Boyd v. Citizens Bank of Pa., Inc.

• Decision Date: 22 May 2014
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 2:12-cv-00332
• Parties: DEBRA BOYD, Plaintiff, v. CITIZENS BANK OF PENNSYLVANIA, INC., Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Pennsylvania

DEBRA BOYD, Plaintiff, v. CITIZENS BANK OF PENNSYLVANIA, INC., Defendant.

Civil Action No. 2:12-cv-00332

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Date: May 22, 2014

Judge Nora Barry Fischer

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

NORA BARRY FISCHER, District Judge.

I. Introduction

This is an employment discrimination case brought by Debra Boyd ("Plaintiff" or "Boyd") against her former employer, Citizens Bank of Pennsylvania, Inc. ("Defendant" or "the Bank"). Plaintiff asserts that Defendant discriminated against her based upon her age and race, and retaliated against her in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 623 et seq. ("ADEA"), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) ("Title VII"), and the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act, 43 P.S. § 951 et seq. ("PHRA").¹

Presently pending before the Court is the Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (ECF No. 81). Upon consideration of the parties' submissions and for the reasons set forth below, the Defendant's Motion will be granted.

II. Background

A. Local Rule 56.1 violation

As an initial matter, the Court notes Plaintiff's failure to properly respond to Defendant's Concise Statement of Undisputed Material Facts as required by the Local Rules of the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania. Local Rule 56.C.1 mandates that a non-moving party's response to a motion for summary judgment must include:

1. A Responsive Concise Statement: A separately filed concise statement, which responds to each numbered paragraph in the moving party's Concise Statement of Material Facts by:

a. admitting or denying whether each fact contained in the moving party's Concise Statement of Material Facts is undisputed and/or material;

b. setting forth the basis for the denial if any fact contained in the moving party's Concise Statement of Material Facts is not admitted in its entirety (as to whether it is undisputed or material), with appropriate reference to the record (See LCvR 56.B.1 for instructions regarding format and annotation); and

c. setting forth in separately numbered paragraphs any other material facts that are allegedly at issue, and/or that the opposing party asserts are necessary for the court to determine the motion for summary judgment.

LCvR 56.C.1. Furthermore, Local Rule 56.E provides as follows:

E. Admission of Material Facts. Alleged material facts set forth in the moving party's Concise Statement of Material Facts or in the opposing party's Responsive Concise Statement, which are claimed to be undisputed, will for the purposes of deciding the motion for summary judgment be deemed admitted unless specifically denied or otherwise controverted by a separate concise statement of the opposing party.

LCvR 56.E.

The Court's Order dated November 4, 2013 explicitly directed the parties to adhere to Local Rule 56.C, and in light of the Plaintiff's pro se status, the Court set out the requirements ofLocal Rule 56.C in its Order. (ECF No. 72).² In addition, the Court's Order instructed the Plaintiff that her Response "shall contain a separately filed Concise Statement of Facts that admits or denies each fact contained in Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment with appropriate citations to the record, ... and an Appendix containing any documents that Plaintiff references in her Concise Statement of Facts." (ECF No. 72 at p. 2).

Defendant filed a Concise Statement of Material Facts, containing paragraphs numbered 1 through 263, in support of its Motion for Summary Judgment on December 16, 2013, see (ECF No. 85), and filed unredacted portions (paragraphs numbered 162 through 248) under seal on December 18, 2013. (ECF No. 87). Defendant additionally filed an Appendix of Exhibits in Support of its Motion for Summary Judgment. (ECF No. 86). In response, Plaintiff filed a Response to Defendant's Concise Statement of Undisputed Material Facts, but only specifically addressed paragraphs numbered 1 through 61. (ECF No. 92). Despite this Court's Order, many of the Plaintiff's responses simply set forth her view of the "facts" with no supporting citations to the record. (ECF No. 92). Moreover, Plaintiff refused to separately respond, as ordered by the Court, to paragraphs numbered 62 through 263, stating:

62-end of Concise statement is disagreed, disagreed in parts and/or is NA. I feel it is not necessary to waste time responding to each statement individually when my position is (sic) already been argued.

(ECF No. 92 at pp. 12-13) (emphasis in original).

This Court "requires strict compliance with the provisions of [Local Rule 56]." E.E.O.C. v. U.S. Steel Corp., 2013 WL 625315 n.1 (W.D.Pa. 2013) (quoting Practices and Procedures of Judge Nora Barry Fischer § II.E.(i), Effective March 23, 2010, available at http://www.pawd.uscourts.gov/Documents/Judge/fischer_pp.pdf.). We recognize that courtsaccord pro se litigants a certain degree of leniency, particularly with respect to procedural rules. Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc. , 704 F.3d 239, 244 (3d Cir. 2013) (quoting Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520, 92 S.Ct. 594, 30 L.Ed.2d 652 (1972)). However, as we recently explained:

