Boyd v. Bureau of Prisons
| Decision Date | 08 August 2022 |
| Docket Number | 3:21-cv-1004-G (BT) |
| Parties | KENNETH S. BOYD, Plaintiff, v. BUREAU OF PRISONS, ET AL. Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Texas |
FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Plaintiff Kenneth S. Boyd is a federal inmate proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis in this civil rights action. See ECF No. 10. In an amended complaint, he alleges that officials at FCI-Seagoville refused to let him visit with his daughter and then revoked his ability to communicate with her. See ECF No. 8 at 4. Pursuant to its screening obligations under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A and 1915(e)(2)(B), the Court should dismiss Boyd's claims for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
Boyd originally brought this action against the Bureau of Prisons (BOP), claiming that the agency improperly removed his daughter from his visitation list. See generally ECF No. 3. Boyd filed an amended complaint that substitutes individual officers of the BOP as defendants in place of the BOP and claims that the defendants, in addition to refusing to allow his daughter to visit him, revoked all his communication “privileges” with her. ECF No. 8.[1] Boyd also responded to a Magistrate Judge Questionnaire (MJQ) to further clarify his claims. Liberally construing all these pleadings, Boyd alleges as follows:
Boyd's daughter was omitted from his approved visitation list pursuant to BOP Program Statement 5324.10, which relates to sex offender management programs (SOMP). ECF No. 12 at 6 8.[2] She was left off the approved visitor list because Defendant M. Nelson felt that she was a victim of Boyd's crime, which Boyd disputes. ECF No. 12 at 6. Defendant Dr. Paulson was the acting SOMP coordinator at the time Boyd was denied visitation rights with his daughter. ECF No. 12 at 8.
Boyd submitted a “request to staff form” to M. Nelson, along with a letter from his attorney. ECF No. 8 at 6. The request sought to add Boyd's daughter to his approved visitor list, and the letter mentioned that a social services agency cleared Boyd of any misconduct in relation to his daughter. See ECF No. 3 at 30. Dr. Paulson denied the request after M. Nelson “supposedly supplied all information” to him for review and opinion. ECF No. 8 at 6.
Boyd appealed that denial to M. Nelson. ECF No. 8 at 6. The appeal was accompanied by a letter from “Blair County Children, Youth & Families” stating that “no records are available [regarding apparent allegations that Boyd engaged in inappropriate conduct with his daughter] as records of unsubstantiated allegations are expunged,” thus tending to confirm Boyd's argument that his daughter was not a victim of his crime. ECF No. 8 at 6. This information was also shared with Defendant F. Tavarez. ECF No. 8 at 6. Nevertheless, the appeal was denied. ECF No. 8 at 6. Boyd submitted a further appeal to M. Nelson. ECF No. 8 at 7. The “relative documents” related to the appeal were supposedly shared with Defendant Zook, but Zook still denied the appeal. ECF No. 8 at 7.
. Defendant Baltazar, a Regional Director of the BOP, denied the appeal. ECF No. 8 at 7. Boyd then submitted a final appeal, along with all related paperwork, to “Central Offices.” ECF No. 8 at 7. Defendant Connors, the National Inmate Appeals Administrator, denied the appeal in March 2021. ECF No. 8 at 7.
Boyd submitted a further appeal, as well as all related paperwork, to the Grand Prairie Regional Office. ECF No. 8 at 7. Defendant Baltazar, a Regional Director of the BOP, denied the appeal. ECF No. 8 at 7. Boyd then submitted a final appeal, along with all related paperwork, to “Central Offices.” ECF No. 8 at 7. Defendant Connors, the National Inmate Appeals Administrator, denied the appeal in March 2021. ECF No. 8 at 7.
After completing the administrative appeal process, Boyd visited with Dr. Paulson about reviewing evidence that “proved [his] innocence.” ECF No. 12 at 6. This included another letter from Boyd's attorney stating that Boyd's daughter was not a victim of his crime. ECF No. 12 at 8. Dr. Paulson asked Boyd to hold off on filing a lawsuit, and Boyd waited for a few weeks before filing this suit. ECF No. 12 at 6.
