Boyce v. Woodruff

Decision Date26 August 1997
Docket NumberCivil No. 1:96-CV-332.
Citation979 F.Supp. 817
PartiesCharles BOYCE, Plaintiff, D.O.C. # 964819 v. Jack L. WOODRUFF, et al., Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — Northern District of Indiana

Charles Boyce, Pendleton, IN, pro se.

J. Timothy McCaulay, Helmke, Beams, Boyer and Wagner, Fort Wayne, IN, for defendants.

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION AND ORDER

COSBEY, United States Magistrate Judge.

I. INTRODUCTION

This matter comes before the Court1 on the motion for summary judgment filed by Defendants, Neil Moore ("Moore"), Jack L. Woodruff ("Woodruff'), R. Jennings ("Jennings"), and S. Adam ("Adam") (collectively, "the Defendants"), on April 11, 1997. The Plaintiff, Charles Boyce ("Plaintiff"), filed a response on July 28, 1997. The Defendants filed their reply on July 28, 1997. For the following reasons, the motion will be GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.

II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The Plaintiff initiated this cause of action by filing a pro se complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ("§ 1983") on September 16, 1996, alleging generally that his constitutional rights were violated as to whether there was probable cause to arrest him, as to whether he was arrested inside his home without a warrant, and as to whether he was unlawfully detained without a prompt probable cause determination following his arrest.2

On April 11, 1997, the Defendants filed their Motion for Summary Judgment together with certain exhibits in support. On the same date, the Defendants provided a "Notice of Consequences of Any Failure to Respond to the Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment" by sending the notice to the Plaintiff's last known address. See Lewis v. Faulkner, 689 F.2d 100, 102-03 (7th Cir. 1982). On May 2, 1997, the Court sent a similar "Notice and Order" to the Plaintiff at his last known address. Id. The Court's notice granted the Plaintiff until May 29, 1997, to respond to the Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. In the meantime, on April 24, 1997, the Plaintiff filed a pro se request for an additional ninety days to respond, and, although he gave no supporting reasons, the Court granted it. Thus, the Plaintiff was granted to and including July 24, 1997, to respond. (See Order entered May 6, 1997.)3

On July 28, 1997, the Plaintiff filed his response to the pending Motion for Summary Judgment.4 Despite being admonished by both the Defendants' notice and the Court's notice, the Plaintiff has failed to provide any affidavits or other admissible evidence that would demonstrate that there is a genuine issue of material fact for trial. (See Court's "Notice and Order" filed May 2, 1997, at 2.) As the Court's "Notice and Order" recited:

Unless you respond to this motion with sworn statements which contradict important facts claimed by the defendants in defendants' sworn materials, the court will accept the defendants' uncontested facts as true. More importantly, you will lose this lawsuit, in whole or in part, if the court determines that, under those unchallenged facts, the defendants are entitled to judgment under the law.

The Plaintiff's one page response merely recites that there are genuine issues of material fact but he does not describe those "facts." Indeed, the Plaintiff merely recites his claims: that the Defendants are responsible for his prolonged detention; that they are responsible for his illegal arrest; and that they delayed filing an information and affidavit for probable cause. The Court will address these issues, but the recitation of facts as hereinafter provided is necessarily accepted by the Court as true since they are supported by the Defendants' sworn materials. (See "Notice and Order" filed May 2, 1997, at 2.). As we shall see, however, this recitation does not necessarily lead to the granting of summary judgement as a matter of law.

On August 17, 1994, shortly before 6:00 a.m., Cornelius Augustus called "911" to report that his brother, Anthony Augustus, had been shot at their residence at 922 Hugh Street, Fort Wayne, Indiana, by their nephew, the Plaintiff, who lived at 912 Madison Street, also in Fort Wayne. (Woodruff Aff. ¶ 3.) Detective Woodruff was dispatched to 922 Hugh Street and interviewed Cornelius Augustus. (Id. ¶ 4.) Cornelius advised Woodruff that at approximately 5:30 a.m. that morning he had heard a knock on the front door, exited his bedroom, observed his brother Anthony open the door, and noticed the Plaintiff at the front door. (Id. ¶ 5.) Anthony and the Plaintiff went into Anthony's bedroom, and then Cornelius overheard parts of a conversation between them about a truck. (Id. ¶¶ 6-7.) He then heard what sounded like four (4) gunshots from Anthony's room, and when he left his bedroom to see what was happening, he observed the Plaintiff leaving the house through the front door. (Id. ¶¶ 8-9.)

Meanwhile, at approximately 6:00 a.m., the police dispatcher broadcast a report of the shooting that named Plaintiff as the "suspected perpetrator." (Jennings Aff. ¶ 3; Adam Aff. ¶ 3.) Jennings had had prior contact with the Plaintiff and could recognize him. (Jennings Aff. ¶ 4.) He and Adam proceeded to the Plaintiff's residence where they observed him sitting on the porch reading a newspaper. (Jennings Aff. ¶ 5; Adam Aff. ¶ 3.) Jennings, in full uniform, approached the Plaintiff and advised him that he was wanted for questioning concerning a shooting. (Jennings Aff. ¶ 6; Adam Aff. ¶ 4.) Boyce made no statement in response to Jennings. (Jennings Aff. ¶ 7; Adam Aff. ¶ 5.) Jennings then "Mirandized" the Plaintiff and advised him that he was under arrest on a preliminary charge of aggravated battery, and that he would be taken to Police Headquarters for questioning about the Hugh Street shooting.5 (Jennings Aff. ¶ 8; Adam Aff. ¶¶ 4, 6). Officer John DiFilippo ("DiFilippo") transported Plaintiff to the Fort Wayne Police Headquarters, 1320 E. Creighton Street, ("Police Headquarters"), and placed him in an interview room to wait for the detectives assigned to the case. (DiFilippo Aff. ¶¶ 3-4.)

