Boyd v. Presbyterian Hosp. in City of New York
| Decision Date | 30 March 2001 |
| Docket Number | No. 95 Civ. 3847(DAB).,95 Civ. 3847(DAB). |
| Citation | 160 F.Supp.2d 522 |
| Parties | Barbara BOYD, Plaintiff, v. The PRESBYTERIAN HOSPITAL IN the CITY OF NEW YORK, Columbia-Presbyterian Medical Center, and Kathleen Dunleavy, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York |
Noah A. Kinigstein, New York, New York, for Plaintiff.
Jackson, Lewis, Schnitzler & Krupman, New York, New York, Gregory I. Rasin, Jennifer B. Courtian, for the Defendants, of counsel.
Barbara Boyd, ("Plaintiff"), an African-American woman, brings this action for declaratory and injunctive relief and damages pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq. ("Title VII"), and 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (" § 1981"). Plaintiff alleges that the Defendants, Presbyterian Hospital in the City of New York (the "Hospital"), and Kathleen Dunleavy, ("Dunleavy"), (collectively "Defendants"), discriminated against Plaintiff on the basis of her race. Defendants move pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 56, for summary judgment. Alternatively, Defendants move pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(f), to strike Plaintiff's request for damages. For the reasons stated below, Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED.
On August 17, 1980, Plaintiff began her employment with the Hospital as a staff nurse. (Pl.'s 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 1; Defs.' 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 1.)1 Plaintiff's duties included "patient care and charge responsibility." (Pl.'s 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 2; Defs.' 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 2.) Plaintiff worked as a staff nurse in various departments within the Hospital until September 1993, when she was assigned to work in the Adult Neurology Department ("Neurology").2 (Pl.'s 56.1 Stmt. ¶¶ 3-4; Defs.' 56.1 Stmt. ¶¶ 3-4.) Plaintiff continued to work in Neurology as of the filing date of Plaintiff's 56.1 Statement. (Pl.'s 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 4; Defs.' 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 4.) In September 1993, Dunleavy became Plaintiff's immediate supervisor when Plaintiff, at her own request, was transferred back to Neurology. (Pl.'s Dep. at 26-30, 32-33.) In September 1995, Dunleavy was transferred to a different department. (Pl.'s 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 8; Defs.' 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 8.) Currently, Dunleavy no longer supervises Plaintiff. (Id.)
Plaintiff does not claim she was ever denied a promotion at the Hospital because of any discriminatory treatment by anyone. (Pl.'s 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 48; Defs.' 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 48.) Throughout Plaintiff's employment with the Hospital, Plaintiff was never demoted. (Pl.'s 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 49; Defs.' 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 49.) Plaintiff's level of seniority was never affected in any way and she never was denied a salary increase because of discrimination by anyone at the Hospital. (Pl.'s 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 50; Defs.' 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 50.) Despite the above, Plaintiff nevertheless alleges that Dunleavy discriminated against her during the time Dunleavy served as Plaintiff's supervisor.
In June 1994, Plaintiff admitted to Dunleavy that she had accidentally taken home a Percocet tablet. (Pl.'s 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 14(h); Defs.' 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 14(h).) Percocet is a narcotic drug. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that subsequently Dunleavy accused Plaintiff of taking home two Percocet tablets in August 1994. (Pl.'s 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 14(h); Defs.' 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 14(h).) However, Plaintiff was on vacation in August 1994, a fact which Plaintiff claims that Dunleavy knew.3 (Pl.'s 56.1 Stmt. at 26; Pl.'s Dep. at 194-96). Dunleavy's August Percocet accusation made the Plaintiff "very upset." (Pl.'s Dep. at 197, 211.) In particular, Plaintiff was concerned that the "accusation" of taking the Percocet tablets could lead to her being "dishonorably discharge[d]" from her military job even though no such result occurred from the admitted June accident.4 (Pl.'s Dep. at 296.) Plaintiff also claims that in August 1994, Dunleavy told other Hospital employees that Plaintiff had taken the Percocet. (Pl.'s Dep. at 207.)
In September 1994, Plaintiff discussed "The August Percocet Incident" with Marianne Kerner, ("Kerner"), a union delegate. Kerner then filed a grievance on Plaintiff's behalf with the Hospital charging that the union contract had been violated as a result of Dunleavy's "harassment re: inappropriate and false accusation." (Pl.'s 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 30; Pl.'s Dep., at 210-18 (); Defs.' 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 30.) Plaintiff's "Step I" grievance was heard at a meeting at which Dunleavy, Kerner and Plaintiff were present. (Pl.'s 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 32; Pl.'s Dep. at 215; Defs.' 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 32.) At the conclusion of "Step I," Kathy Stendor ("Stendor")5 wrote a letter to Kerner stating that Dunleavy "has apologized for any comment made which may have been misconstrued." (Pl.'s Dep. at 242-43; Rasin Aff., Ex. I.) Kerner and Plaintiff instituted "Step II." (Pl.'s 56.1 Stmt. ¶¶ 34-35; Defs.' 56.1 Stmt. ¶¶ 34-35.) As a result of "Step II," Hospital management sent a letter to a union delegate stating that Plaintiff was not involved with a Percocet loss in her unit.6 (Rasin Aff., Ex. J.) Also as a result of the "Step II" grievance, Dunleavy wrote a letter to Plaintiff on February 27, 1995, which "assur[ed Plaintiff] that no accusations were made against her regarding her handling of controlled substances."