Boyd filed his original complaint in May 2021. ECF No. 3. Thereafter, Boyd was advised that all forms of communication with his daughter would be revoked, and it would remain that way for the duration of his incarceration. ECF No. 12 at 6. His communication privileges with his daughter were revoked for “answering a question [his] daughter asked” about whether he used to be a swinger. ECF No. 12 at 7. He informed his daughter that he used to be a swinger, and “psychology” seized on that conversation to revoke his communication privileges. ECF No. 12 at 7. In June 2021, Boyd filed an amended complaint against the individual defendants who he claims had roles in terminating his ability to visit and communicate with his daughter. ECF No. 8.
According to Boyd, the BOP's decision to revoke his communication privileges with his daughter is not rationally related to any legitimate penological or general safety concerns. ECF No. 12 at 7. Further, Boyd made the supposedly inappropriate statement to his daughter five months before his communication privileges were revoked, which, coupled with the fact that the communication privileges were revoked only after he filed this suit, shows that the defendants revoked his communication privileges in retaliation for filing this suit. ECF No. 12 at 8.
However, four months after the communication privileges were revoked, Boyd was given back his e-mail privileges and told that if his e-mail messages with his daughter were appropriate, “they would look into giving [him] back telephone communication.” ECF No. 12 at 5, 7.
And later, in April 2022, Boyd was “awarded visitation” with his daughter. ECF No. 12 at 3. He had two visits with her in in April 2022 and “[f]uture visits will be scheduled after June 13, 2022, when FCI Seagoville re-opens and the visitation becomes contact again.” ECF No. 12 at 3.
As for relief, Boyd seeks an order approving visitation rights with his daughter; an order re-instating all e-mail, phone, and mail privileges; an award of court costs; an order requiring that some of the defendants be demoted or retrained; and monetary damages for emotional and financial distress. ECF No. 8 at 6; ECF No. 12 at 6-16.
Boyd's complaint is subject to preliminary screening under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. that section provides in pertinent part:
The court shall review . . . as soon as practicable after docketing, a complaint in a civil action in which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity [and] [o]n review, the court shall identify cognizable claims or dismiss the complaint, or any portion of the complaint, if the complaint (1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or (2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from suit.
28 U.S.C. § 1915(A)(a) and (b).
And under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e), a district court may also summarily dismiss a complaint filed in forma pauperis if it concludes the action is: (1) frivolous or malicious; (2) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or (3) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
To state a claim upon which relief may be granted, a plaintiff must “plead enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face[,]” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007), and must plead those facts with enough specificity “to raise a right to relief above the speculative level[.]” Id. at 555. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
And “[a]lthough pleadings filed pro se are generally held to less stringent standards than those drafted by lawyers, pro se litigants must still reasonably comply with procedural rules.” Miller v. Lowe's Home Ctrs. Inc., 184 Fed.Appx. 386, 389 (5th Cir. 2006) (per curiam) (citing Grant v. Cuellar, 59 F.3d 523, 524-25 (5th Cir. 1995)).
Boyd asks the Court to “award approval of visitation rights between Plaintiff and his daughter; re-instate all e-mail, phone, and mail privileges; [and to] pay all court fees upon favorable judgment.” ECF No. 8 at 6. Since filing his amended complaint, however, his visitation rights and e-mail privileges have been restored. ECF No. 12 at 3, 5.[3] Because it appears that the defendants have voluntarily stopped at least some of the conduct that spawned this lawsuit, and because Boyd is suing federal officials for injunctive relief (presumably in their official capacities), the Court must address two preliminary issues: mootness and sovereign immunity.
Although the defendants have apparently restored Boyd's daughter to his visitation list and now allow him to e-mail her, this does not necessarily moot any of his claims. See, e.g., Los Angeles County v. Davis, 440 U.S. 625, 631 (1979) () (citing United States v. W.T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629, 632 (1953)). Voluntary cessation may render a case moot, however, “if subsequent events [make] it absolutely clear that the allegedly wrongful behavior could not be reasonably expected to recur.” Friends of the Earth, Inc. v....
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