Boyce v. Safeway Stores, Inc.

• Citation: 351 F. Supp. 402
• Decision Date: 04 December 1972
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. 430-72.
• Parties: Lawrence W. BOYCE, Plaintiff, v. SAFEWAY STORES, INC., Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Columbia

351 F. Supp. 402

Lawrence W. BOYCE, Plaintiff, v. SAFEWAY STORES, INC., Defendant.

Civ. A. No. 430-72.

United States District Court, District of Columbia.

December 4, 1972.

Robert B. Fitzpatrick, Washington, D. C., for plaintiff.

W. Frank Stickle, Jr., Washington, D. C., for defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

GESELL, District Judge.

Plaintiff, a part-time food clerk, was discharged by Safeway about two months after being hired because his head and facial hair no longer conformed to written grooming standards previously established by the company as applicable to male employees who have regular contact with the public. He claims this action violated Section 703 of the 1964 Civil Rights Act (42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2) and seeks a declaration of rights and damages. The issue of liability is now before the Court on cross-motions for summary judgment and has been fully briefed and argued.^*

Safeway hires men and women indiscriminately for food clerk positions without regard to sex or race. All male and female employees dealing with the public must comply with separate written grooming standards developed for men and for women. The male standard does not allow for head hair as long as that permitted women, and the female standard does not deal with mustaches beards and sideburns. Because of this differentiation, plaintiff claims that Safeway is unlawfully discriminating against males. The pertinent section of the statute reads as follows:

(a) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer —

(1) . . . to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's . . . sex . . .; or

(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such individual's . . . sex . . . .

. . . . .

(e) (1) it shall not be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to hire and employ employees . . . on the basis of their . . . sex . . . in those certain instances where . . . sex . . . is a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the normal operation of that particular business or enterprise.

As has been often noted, there is no meaningful legislative history indicating what Congress had in mind by this sweeping pronouncement. It is obvious that forms of sex discrimination based on the notion that women cannot be employed because they are frail, get pregnant, should not be employed on jobs involving travel, cannot do dangerous work, etc., are prohibited. It is also obvious that sex discrimination cannot be accomplished by establishing such an artificial work standard that for practical purposes one sex is necessarily almost eliminated from consideration: e. g., men must wear female dress, all employees must have played high school football, or the like.

The present case has none of these obvious attributes of discrimination. Here is an employer who simply wished to have its personnel meet grooming standards which in its judgment will appeal to the largest number of its customers. No claims of violations of fundamental constitutional rights are made.

The employer, moreover, is not attempting to stereotype its male and female employees, for the grooming standards allow for great variation in individual dress and appearance within the limits permitted. There is no proof that the standards have resulted in favoring or deterring men or women from employment. In short, the mild grooming rules are not shown to discriminate on the basis of sex any more than a condition of employment that requires males and females to use separate toilet facilities, or bars males but not females from wearing skirts.

With one or two arguable exceptions, this is a case of first impression for the federal courts. Invariably those cases that have struck down discriminations based on...