Boyce v. Moore

• Decision Date: 27 December 2002
• Docket Number: No. 01-2809.,01-2809.
• Citation: 314 F.3d 884
• Parties: Chester BOYCE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Lieutenant MOORE, Division 1, Stanley Serwinsky, Executive Director of Cook County Department of Corrections, Jeffrey Malek, Division 1, et al., Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit

314 F.3d 884

Chester BOYCE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Lieutenant MOORE, Division 1, Stanley Serwinsky, Executive Director of Cook County Department of Corrections, Jeffrey Malek, Division 1, et al., Defendants-Appellees.

No. 01-2809.

United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.

Argued October 15, 2002.

Decided December 27, 2002.

Appeal from the Northern District of Illinois, Sidney I. Schenkier.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Todd G. Smith (argued), Lafollette, Godfrey & Kahn, Madison, WI, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Patrick S. Smith (argued), William B. Oberts, Office of the State's Attorney of Cook County, Chicago, IL, for Defendant-Appellee.

Before POSNER, RIPPLE and KANNE, Circuit Judges.

RIPPLE, Circuit Judge.

Chester Boyce, a prisoner incarcerated at the Cook County Department of Corrections ("CCDOC"), filed a pro se complaint against Lieutenants Jeffrey Malek and Leroy Moore, as well as the Executive Director of CCDOC ("Executive Director") and other individuals. Proceeding under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Mr. Boyce alleged that the defendants violated his Eighth Amendment rights by failing to take action to protect him from attacks by fellow inmates and by refusing to provide medical care. After the completion of discovery, the district court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment on all claims. For the reasons set forth in the following opinion, we affirm the judgment of the district court.

I BACKGROUND

A. Facts

Mr. Boyce was incarcerated in Division 1, Tier C-4, of CCDOC from February 1993 to June 8, 1994, and in Division 1, Tier H-1, from June 8, 1994 to June 30, 1994. Lieutenants Moore and Malek were co-supervisors in Division 1 of CCDOC during 1994; Lieutenant Moore was the senior supervisor. In June 1994, there were three different shifts in Division 1, Tier C-4. Prisoners could make complaints to any officer on these different shifts. Complaints could also be made to clergy and paramedics, who visited the tiers on a regular basis, and to social workers, who visited the tiers by request. In June 1994, there was no protective custody in Division 1.

Reading the record in the light most favorable to Mr. Boyce, on June 1, 1994, he was attacked and beaten by other inmates for ten to fifteen minutes upon returning to his cell. The attackers threatened to kill Mr. Boyce if he reported the attack to officials. As a result of the attack, Mr. Boyce's eyes became swollen, and he bled from his left eye and his mouth. Mr. Boyce does not know the identity of the attackers, nor does he know the reason for the attack. Mr. Boyce did not file a grievance with the officer on duty when he made his check, and there is no mention of the incident in the Tier C-4 logbook for that day.

Although Mr. Boyce noticed that, after the attack, his eyes were growing gradually weaker, he did not seek medical attention between June 1 and June 7, 1994. On June 3, 1994, Officer Brown approached Mr. Boyce and inquired about his condition; Mr. Boyce responded that there was no problem. The logbook contains an entry on June 3, 1994, stating "Several inmates told [Reporting Officer] there is a conflict brewing on the [C-4] tier," R.95, Ex.F at 26. The entry does not mention Mr. Boyce, and there is no evidence that any defendant saw the entry.

On June 7, 1994, Mr. Boyce informed an officer during lockup that he desired to be moved off of Tier C-4; an entry was made in the logbook that states, "Boyce, Chester ... refuses to remain on the tier. Supervisor notified. Appeared to have swollen eyes. Boyce would not elaborate on condition." Id. at 27. The logbook further contains a June 8, 1994, entry that states, "[Reporting Officer] was informed by Officer Ware that inmate Boyce, Chester, refused to lock up. Officer Ware said inmate eyes appear to be swollen. Inmate would not inform officer as to how it happened. Inmate Boyce was then removed to Cermak." Id. at 29. Mr. Boyce was treated by a physician at Cermak¹ on June 8, 1994, and returned to CCDOC that day. Upon his return, because Mr. Boyce refused to return to Tier C-4, he was moved to Tier H-1 on Lieutenant Malek's orders. There is no evidence that Mr. Boyce requested further protection because of any specific assault or threat.

