Boyd v. National R.R. Passenger Corp.

• Decision Date: 14 April 2006
• Citation: 845 N.E.2d 356,446 Mass. 540
• Parties: J. Michael BOYD, administrator,<SMALL><SUP>1</SUP></SMALL> v. NATIONAL RAILROAD PASSENGER CORPORATION<SMALL><SUP>2</SUP></SMALL> & others.<SMALL><SUP>3</SUP></SMALL>
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

845 N.E.2d 356

446 Mass. 540

J. Michael BOYD, administrator,¹ v. NATIONAL RAILROAD PASSENGER CORPORATION² & others.³

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Suffolk.

Argued January 6, 2006.

Decided April 14, 2006.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

John B. Flemming, Boston (Joseph P. Musacchio with him) for the plaintiff.

David T. Mitrou, Boston, for the defendants.

Present: MARSHALL, C.J., GREANEY, IRELAND, SPINA, SOSMAN, & CORDY, JJ.

SPINA, J.

On June 24, 1998, Kelly Ann Boyd (Boyd), fifteen years old, was struck and killed by a commuter rail train at the Pine Street grade crossing in Abington. Her father, J. Michael Boyd (plaintiff), filed a wrongful death action against the National Railroad Passenger Corporation (Amtrak), the Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority (MBTA), and Richard Prone, the engineer who had been operating the train at the time of the accident. The plaintiff's complaint asserted claims predicated on (1) negligence against Amtrak, the MBTA, and Prone; (2) statutory violations for failure to give adequate warnings against Amtrak and the MBTA; and (3) gross negligence and wilful, wanton, or reckless conduct against Amtrak and the MBTA. A judge in the Superior Court allowed the motion for summary judgment filed by Amtrak, the MBTA, and Prone, and the plaintiff's complaint was dismissed.

The Appeals Court affirmed the judgment, concluding, inter alia, that the plaintiff's wrongful death claims alleging wilful, wanton, or reckless conduct by Amtrak and the MBTA (together, the defendants) had been properly dismissed because (1) local speed limit and safety gate requirements were preempted by the Federal Railroad Safety Act (FRSA), 49 U.S.C. §§ 20101 et seq. (2000), and related regulations promulgated by the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA); (2) documents, reports, and testimony related to the defendants' purported knowledge that children were circumventing safety gates at grade crossings were excluded from discovery or admission in evidence, pursuant to 23 U.S.C. § 409 (2000), where such information had been obtained from train corridor analyses and video surveillance tapes⁴; and (3) the remaining admissible evidence produced by the plaintiff, relating to Prone's alleged excessive speed beyond federally prescribed limits and Prone's failure to sound the train's whistle⁵ in compliance with G.L. c. 160, § 138,⁶ was insufficient to support the plaintiff's claims that the defendants had engaged in wilful wanton, or reckless conduct.⁷ See Boyd v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 62 Mass.App.Ct. 783, 791-798, 821 N.E.2d 95 (2005). We granted the plaintiff's application for further appellate review, limited specifically to the issue of reckless conduct. As to that issue, the judgment of the Superior Court dismissing the plaintiff's complaint is reversed.⁸

A comprehensive factual and procedural history of this case is set forth in the Appeals Court's opinion. We describe only those facts relevant to this limited appeal and reserve for later discussion the details relevant to the defendants' alleged reckless conduct.

In September, 1997, the MBTA completed the rebuilding of the Old Colony railroad line, which restored rail service to numerous South Shore communities after thirty-eight years of nonuse. As part of this project, the MBTA contracted with Amtrak to be the commuter railroad operator. The town of Abington is located on the Kingston-Plymouth branch of the Old Colony line and has five public grade crossings, including one at Pine Street, where the accident at issue occurred. Double railroad tracks run through this crossing, enabling high-speed trains to meet and pass in opposite directions several times each day. The Pine Street grade crossing is equipped with automatic safety gates, bells, and warning lights.

During the early afternoon of June 24, 1998, Boyd rode her bicycle up Pine Street toward the railroad tracks, where she was observed by John Silva, a motorist who had been traveling in the same direction as Boyd until he stopped at the Pine Street grade crossing. The automatic safety gates had been lowered, the bells were ringing, and the warning lights were flashing. A southbound train went through the crossing on the east side of the track at a "pretty slow" or "normal" rate of speed. After that train passed, Boyd rode her bicycle around Silva's car, looked to the right and the left down the tracks, proceeded around the lowered safety gate, and began to cross the northbound track. According to Silva, it was difficult to see down the tracks because a signal bungalow obstructed the view, but he plainly could hear train whistles blowing. A fast-moving northbound train struck Boyd as she reached the middle of the first track, killing her.

