Boyd v. Biggers

• Decision Date: 26 August 1994
• Docket Number: No. 93-7430,93-7430
• Citation: 31 F.3d 279
• Parties: John BOYD, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Neal B. BIGGERS, Jr., et al., Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

Page 279

31 F.3d 279

John BOYD, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Neal B. BIGGERS, Jr., et al., Defendants-Appellees.

No. 93-7430

Summary Calendar.

United States Court of Appeals,

Fifth Circuit.

Aug. 26, 1994.

John Boyd, pro se.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Mississippi.

Before KING, HIGGINBOTHAM and BARKSDALE, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Mississippi State Penitentiary inmate John L. Boyd appeals the district court's dismissal with prejudice of his pro se and in forma pauperis Sec. 1983 complaint. We affirm as to two defendants based on the doctrine of absolute immunity, and as to the remaining defendants based on the Supreme Court's recent decision in Heck v. Humphrey, --- U.S. ----, 114 S.Ct. 2364, 129 L.Ed.2d 383 (1994).

I. BACKGROUND

On January 8, 1981, John L. Boyd (Boyd) and his cousin, Johnny B. Boyd, were charged with the murder of Bobby Rogers. In 1981, Boyd was tried, convicted, and sentenced to life imprisonment. The evidence showed that Boyd's cousin fired the fatal shot and that Boyd struck the victim with an axe handle. Before the trial of Boyd's cousin in 1984, new evidence was discovered that supported Boyd's contention that he and his cousin had acted in self-defense. This evidence was admitted at the trial of Boyd's cousin, and he was convicted of the lesser offense of manslaughter and sentenced to twenty years imprisonment. Boyd petitioned for habeas corpus based on the newly discovered evidence, and in 1989 the federal district court granted Boyd's petition and ordered a new trial. We reversed the district court's judgment, reasoning that newly discovered evidence pertaining to the guilt or innocence of a state prisoner cannot support federal habeas corpus relief. Boyd v. Puckett, 905 F.2d 895 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 988, 111 S.Ct. 526, 112 L.Ed.2d 537 (1990).

On August 6, 1991, Boyd used a form designed for prisoner complaints concerning conditions of confinement to file an action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 in federal district court alleging inter alia that Judge Neal Biggers (a state judge at the time of the events at issue here), Prosecutor John Young, Ronald Windsor (Boyd's court-appointed counsel), Sheriff Edwin Coleman and Investigator Larry Brinkley conspired to violate his constitutional rights by causing him to be convicted and sentenced more severely than his cousin. In the blank left for requested relief, Boyd asked for $10,000 in compensatory damages, $10,000 in punitive damages, $10,000 in mental anguish damages, and "any other relief this Court deems proper and adequate[ ] in the foregoing matter." The case was referred to a magistrate judge. On January 12, 1993, the magistrate judge held a Spears ¹ hearing to determine whether a non-frivolous basis for Boyd's Sec. 1983 action existed. At the Spears hearing, Boyd stated that by filing this suit he was seeking to attack the constitutionality of his state court conviction.

In a written report filed on January 21, 1993, the magistrate judge recommended that Boyd's claim be dismissed with prejudice. The magistrate judge concluded that Judge Biggers and Prosecutor Young were absolutely immune from suit under Sec. 1983 for the conduct alleged by Boyd, that Boyd's defense attorney was not a state actor for Sec. 1983 purposes, and that Boyd's allegations against Sheriff Coleman and Investigator Brinkley were merely conclusory and failed to state a claim under Sec. 1983. The magistrate judge also advised Boyd to exhaust his state remedies if he wished to pursue a claim of ineffective assistance against his defense counsel. On June 18, 1993, the district court adopted the magistrate judge's report and recommendation in its entirety and entered final judgment dismissing Boyd's complaint with prejudice.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Although the district court did not expressly state that Boyd's claims were "frivolous" under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1915(d), we treat the court's determination as a Sec. 1915(d) dismissal because the court dismissed his complaint with prejudice prior to service. Spears v. McCotter, 766 F.2d 179, 181 (5th Cir.1985). Dismissal of an in forma pauperis complaint is appropriate if the district court determines that it is frivolous, i.e., that "it lacks an arguable basis in either law or fact." Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325, 109 S.Ct. 1827, 1831-32, 104 L.Ed.2d 338 (1989). A complaint is legally frivolous if it is premised on an "indisputably meritless legal theory." Id. at 327, 109 S.Ct. at 1833. We review a district court's Sec. 1915(d) dismissal using an abuse of discretion standard. Denton v. Hernandez, --- U.S. ----, ----, 112 S.Ct. 1728, 1734, 118 L.Ed.2d 340 (1992).

