Boyd v. FCA US LLC (In re Takata Airbag Prods. Liab. Litig.)

• Decision Date: 01 June 2020
• Docket Number: Economic Loss No. 14-24009-CV-MORENO,Master File No. 15-02599-MD-MORENO,MDL No. 2599
• Citation: 464 F.Supp.3d 1291
• Parties: IN RE TAKATA AIRBAG PRODUCTS LIABILITY LITIGATION Bridget Boyd, et al., individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. FCA US LLC, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Florida

464 F.Supp.3d 1291

IN RE TAKATA AIRBAG PRODUCTS LIABILITY LITIGATIONBridget Boyd, et al., individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs,

v.FCA US LLC, Defendant.

MDL No. 2599

Master File No. 15-02599-MD-MORENO

Economic Loss No. 14-24009-CV-MORENO

United States District Court, S.D. Florida, Miami Division.

Signed June 1, 2020

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART FCA US LLC'S MOTION TO DISMISS

FEDERICO A. MORENO, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

I. INTRODUCTION

This multidistrict litigation consolidates allegations of economic loss and personal injury related to airbags manufactured by former-defendants Takata Corporation and TK Holdings (collectively, "Takata") and equipped in vehicles distributed by FCA US LLC. The allegations are that FCA's vehicles were equipped with Takata airbags containing the chemical ammonium nitrate, which creates a small explosion to inflate the airbags during a crash. Plaintiffs, who are consumers of FCA's vehicles, contend that when exposed to high heat and humidity, the explosion is much more forceful and can cause significant injuries and even death.

The crux of Plaintiffs’ legal claims is that FCA knew or should have known of the Takata inflator defect prior to installing the Takata airbags in their vehicles, and that FCA concealed from, or failed to notify, the Plaintiffs and the general public of the full and complete nature of the inflator defect. Plaintiffs allege that as a result of FCA's concealment, Plaintiffs would not have purchased their vehicles or would not have paid as much for them as they did.

FCA vigorously contests the sufficiency of the allegations supporting the myriad of claims remaining in the 46-count Complaint. The Court has thoroughly reviewed the allegations in the Complaint and the arguments in the parties’ moving papers. This Order resolves all remaining claims asserted by the Consumer Plaintiffs against FCA.

For the reasons explained below, FCA's Motion to Dismiss (D.E. 2983) is GRANTED IN PART as follows:

• The nationwide-class Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act claim (Count 1) is DISMISSED in full;

• The statewide-class breach of implied warranty claims under the laws of Indiana, New York, and North Carolina (Counts 22, 36, and 38), and the duplicative claim under California law (Count 15), are DISMISSED ;

• The statewide-class statutory consumer protection claims under the laws of Alabama, Florida, Indiana, and Pennsylvania (Counts 7, 16, 21, and 40) are DISMISSED in full, and the claims under the laws of California, Georgia, and Illinois (Counts 12, 18, and 20) are DISMISSED only to the extent they seek damages;

• The fraud claim (Count 4) is DISMISSED as to named-Plaintiffs Arlen Sturgis (Mississippi), and T'Keya Cooper, Jamelle Lowery, and Michael McClellion (South Carolina), and as to all putative class members whose fraud claims are governed under the laws of Alabama, Florida, Indiana, Mississippi, and South Carolina;

• The unjust enrichment claim (Count 5) is DISMISSED as to all putative class members whose unjust enrichment claims are governed under the laws of Alabama, Arizona, Florida, Indiana, Maryland, Mississippi, New Jersey, North Carolina, and Ohio, and as to these named-Plaintiffs: Laurie Reynolds (Arizona); Ronaldo Maldia (California); Daniel Dwinnells (Maryland); Michael Eikenberry, Kenneth Fischer, Deborah Hillyer, Dave Krzeminski, and Elizabeth Washington (Michigan); Arlen Sturgis (Mississippi); Gene Marsilio (New Jersey); Laquintha O'Neal and Terrie Swanson (North Carolina); Victoria Lykins and Reginald Price (Ohio); Jamelle Lowery (South Carolina); and Bridget Boyd (Texas); and

• The negligence claim (Count 6) is DISMISSED as to all named-Plaintiffs whose negligence claims are governed under the laws of Alabama, Arizona, Florida, Georgia, Indiana, Mississippi, Missouri, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, and Texas, and as to all putative class members whose negligence claims are governed under the laws of these states.