According to an incident report filed by Abington police Officer Robert O'Keefe, the train's lights, horn, and bell were all in working order. The statements that Prone gave to Abington, MBTA, and State police officers, as well as to Amtrak investigators, as to exactly how the accident occurred were somewhat inconsistent. The substance of Prone's statements was that he had been operating the train in a northbound direction and had just passed the southbound train when he noticed Boyd starting to cross the tracks. The safety gates were down at the grade crossing, his headlights were flashing, and he was sounding his horn. Prone claimed that he blew the horn for ten to fifteen seconds before impact, and that he had been sounding it almost continuously through all of North Abington. When he realized that Boyd was not stopping at the safety gates, Prone applied the emergency brakes, but it was too late, and he struck her. In his statements to Amtrak investigators, Prone claimed that he applied the emergency brakes about 300 feet before the point of impact, but in his statement to the State police, the distance was "approximately 200 feet."

Pursuant to 49 C.F.R. § 213.9(a) (1997), the maximum allowable speed for a passenger train on a Class 4 track, the type involved here, was eighty miles per hour, although the defendants had set a more stringent maximum allowable speed of seventy miles per hour along the Old Colony line. Prone told MBTA and State police officers that he had been operating the train at approximately seventy miles per hour when he approached the Pine Street grade crossing. However, data from the train's event recorder indicated that the train had been operating at a speed of seventy-eight miles per hour approximately twelve to fourteen seconds before the collision occurred, and that the train was traveling at approximately seventy-five miles per hour when it hit Boyd. Data from the event recorder also showed that as the train approached the Pine Street crossing, Prone had "feathered" the horn, which meant that the horn was not sounded very much. The data indicated that the horn was blown continuously for five to six seconds immediately before the collision, suggesting the moments when Prone observed Boyd on the tracks. Amtrak's incident report concluded that Prone had been exceeding the maximum authorized speed limit while operating the train, and that at three grade crossings earlier in his run, Prone had not sounded his engine whistle in proper compliance with rules promulgated by the Northeast Operating Rules Advisory Committee (NORAC).⁹ Prone was suspended for thirty days for these violations in accordance with his union contract.

We begin with the familiar principle that "[t]he standard of review of a grant of summary judgment is whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, all material facts have been established and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Augat, Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 410 Mass. 117, 120, 571 N.E.2d 357 (1991). See Mass. R. Civ. P. 56(c), 365 Mass. 824 (1974). Here, all evidentiary inferences must be resolved in favor of the plaintiff. See Simplex Techs., Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 429 Mass. 196, 197, 706 N.E.2d 1135 (1999). Summary judgment is seldom granted in a cause of action alleging reckless conduct. See Manning v. Nobile, 411 Mass. 382, 388, 582 N.E.2d 942 (1991). However, this is not an absolute rule. See id. See also Hawco v. Massachusetts Bay Transp. Auth., 398 Mass. 1006, 1007, 499 N.E.2d 295 (1986) (no error in directing verdict for defendant MBTA on count of complaint alleging wilful, wanton, or reckless conduct).

The plaintiff contends that, when viewing the totality of the circumstances surrounding Boyd's death, he presented sufficient evidence to show that the defendants' conduct in the face of exceedingly dangerous conditions created a high degree of risk that death or serious physical harm would result. The plaintiff focuses on evidence that Prone was operating the train at an excessive rate of speed and that he failed to sound the train's horn at least 1,320 feet from the Pine Street grade crossing, in violation of G.L. c. 160, § 38. Such evidence, the plaintiff argues, created a triable issue of material fact as to whether the defendants' conduct constituted reckless disregard for the safety of another such that the defendants should be held liable for damages.¹⁰ We agree.

The Massachusetts wrongful death statute, G.L. c. 229, § 2, provides that a wrongful death claim may be brought against someone who, by wilful, wanton, or reckless act, causes the death of another person. The statute includes a specific exemption to liability for railroads that states that "a person operating a railroad shall not be liable for negligence in causing the death of a person while walking or being upon such railroad contrary to law or to the reasonable rules and regulations of the carrier" (emphasis added). G.L. c. 229, § 2. See Gage v. Westfield, 26 Mass.App.Ct. 681, 691, 532 N.E.2d 62 (1988). However, even where a decedent is a trespasser, a railroad can be held liable for damages if the conduct of its agents that caused...