III. DISCUSSION

A. HECK V. HUMPHREY

We first consider the impact of Heck v. Humphrey, --- U.S. ----, 114 S.Ct. 2364, 129 L.Ed.2d 383 (1994), decided during the pendency of this appeal, on the instant case. ² For reasons that will be explained in Part III.B, infra, we limit our discussion of Heck to the dismissal of Boyd's claims against Windsor, Sheriff Coleman, and Investigator Brinkley.

The facts of Heck are strikingly similar to those presented in the instant case. The Sec. 1983 plaintiff in that case, Roy Heck, was convicted of involuntary manslaughter in Indiana state court and sentenced to a fifteen-year term of imprisonment. Id. at ----, 114 S.Ct. at 2368. He filed his Sec. 1983 lawsuit in federal court while his appeal from his conviction was pending in the Indiana courts, alleging that he had been the victim of a conspiracy by county prosecutors and a police investigator to destroy exculpatory evidence and to use an illegal voice identification procedure at his trial. Id. The district court dismissed Heck's Sec. 1983 action because the issues raised in that action directly implicated the legality of Heck's confinement. Id. While Heck's appeal to the Seventh Circuit was pending, the Indiana Supreme Court affirmed his conviction. Id. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of Heck's Sec. 1983 action, following the rule that

[i]f, regardless of the relief sought, the [Sec. 1983] plaintiff is challenging the legality of his conviction, so that if he won his case the state would be obliged to release him even if he hadn't sought that relief, the suit is classified as an application for habeas corpus and the plaintiff must exhaust his state remedies, on pain of dismissal if he fails to do so. ³

Heck v. Humphrey, 997 F.2d 355, 357 (7th Cir.1993), aff'd, --- U.S. ----, 114 S.Ct. 2364, 129 L.Ed.2d 383 (1994).

Although the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment in Heck, it rejected the analysis employed by the Seventh Circuit and by our court in cases such as Fulford v. Klein, 529 F.2d 377 (5th Cir.1976), adhered to en banc, 550 F.2d 342 (5th Cir.1977) (en banc) (per curiam), and Meadows v. Evans, 529 F.2d 385 (5th Cir.1976), adhered to en banc, 550 F.2d 345 (5th Cir.1977) (en banc) (per curiam), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 969, 98 S.Ct. 517, 54 L.Ed.2d 457 (1977). The Court adhered to its "teaching that Sec. 1983 contains no exhaustion requirement beyond what Congress has provided." Heck, --- U.S. at ----, 114 S.Ct. at 2370. The Court agreed, however, that Heck could not proceed with his Sec. 1983 action. Using the common law tort of malicious prosecution as an analogy to aid in interpretation of Sec. 1983, the Court concluded that

in order to recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid, a Sec. 1983 plaintiff must prove that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2254. A claim for damages bearing that relationship to a conviction or sentence that has not been so invalidated is not cognizable under Sec. 1983.

Id. at ----, 114 S.Ct. at 2372. As the Court remarked a little later in the opinion,

We do not engraft an exhaustion requirement upon Sec. 1983, but rather deny the existence of a cause of action. Even a prisoner who has fully exhausted available state remedies has no cause of action under Sec. 1983 unless and until the conviction or sentence is reversed, expunged, invalidated, or impugned by the grant of a writ of habeas corpus.... [A] Sec. 1983 cause of action for damages attributable to an unconstitutional conviction or sentence does not accrue until the conviction or sentence has been invalidated.

Id., at ----, 114 S.Ct. at 2373-74.

Although the Heck Court rejected part of the reasoning underlying the Fulford/ Meadows doctrine, the analysis required by Heck is similar in certain respects to the analysis we have long used in this circuit when a state prisoner brings a Sec. 1983 action in federal district court. Under Heck, when a state prisoner brings a Sec. 1983 action seeking damages, the trial court must first ascertain whether a judgment in favor of the plaintiff in the Sec. 1983 action would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence. Id. at ----, 114 S.Ct. at 2372. If it would, the prisoner must show that his conviction has been "reversed, expunged, invalidated, or impugned by the grant of a writ of habeas corpus," id. at ----, 114 S.Ct. at 2373, in order to state a claim. Dismissal of the Sec. 1983 action under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1915(d) is appropriate, post-Heck, because the plaintiff's action has been shown to be legally frivolous.

The validity of Boyd's conviction and sentence has yet to be undermined; we proceed to evaluate the claims raised in his Sec. 1983 action to determine whether they challenge the constitutionality of his conviction or sentence. We conclude that they do. Some of his allegations amount to claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. If proved, these claims would call Boyd's...