During the same time frame, at approximately 6:00 a.m., Detective Michelle Adam ("M.Adam") received a page to respond to 922 Hugh Street concerning a shooting. (M. Adam Aff. ¶ 4.) While en route to 922 Hugh Street, she received a report that a suspect in the shooting had been taken into custody at 912 Madison. (M. Adam Aff. ¶ 5.) She then proceeded to 912 Madison, where she questioned the occupants of that location and conducted a consensual search of the residence. (M. Adam Aff. ¶ 6).

Detectives M. Adam and Woodruff each returned to Police Headquarters shortly before 9:00 a.m. on August 17, 1994, after gathering information from the scenes of the Plaintiff's arrest at 912 Madison and the shooting at 922 Hugh Street, respectively. (M. Adam Aff. ¶ 7; Woodruff Aff. ¶ 10.) By that time, Anthony Augustus had died as a result of the gunshot wounds he had sustained. (Woodruff Aff. ¶ 11.) M. Adam and Woodruff consulted briefly with then Allen County Chief Deputy Prosecutor Fran Gull before attempting to interview the Plaintiff. (M. Adam Aff. ¶ 8, Woodruff Aff. ¶ 12.) At approximately 9:00 a.m., M. Adam attempted to interview the Plaintiff but he refused to answer any questions. (M. Adam Aff. ¶ 9; Woodruff aff. ¶ 13.) M. Adam then left the interview room and consulted again with Deputy Prosecutor Gull. (M. Adam Aff. ¶ 10; Woodruff Aff. ¶ 15.) Deputy Prosecutor Gull advised her to arrest the Plaintiff for the murder of Anthony Augustus. (M. Adam Aff. ¶ 11.) M. Adam returned to the interview room, and at 9:10 a.m. on August 17, 1994, advised the Plaintiff that he was under arrest for murder. (Id. ¶ 12.) Woodruff was present in the room at the time. (Woodruff Aff. ¶ 16.) Plaintiff was then transported to the Allen County Lock-up. (Id. ¶ 17.)

Thereafter, none of the Fort Wayne police officers who are defendants in this action had any contact with the Plaintiff prior to his initial hearing on the charge of murder. (Moore Aff. ¶ 4; Woodruff Aff. ¶ 18; Jennings Aff. ¶ 11; Adam Aff. ¶ 8.) The Allen County Lock-up and Jail are operated by the Allen County Sheriff and not by the Fort Wayne Police Department. (Moore Aff. ¶¶ 6-8.) None of the defendant police officers requested that the Plaintiff's probable cause hearing be delayed. (Moore Aff. ¶ 9; Woodruff Aff. ¶ 19; Jennings Aff. ¶ 12; Adam Aff. ¶ 9.) The Plaintiff was also not a suspect in any unsolved crime that any of the defendant police officers were investigating at the time of Plaintiff's August 17, 1994, arrest. (Woodruff Aff. ¶ 20; Jennings Aff. ¶ 13; Adam Aff. ¶ 10.)

The Plaintiff appeared before a state judicial officer on August 18, 1994, at approximately 9:00 a.m., who found probable cause to hold the Plaintiff. (See Def. Exh. A.) On August 23, 1994, a formal charge of murder was filed against him. (See Def. Exh. B.) Approximately two years later, he pled guilty to voluntary manslaughter, a charge added as a second count. (Id.; see also Def. Exh. C.) On October 16, 1996, Plaintiff was sentenced to twenty years' imprisonment on the voluntary manslaughter charge. (See Def. Exh. B.)

III. SUMMARY JUDGMENT PRINCIPLES

Summary judgment is proper "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). However, Rule 56(c) is not a requirement that the moving party negate his opponent's claim. Fitzpatrick v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 916 F.2d 1254, 1256 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 824, 106 S.Ct. 79, 88 L.Ed.2d 64 (1985). Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery, against a party "who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and in which that party will bear the burden of...

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2 cases
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    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of North Dakota
    • 1 Agosto 2012
    ...arrest may be minimal, it would be premature to conclude now that jury would award only nominal damages. See Boyce v. Woodruff, 979 F.Supp. 817, 831 (N.D.Ind.1997) (jury should be allowed to determine whether an arrest that was premature by only three hours resulted in more than nominal dam......
  • Tucker v. Price
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    • U.S. District Court — District of South Carolina
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    ...case is unrequired to pursue a malicious prosecution claim under Section 1983, citing Boyce v. Woodruff, 979 F.Supp. 817 (N.D. Ind. 1997). Boyce, decided by a district court in another state, is on this Court. The Court must follow Fourth Circuit precedent, which, as the Magistrate Judge ex......

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