Furthermore, the Motion to Dismiss is DENIED as to the following claims, which will proceed to summary judgment:

• The statewide-class statutory consumer protection and breach of implied warranty claims in Counts 8–14, 17–20, 23–35, 37, 39, and 41–46;

• Claims for fraud (Count 4) asserted by all named-Plaintiffs whose claims are governed under the laws of Arizona, Arkansas, California, Georgia, Illinois, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Missouri, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, and Texas;

• Claims for unjust enrichment (Count 5) asserted by these named-Plaintiffs: Cathy Parker and Bobbie Simmons (Arkansas); Rushelle Gonder and Pedro Lucero (California); Michelle Gibson and Debrah Johnson (Georgia); John Fuesting and Priscilla Fuesting (Illinois); Carla Campagnone (Massachusetts); Randy Nielsen (Michigan); Jason Williams (Missouri); Rmzy Abdallah (New York); Marcia Griffith (Pennsylvania); T'Keya Cooper (South Carolina); and Shanna Moore (Texas); and

• Claims for negligence (Count 6) asserted by these named-Plaintiffs: Cathy Parker and Bobbie Simmons (Arkansas) and Daniel Dwinnells (Maryland).

II. LEGAL STANDARD

"A pleading that states a claim for relief must contain ... a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). To survive a motion to dismiss, the "complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ " Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) ).

A claim has facial plausibility when "the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. (citing Twombly , 550 U.S. at 556, 127 S.Ct. 1955 ). Although legal conclusions can provide the framework of the complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations. Id. at 679, 129 S.Ct. 1937. Detailed factual allegations are not required, but the complaint must offer more than "labels and conclusions" or "a formulaic recitation of the elements of the cause of action." Twombly , 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955 (citation omitted). The factual allegations must be enough to "raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Id. (citations omitted).

Where a cause of action sounds in fraud, the allegations in the complaint must satisfy the particularity pleading requirement of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b). Under Rule 9(b), "a party must state with particularity the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake"; although "conditions of a person's mind," such as malice, intent, and knowledge may be alleged generally. Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b). To comply with Rule 9(b), a plaintiff must allege: (1) the precise statements, documents, or misrepresentations made; (2) the time, place, and person responsible for the statement; (3) the content and manner in which these statements misled the plaintiffs; and (4) what the defendants gained by the alleged fraud. Brooks v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Fla., Inc. , 116 F.3d 1364, 1380–81 (11th Cir. 1997) (per curiam ) (citation omitted). In other words, a plaintiff is required to plead the "who, what, when, where, and how" pertaining to the underlying fraud. See Garfield v. NDC Health Corp. , 466 F.3d 1255, 1262 (11th Cir. 2006) (citation omitted). The purpose of particularity pleading is to alert the defendants to their precise misconduct and protect them against baseless charges of fraudulent behavior. See Durham v. Bus. Mgmt. Assocs. , 847 F.2d 1505, 1511 (11th Cir. 1988) (citation omitted).

Finally, at the motion to dismiss stage, the Court must view the allegations in the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs and accept well-pleaded facts as true. See St. Joseph's Hosp., Inc. v. Hosp. Corp. of Am. , 795 F.2d 948, 954 (11th Cir. 1986).

III. DISCUSSION

In a previous order, the Court resolved FCA's personal jurisdiction challenge and ruled on the sufficiency of the allegations supporting the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act claims. See In re Takata Airbag Prods. Liab. Litig. , 396 F. Supp. 3d 1101 (S.D. Fla. 2019). After thoroughly reviewing the Complaint and the moving papers, the Court dismissed the RICO claims (Counts 2 and 3), and the "Direct-File Action" in its entirety for lack of personal jurisdiction.

The Court will now resolve FCA's challenges to the claims remaining in the 46-count Complaint, which includes: a nationwide-class claim under the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act (Count 1); nationwide-class common-law claims for fraud, unjust enrichment, and negligence (Counts 4–6); and statewide-class claims alleging breach of implied warranty and violations of various state unfair and deceptive trade practices statutes (Counts 7–46). Before addressing the sufficiency of the allegations, the Court will determine the substantive law governing the claims of each named-Plaintiff.

A. APPLICABLE LAW

Questions of federal law in cases transferred under 28 U.S.C. Section 1407 are governed by the clearly settled law of the transferee court's circuit. See In re Managed Care Litig. , 150 F. Supp. 2d 1330, 1336 (S.D. Fla. 2001) (citing Murphy v. F.D.I.C. , 208 F.3d 959, 966 (11th Cir. 2000) ("Since the federal courts are all interpreting the same federal law, uniformity does not require that transferee courts defer to the law of the transferor circuit.") (citing In re Korean Air Lines Disaster of September 1, 1983 , 829 F.2d 1171, 1176 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (ruling, in the context of a Section 1407(a) transfer, that "[b]inding precedent for all is set only by the Supreme Court, and for the district courts within a circuit, only by the court of appeals for that circuit"))).

Questions arising under state law are generally governed by the substantive state law dictated by the choice of law rules of the federal court's state. See Grupo...