Boyd v. City of Jersey City
| Decision Date | 13 June 2018 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 15-0026 (ES) (MAH) |
| Parties | CHARLES A. BOYD, JR., Plaintiff, v. CITY OF JERSEY CITY, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of New Jersey |
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
This action arises out of Plaintiff Charles A. Boyd, Jr.'s ("Boyd or Plaintiff") Complaint alleging malicious prosecution, false arrest, negligent supervision and hiring, excessive use of force, and violations of his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights by police officers Melissa Sarmiento ("Sarmiento"), Janixza Domenech ("Domenech"), Joseph Olszewski ("Olszewski") (the "Responding Officers"), Thomas F. Broderick ("Broderick"), Brian R. Davis ("Davis"), Gary A. Moffit ("Moffit"), Joseph Doyle ("Doyle") (together with the Responding Officers, the "Officers"), the Jersey City Police Department ("JCPD")1, and the City of Jersey City ("Jersey City") (together with the Officers and JCPD, "Defendants"). This Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims under to 28 U.S.C. § 1367. Defendants moved for summary judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. (D.E.No. 30). Having considered the parties' submissions in support of and in opposition to Defendants' motion, the Court decides the matter without oral argument. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 78(b). For the reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS-in-part and DENIES-in-part Defendants' motion for summary judgment.
Factual Background. In the early morning hours on August 5, 2012, three JCPD police officers responded to a complaint of loud noise coming from Plaintiff's residence. (SMF ¶ 4). Once on Boyd's property, Officers Domenech, Sarmiento, and Olszewski spoke with Boyd—who was hosting a party—and informed him that "the music had to be turned off because of the complaints," and that "if they had to come back [] the appropriate summonses would be issued." (Id. ¶ 6). The music was turned off and Officers Domenech, Sarmiento, and Olszewski left. (Id. ¶ 6-7). While making their way back to their patrol cars, Domenech, Sarmiento, and Olszewski heard loud music, which they believed was coming from Boyd's residence. (Id. ¶ 7). Because they estimated that up to 70 people were at Boyd's residence they called for backup before returning to Boyd's property. (Id.).
The Responding Officers approached Boyd in his backyard and asked for his identification. (Id. ¶ 8). Boyd refused and instructed his wife "not to give the officers his identification." (Id.).Olszewski then ordered Domenech to "confiscate [Boyd's] music equipment," which the Responding Officers believed "[was] a Dell laptop." (Id. ¶ 9); (Olszewski Cert. ¶ 13). As Domenech went to confiscate the laptop, Boyd "walked over to protect his laptop by [] guarding and hovering over it in order to prevent the officers from taking [it]," and then pushed Domenech. (SMF ¶ 10-11). Officers Moffit and Domenech attempted to arrest Boyd who refused to place his arms behind his back and whose yelling began to agitate the other party-goers in his backyard. (Id. ¶ 12). Boyd testified that he was standing up while the Officers placed him into handcuffs and that he "was not pushed and couldn't recall an officer hitting him." (Id. ¶ 13). Boyd did not receive any medical treatment—emergency care or otherwise—and was released by JCPD custody six-and-a-half-hours after his arrest. (Id. ¶ 15); (D.E. No. 30-7 at 61). Boyd was charged with aggravated assault on a police officer, resisting arrest, inciting a riot, and disorderly conduct. (Id. ¶ 16). On June 20, 2014, a Judgment of Acquittal was entered on Boyd's behalf for all charges. (Compl. Count II ¶ 3).