Plaintiff alleges that Dunleavy denied Plaintiff's request to have a vacation day on Christmas 1993, and Christmas 1994. (Defs.' 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 14(a); Pl.'s 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 14(a).) Plaintiff claims that in December 1993, Plaintiff had requested vacation for Christmas, but that Dunleavy told her that "she couldn't give [her] the time off [because she doesn't] give vacation time during the holidays."7 (Pl.'s Dep. at 41-42.) However, Dunleavy claims that she does give vacation on Christmas to employees when it is requested. (Dunleavy Dep. at 128-29.)
Plaintiff claims that a white nurse, Mary McManis ("McManis"), was given vacation from December 25, 1993 to January 7, 1994.8 (Pl.'s Dep. at 41-42, 60-61.) Thus, in January 1994, the time of the year when the Hospital staff submits vacation request forms for that year, Plaintiff claims that she requested vacation during Christmas 1994. (Pl.'s Dep. at 42.) Plaintiff alleges that Dunleavy again told Plaintiff that she doesn't give vacation during the Christmas holiday. (Id.) Nevertheless, in 1994, Plaintiff was given vacation from December 16, at 7:30 p.m., to December 25, at 7:00 p.m. (Pl.'s Dep. at 100-01.)
As a result of Dunleavy's denial in January 1994 of Plaintiff's request for a vacation day on Christmas 1994, Plaintiff contacted union delegate Marie Fetell, ("Fetell"), who spoke with Dunleavy. (Pl.'s Dep. at 43.) Plaintiff's conversation with Fetell allegedly led to a conversation between Plaintiff and Dunleavy in which Plaintiff claims that Dunleavy told Plaintiff that it is her policy not to "give vacation during the Christmas holiday." (Id.)
Plaintiff claims that she spoke with Dunleavy again, during which Plaintiff complained that Dunleavy's policy of refusing vacation requests on the Christmas holiday was not in the union contract. (Pl.'s Dep. at 77.) The union contract between the New York State Nurses Association and the Hospital grants the Hospital discretion in determining vacation time. (Defs.' 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 15(a); Pl.'s 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 15(a).) Dunleavy's job duties include creating vacation schedules for the nurses under her charge. (Pl.'s 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 18; Defs.' 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 18.)
On Plaintiff's performance appraisal covering the period September 5, 1993, to June 30, 1994, ("1993 evaluation"), Dunleavy attributed one "patient fall" to Plaintiff.9 (Pl.'s 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 14(g); Defs.' 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 14(g).) Plaintiff contends that the patient who fell was not assigned to her, but was assigned to a white nurse. Plaintiff claims that she had signed the incident report for the patient fall since "the first person that find [sic] the patient should fill out the incident report." (Pl.'s Dep. at 50.) Plaintiff claims that she explained to Dunleavy that the patient fall should not have been attributed to her, but that Dunleavy refused to remove the patient fall from Plaintiff's evaluation. (Id. at 50-51.)
Plaintiff again met with Fetell, this time to discuss the patient fall. (Id.) After Fetell called Stendor, Stendor indicated that she would remove the Patient Fall from Plaintiff's evaluation. (Pl.'s Dep. at 52.) The Patient Fall does not appear on Plaintiff's 1993 evaluation. (Rasin Aff., Ex. D.)
At Plaintiff's request, Dunleavy attended a meeting in September 1994, with Plaintiff and Lois Joseph ("Joseph"), the "CN-3"11 nurse with the most seniority in Neurology. (Pl.'s 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 14(i); Defs.' 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 14(i).) In the meeting Plaintiff complained that Joseph assigned Plaintiff the most difficult patients on the floor. (Id.) Plaintiff claims that Dunleavy told her at the meeting that Plaintiff was assigned the most difficult patients because Dunleavy and Joseph knew Plaintiff could handle it.12 (Pl.'s Dep. at 214.)
In June 1995, Dunleavy called Plaintiff into her office and questioned whether Plaintiff gave the wrong dosage of medication to a patient. (Pl.'s 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 14(b); Pl.'s Dep. at 45; Defs.' 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 14(b).) Although Plaintiff cannot remember the name of the medicine, (Pl.'s Dep. at 114), this first incident involved a general confusion regarding the alternating dose schedule a doctor directed that a patient receive, (Pl.'s Dep. at 46, 102-03, 111). Plaintiff explained to Dunleavy that she had discussed the dosage with a doctor before administering it. (Pl.'s Dep. at 45-48.) Plaintiff claims that a white nurse...
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