should not dismiss, but should let the case proceed and rule on a subsequent motion to dismiss if one is presented."⁵

Turning from the procedure to be used under § 1915(d) to the substantive question of when the power thereby given is to be exercised, many decisions have declared that the exercise of that authority is discretionary and that the discretion is "especially broad" in civil rights actions brought by prisoners.Flowers v. Turbine Support Division(5th Cir.1975)507 F.2d 1242, 1244;Diamond v. Pitchess(9th Cir.1969)411 F.2d 565, 566;Shobe v. California(9th Cir.1966)362 F.2d 545, 546, Cert. denied 385 U.S. 887, 87 S.Ct. 185, 17 L.Ed.2d 115;Boston v. Stanton(W.D.Mo.1978)450 F.Supp. 1049, 1053-4;Ramsey v. United States(N.D.Ill.1978)448 F.Supp. 1264, 1275-6;Jones v. Bales(N.D.Ga.1972)58 F.R.D. 453, 463-4, Aff'd.480 F.2d 805(5th Cir.).⁶But however broad the discretion may be, it may not be exercised arbitrarily and is limited in a Pro se case, such as here, by the rule in Haines v. Kerner(1972)404 U.S. 519, 92 S.Ct. 594, 30 L.Ed.2d 652 and in every case by the language of the statute itself which restricts its application to complaints found to be "frivolous or malicious."⁷There is, it will be noted, little practical difference between the Haines rule and the definition to be given "frivolous" under the statute.The rule in Haines as reaffirmed in Estelle v. Gamble(1976)429 U.S. 97, 106, 97 S.Ct. 285, 292, 50 L.Ed.2d 251, is that "a Pro se complaint, 'however inartfully pleaded,' must be held to 'less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers' and can only be dismissed for failure to state a claim if it appears 'beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.' "Frivolousness of a complaint under § 1915(d) has been defined in largely those same terms.Thus, Judge Bell in Watson v. Ault(5th Cir.1976)525 F.2d 886, 892, defined frivolity under the statute:

"The test of frivolity in the context of Section 1915(d) in the trial court, has not been defined.In Anders v. California, 1967, 386 U.S. 738, 744, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493, 498, the Supreme Court in a criminal case defined a frivolous appeal as being one without arguable merit.In our view this same test or standard should be applied in the trial court but in terms of the arguable substance of the claim presented, both in law and in fact."⁸

To satisfy the test of frivolousness under § 1915(d), it is accordingly essential for the district court to find "beyond doubt" and under any "arguable" construction, "both in law and in fact" of the substance of the plaintiff's claim that he would not be entitled to relief.Conley v. Gibson(1957)355 U.S. 41, 45-6, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80;Watson v. Ault, supra525 F.2d at 892.And a dismissal under such standard is appealable.Roberts v. U. S. District Court(1950)339 U.S. 844, 845, 70 S.Ct. 954, 94 L.Ed. 1326;Flowers v. Turbine Support Division, supra, 507 F.2d at 1244;Foster v. United States(6th Cir.1965)344 F.2d 698, 700.In resolving this appeal and in determining whether the district court abused its discretion in dismissing the action against all defendants, we must thus apply the standard of frivolousness and want of arguable merit declared in Haines and Watson to the facts, liberally construed, as set forth in the plaintiff's discursive complaint.

The plaintiff alleges in his complaint that he developed an infection in both ears while incarcerated in Washington County Detention Center, Hagerstown, Maryland, as a prisoner.He had had such an infection on at least three occasions prior to his incarceration and had been successfully treated for it.When he reported his infection to the prison authorities on this particular occasion, he was directed to the prison physician, the defendant Alizaduh, for medical attention.When seen by Dr. Alizaduh, the plaintiff told the doctor of his previous successful treatment of the condition.This prior treatment consisted, according to him, of a "white kind of Kenalog Cream and Timmeral tablets for the itching" and some "little white pills called steriods or something like that."He, also, identified certain drugs to which he was supposed to be allergic.He specifically identified "Keeplex" and certain "Otic drop solutions" as such drugs.

Despite what may be considered, under a liberal construction of the pleadings, plaintiff's warning that "Otic drop solutions" might produce an allergic reaction from such treatment, Dr. Alizaduh proceeded to prescribe for his condition "Neo-Decadron Otic drops."The result, plaintiff alleges, was a serious aggravation of the infection.At this point, the plaintiff referred Dr. Alizaduh to his prior medical records and the drugs which were used in his...