On June 14, 1994, Mr. Boyce was attacked by fellow inmates in the H stairwell while he was returning from yard exercise. An inmate in Division 1, Tier H-1, would have been excused from yard exercise, if he had a medical reason, a physician's appointment or a fear of assault. Such an inmate would be placed in a holding cell instead of going to the yard. Mr. Boyce had requested to be excused from yard exercise; but, because he had given no reason for the request, it had been denied. No inmates from Tier C-4 participated in yard exercise with the Tier H-1 inmates. Mr. Boyce did not file a grievance, nor does the logbook mention any incidents involving Mr. Boyce on that day; nevertheless, he immediately received medical attention from a paramedic in the dispensary.

On June 30, 1994, Mr. Boyce was moved from Division 1 to Division 6, and he went to sick call several times. No officer refused to send him to the dispensary for medical attention, and Mr. Boyce was seen at Cermak Health Services on July 14, 1994. Although Mr. Boyce has undergone multiple eye surgeries, he alleges that he lost complete sight in his left eye in early September 1994.

CCDOC policy mandates that, when an officer finds an inmate in need of medical attention, he must notify a supervisor, who in turn must notify a paramedic. The paramedic makes the ultimate decision regarding whether treatment is necessary; the approval of jail staff is not required. Mr. Boyce has not presented evidence of any policy or any action by the defendants to deny inmates access to Cermak. Nor has he alleged knowledge of anything the defendants did or said to prevent him from receiving adequate medical care.

B. District Court Proceedings

The district court determined that Mr. Boyce had failed to present sufficient evidence to withstand summary judgment with regard to Lieutenants Moore and Malek. Mr. Boyce had relied on the existence of three notations in the jail logbooks. He contended that these entries established knowledge on the part of Lieutenants Moore and Malek as to his dangerous predicament. The district court, however, found no evidence that these defendants were required to review the logbooks or that they in fact did review them. Noting that Mr. Boyce had not presented any evidence that Lieutenant Malek's actions were unreasonable, it concluded that Lieutenant Malek's transfer of Mr. Boyce from Tier C-4 to Tier H-1 did not constitute deliberate indifference. R.100 at 13-14. Finally, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Executive Director because it could not find that the absence of protective custody was a per se constitutional violation, nor could it find a pattern of violations through which to impute knowledge to CCDOC. R.100 at 16.

II DISCUSSION

We review the district court's decision to grant summary judgment de novo. See Mauler v. Bayfield County, 309 F.3d 997, 1000 (7th Cir.2002); O'Neal v. City of New Albany, 293 F.3d 998, 1003 (7th Cir.2002). The Eighth Amendment requires prison officials to "`take reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of the inmates'" and to protect them from harm at the hands of others. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832-33, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 128 L.Ed.2d 811 (1994) (quoting Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 526-27, 104 S.Ct. 3194, 82 L.Ed.2d 393 (1984)); see Henderson v. Sheahan, 196 F.3d 839, 844 (7th Cir.1999) (noting that the Eighth Amendment requires states to "ensure that inmates receive adequate food, clothing, shelter, protection, and medical care" (citation omitted)). Liability must be predicated on a finding of "`deliberate indifference' to inmate health or safety." Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834, 114 S.Ct. 1970 (quoting Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 302-03, 111 S.Ct. 2321, 115 L.Ed.2d 271 (1991)); see Sanville v. McCaughtry, 266 F.3d 724, 735 (7th Cir.2001) (finding negligence insufficient to establish deliberate indifference); Henderson, 196 F.3d at 844 (requiring "deliberate indifference" for Eighth Amendment violation). Therefore, a prison official may be found liable only if he "knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference." Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837, 114 S.Ct. 1970; see Sanville, 266 F.3d at 734 (quoting Farmer's requirement that official be aware of facts supporting inference of substantial risk of harm and that he actually draw the inference); Delgado-Brunet v. Clark, 93 F.3d 339, 345 (7th Cir.1996) (same). Moreover, a supervisor cannot be held liable in a § 1983 action unless the individual was personally involved in the wrongful conduct such that he or she caused or participated in the alleged violation. See Moore v. Indiana, 999 F.2d 1125, 1129 (7th Cir. 1993).

In Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 97 S.Ct. 285, 50 L.Ed.2d 251 (1976), the Supreme Court held that the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment, made applicable to the states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, imposes a duty upon states to provide adequate medical care to incarcerated individuals. See id. at 103, 97 S.Ct. 285; see also Walker v. Benjamin, 293 F.3d 1030, 1036-37 (7th Cir.2002) (noting that deliberate indifference to prisoners' serious medical needs violated the Eighth Amendment (citing Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104-05, 97 S.Ct. 285)). To create a violation by failing to provide medical care, there must be "deliberate indifference" to a substantial risk of harm. Sherrod v. Lingle, 223 F.3d 605, 610 (7th Cir.2000) (citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837, 114 S.Ct. 1970). This standard requires the plaintiff to establish...