[T]he Court may not be co-opted by a pro se litigant to perform tasks normally carried out by hired counsel. Mala, 704 F.3d at 244 (citing Pliler v. Ford, 542 U.S. 225, 231, 124 S.Ct. 2441, 159 L.Ed.2d 338 (2004)); Martinez v. Court of Appeal of California, Fourth Appellate Dist., 528 U.S. 152, 162, 120 S.Ct. 684, 145 L.Ed.2d 597 (2000). Providing assistance or "[e]xtending too much procedural leniency to a pro se litigant risks undermining the impartial role of the judge in the adversary system." Id. (quoting Procedural Due Process Rights of Pro Se Civil Litigants, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 659, 671 (1988)). Moreover, it has never been suggested that "procedural rules in ordinary civil litigation should be interpreted so as to excuse mistakes by those who proceed without counsel." Id. at 245 (quoting McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S. 106, 113, 113 S.Ct. 1980, 124 L.Ed.2d 21 (1993)). Pro se litigants must adhere to procedural rules as would parties assisted by counsel. Id. This includes procedural requirements regarding the provision of adequate factual averments to sustain legal claims. Id. (citing Riddle v. Mondragon, 83 F.3d 1197, 1202 (10th Cir. 1996)).

U.S. v. Gregg, 2013 WL 6498249 at *4 (W.D.Pa. 2013).

Accordingly, to the extent Plaintiff's recitation of the facts do not specifically address Defendant's statement of facts, Defendant's statement will be deemed admitted. LCvR 56.E; Gupta v. Sears, Roebuck and Co., 2009 WL 890585 at *3 (W.D.Pa. 2009); Aubrey v. Sanders, 2008 WL 4443826 at *1 (W.D.Pa. 2008), aff'd, 346 F. App'x 847 (3d Cir. 2009); Janokowski v. Demand, 2008 WL 1901347 at *1 (W.D.Pa. 2008). To the extent Plaintiff's statement of "fact" specifically controverts Defendant's, the Court will consider these facts in determining whether summary judgment should be granted.

B. Facts

1. Plaintiff's general employment history with Defendant

Plaintiff was hired by Mellon Bank on June 27, 1983. (ECF No. 85 at ¶ 2, ECF No. 23 at ¶ 10). As a result of a merger, she became an employee of Defendant in the Operations Services department in 2001. (ECF No. 85 at ¶ 3, ECF No. 86-1 at ¶ 4). Although Plaintiff reported to different managers since 2001, her ultimate supervisor, at all relevant times, was Barbara J.Black ("Black"), the Vice President and Operations Services Manager for Consumer Operations for the Bank. (ECF No. 85 at ¶ 5, ECF No. 86-1 at ¶ 5). Shortly after the merger, Plaintiff became responsible for reconciling payments related to American Express travelers' checks issued by the Bank's branch locations, and she reported directly to Maureen Norman ("Norman"), who, in turn, reported to Black. (ECF No. 85 at ¶¶ 6-7, ECF No. 86-1 at ¶¶ 6-7).

In July 2002, a performance appraisal was conducted by Norman, and Plaintiff received an overall performance rating of 2, which was defined as "Exceeds Most Expectations." (ECF No. 85 at ¶ 156(a), ECF No. 86-9 at pp. 9-10).³ In August 2003, Norman assigned Plaintiff an overall performance rating of 3, which was defined as "Meets Expectations." (ECF No. 85 at ¶ 156(b), ECF No. 86-9 at pp. 11-15). Plaintiff disagreed with this rating, commenting that she felt like she did "more than what [was] expected of me with my job." (ECF No. 85 at ¶ 156(c), ECF No. 86-9 at p. 15).

In August 2004, Plaintiff received an overall rating of 3 (meets expectations). (ECF No. 85 at ¶ 156(c), ECF No. 86-9 at pp. 17-28). Plaintiff was of the view that she should have been rated higher, stating in the "Employee's Comments" section, "I agree with review, but I feel as though I did exceeding with my work." (ECF No. 85 at ¶ 156(c), ECF No. 86-9 at p. 21). Dissatisfied with her rating, Plaintiff submitted a letter to the Human Resources department stating, inter alia:

I agree with getting a review, but there are important things that should be on my review, and they are not. One of which is I created a screen called IPAX & its purpose is to make corrections that proof & branches have made, when balancing American Express. Also, I confiscated almost $80,000.00 back to the bank. When I wrote on my review (I did exceeding), I would like it to be shown in my records that I exceeded most of my expectations for American Express.

(ECF No. 86-9 at p. 24). Plaintiff subsequently had several meetings with Norman, Black and Debra Kerchner from Human Resources regarding her appraisal rating. (ECF No. 86-8 at p. 15).

Plaintiff also contacted and met with Vice President Paul McKinnon. Id. Plaintiff reiterated her view that her involvement in creating the IPAX screen and the recovery of $80,000.00 of paid, and not issued American Express items, warranted a rating of 2, "Exceeds Most Expectations." (ECF No. 86-1 at ¶ 54, ECF No. 86-8 at p. 15).

According to Defendant...