In August 2014, Plaintiff filed the instant complaint in New Jersey Superior Court, alleging (i) malicious prosecution, false imprisonment, and false arrest in violation of his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights (Count I); (ii) that the JCPD and Jersey City implemented a policy or custom that lead to the violation of Plaintiff's constitutional rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Counts III and V); (iii) excessive use of force in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Count IV); (iv) that because of an unlawful custom or policy, Plaintiff's constitutional rights were violated (Count VI); (v) failure by the JCPD and Jersey City to adequately hire, train, and supervise police officers that led to the violation of Plaintiff's constitutional rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1986 (Count VII and IIX); and (vi) negligence pursuant to N.J.S.A. § 59:8-1 et seq. (Counts II, IX and X). (D.E. No. 1, Compl. at 5-16).Defendants successfully removed the complaint to this Court on January 5, 2015. (Id. ¶ 2). Following the conclusion of fact discovery, Defendants moved for summary judgment on all counts. . Boyd submitted a sealed, and largely unresponsive, opposition to Defendants' motion. (Pl. Opp.). Defendants submitted a reply to Plaintiff's opposition. (D.E. No. 32). This matter is now ripe for resolution.
Summary Judgment. Summary judgment is appropriate if the moving party shows that there is "no genuine issue of any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). An issue is "genuine" if it is supported by evidence such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict in the non-moving party's favor. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).3 A fact is "material" if it "might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law." Id. The burden is on the moving party to show no genuine issue of material fact exists. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). Where the non-moving party bears the burden of proof at trial, the moving party may discharge its burden by showing "that there is an absence of evidence to support the non-moving party's case." Id. at 325. If the movant meets this burden, the non-movant must then set forth specific facts that demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue for trial. Id. at 324; Azur v. Chase Bank, USA, Nat'l Ass'n, 601 F.3d 212, 216 (3d Cir. 2010).
Conversely, where the moving party bears the burden of proof at trial, it "must show that it has produced enough evidence to support the findings of fact necessary to win." El v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth. (SEPTA), 479 F.3d 232, 237 (3d Cir. 2007). "Put another way, it is inappropriate to grant summary judgment in favor of a moving party who bears the burden of proof at trial unlessa reasonable juror would be compelled to find its way on the facts needed to rule in its favor on the law." Id. at 238.
Notably, the "evidence of the non-movant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255. But the non-moving party "must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986); see also Swain v. City of Vineland, 457 F. App'x 107, 109 (3d Cir. 2012) ().
Section 1983 Actions. Section 1983 provides, in relevant part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress . . . .
Thus, to state a claim under § 1983, Plaintiff must allege (i) the violation of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States; and (ii) that the alleged deprivation was committed or caused by a person acting under color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Malleus v. George, 641 F.3d 560, 563 (3d Cir. 2011).
Defendants move for summary judgment on all of Boyd's claims. (Def. Mov. Brief. at 2). Specifically, Defendants argue that the Officers had probable cause to arrest Boyd, thus Boyd's claims for false arrest, false imprisonment, and malicious prosecution fail. (Id.). Defendants further argue that Boyd's Fourth Amendment excessive-force claims fail because "the record is devoid of anything more than allegations of a minimum amount of force used during [Boyd's]arrest." (Id.). Lastly, with respect to Plaintiff's state-tort claims, Defendants contend that they are entitled to judgment because of Boyd's "failure to serve the City Defendants with a Notice of Claim pursuant to the New Jersey Tort Claims Act." (Id. at 2-3).
This Court has thoroughly reviewed the parties' submissions and all documents in the record. For the reasons below, the Court GRANTS-in-part and DENIES-in-part Defendants' motion for summary judgment.
New Jersey Tort Claims Act. The notice provisions of the New Jersey Tort Claims Act (the "Act") "apply to causes of action based on the intentional conduct of public employees." Davis v. Twp. of Paulsboro, 371 F. Supp. 2d 611, 618 (D.N.J. 2005); Velez v. City of Jersey City, 180 N.J. 284 (2004). The Act provides that "[n]o action shall be brought against a public entity or public employee under [the Act] unless the claim upon which it is based shall have been presented in accordance with the procedures set forth in this chapter." N.J.S.A. § 59:8-3. Relevant here is the Act's requirement that "[a] claim relating to a cause of action for [] injury or damage to person or to property shall be presented as provided in this chapter not later than the 90th day after accrual of the cause of action." N.J.S.A. § 59:8-8. Only until "[a]fter the expiration of six months from the date notice of the claim is received, [may] the claimant [] file suit in an appropriate court of law." Id. Thus, failure to comply with...
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