Boyd v. Scott

• Decision Date: 30 December 1994
• Docket Number: No. 93-8563,93-8563
• Citation: Boyd v. Scott, 45 F.3d 876 (5th Cir. 1994)
• Parties: Michael J. BOYD, Petitioner-Appellee, v. Wayne SCOTT, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, and Dan Morales, Attorney General, Respondents-Appellants.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

Page 876

45 F.3d 876

Michael J. BOYD, Petitioner-Appellee, v.Wayne SCOTT, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice and Dan Morales, Attorney General, Respondents-Appellants.

No. 93-8563.

United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit.

Dec. 30, 1994.

Amy Holley Hennessee, Asst. Atty. Gen., Dan Morales, Atty. Gen., Austin, TX, for appellants.

Beth L. Fancsali, Larry A. Gaydos(Court-appointed), Haynes and Boone, Fort Worth, TX, for appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas.

Before REYNALDO G. GARZA, WIENER and EMILIO M. GARZA, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

In this appeal by the Attorney General and the Director of the Department of Criminal Justice of the State of Texas, Respondents-AppellantsWayne Scott and Dan Morales(hereafter "Scott"), challenge a district court order granting Petitioner-AppelleeMichael Boyd a writ of habeas corpus.Scott asserts that the district court erred in concluding that Boyd's trial was fundamentally unfair as a result of the state trial court's giving an Allen charge that unconstitutionally coerced the jury into reaching a verdict.Scott also contends that, as the state court of appeals based its rejection of Boyd's claim regarding the Allen charge on adequate and independent state procedural grounds, Boyd's claim was procedurally barred from federal court review.Thus, Scott asserts, the district court erred procedurally in reviewing Boyd's claim and substantively in granting his petition for writ of habeas corpus.

Our de novo review of this appeal leads us to conclude that, as the state appellate court failed to state clearly and expressly that its rejection of Boyd's claim rested on adequate and independent state procedural grounds, his claim was not procedurally barred from federal review.As such, we are convinced that the district court did not err in reviewing Boyd's claim.

We are equally convinced, however, that the district court did err when it determined that the Allen charge given to the jury rose to the level of a constitutional violation.Although we have reviewed similar Allen charges on direct appeal, and have held that the charges were coercive, we here conclude that, pursuant to the level of review required for federal habeas cases, the instant Allen charge did not render Boyd's trial fundamentally unfair.As such, Boyd's constitutional due process right was not violated.Based on these conclusions we reverse the district court's order granting Boyd's petition for writ of habeas corpus and remand for dismissal in accordance with this opinion.

IFACTS AND PROCEEDINGS

Michael Boyd was charged in state court with first-degree felony aggravated sexual assault, to which he pleaded not guilty.Boyd's case was tried before a jury which, after hearing evidence for three days, began its deliberations on the fourth day of the trial.After approximately five hours of deliberation, the jury notified the judge that it could not reach a unanimous decision.In response to that information the trial judge read the following supplemental Allen charge ¹ to the jury.

In response to the information you have given me, I give you the following instructions, and I want you to pay close attention to what I tell you:

You should endeavor to reach an agreement if at all possible.Some jury, sometime, will have to decide this question.

The issue has been tried out very ably by both sides, who have presented this evidence to you, and a decision has to be reached by a jury.You are that jury, and it seems to me that you ought to make every effort to arrive at a unanimous verdict and to reach a conclusion.

Of course, the verdict of the jury should represent the opinion of each individual juror.But that does not mean that the opinion may not be changed by a conference in the jury room.

The very object of the jury system is to secure unanimity by comparison of views and by argument among the jurors themselves.

Each juror should listen with deference to the arguments of the other jurors, and with a distrust of his own judgment if he finds that a large majority of the jury takes a different view of the case from what he, himself takes.

No juror should go to the jury room with a blind determination that the verdict should represent his opinion of the case at that moment, or that he should close his ears to the arguments of other jurors who are equally honest and intelligent as himself.

Accordingly, although your verdict must be the verdict of each individual juror and not a mere acquiescence in the conclusion of your fellow jurors, the Court instructs you, however, that you should examine what has been submitted to you with an open mind, and with candor and proper regard and deference to the opinion of each other.

It is your duty to decide the case if you can conscientiously do so.

You should listen to each other's arguments with a disposition to be convinced.If much the larger number favor one side or the other, a dissenting juror should consider whether, in the light of the opinions that are expressed by the other jurors in the jury room, he is not in error as to his views.

I want you to go back to the jury room and continue your deliberations.Discuss the matter among yourselves in a friendly spirit and endeavor to agree upon a verdict.

These are the instructions of the Court.

Approximately one hour and twenty minutes after hearing the Allen charge, the jury reached a unanimous guilty verdict.²

Boyd appealed his conviction to the Texas Fourth Court of Appeals, which affirmed the trial court judgment.The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals refused Boyd's petition for discretionary review, and dismissed without prejudice Boyd's subsequent application for a state writ of habeas corpus.Boyd then petitioned a federal district court for a writ of habeas corpus, alleging that the Allen charge that was given to the jury violated his right of due process in that it unconstitutionally coerced the jury into reaching a verdict.

A magistrate judge reviewed Boyd's petition for habeas corpus relief and concluded that the Allen charge that was given here unconstitutionally coerced the jury into reaching a verdict, thus making Boyd's trial fundamentally unfair.Consequently the magistrate judge recommended that the district court grant Boyd's petition for habeas corpus.Scott objected to the magistrate judge's recommendation, contending that any inherent coerciveness in the Allen charge did not rise to the level of a constitutional violation, the level of harm required for a grant of federal habeas corpus relief.Scott also asserted for the first time that Boyd's claim was barred procedurally from federal court review.

In response to Boyd's objections the magistrate judge issued a second memorandum and recommendation, concluding that Boyd's claim was not procedurally barred.The magistrate judge determined that even if Boyd's claim was defaulted procedurally, the default was excusable as it was caused by ineffective assistance of trial counsel.The magistrate judge recommended that Scott's procedural default defense be rejected.The district court ultimately adopted the magistrate judge's memoranda and recommendations, rejecting Scott's objections, vacating Boyd's state court conviction, and granting Boyd's petition for writ of habeas corpus.Scott appeals the district court order that granted a writ of habeas corpus to Boyd.

IIANALYSIS

A.STANDARD OF REVIEW

In appeals pertaining to habeas corpus, we review the district court's findings of fact for clear error and rulings of law de novo.³Thus, we review de novo this appeal which challenges both the district court's determination that Boyd's claim was not barred procedurally and that court's determination that Boyd's petition for writ of habeas corpus should be granted because the instant Allen charge was unconstitutionally coercive.⁴

B.PROCEDURAL BAR⁵

Scott asserts that the district court erred in reviewing Boyd's claim because the state court of appeals had addressed and rejected Boyd's claim on grounds of adequate and independent state procedure.⁶If a state court decision rejecting a federal habeas petitioner's constitutional claim "rests on an adequate and independent state procedural bar and does not fairly appear to rest primarily on federal law, we may not review the merits of the federal claim absent a showing of cause and prejudice for the procedural default, or a showing that our failure to review the claim would result in a complete miscarriage of justice."⁷Procedural default does not bar consideration of a federal claim, however, unless the last state court rendering a judgment in the case clearly and expressly states that its judgment rests on a state procedural bar.⁸Furthermore, when a state court concludes that an issue is rejected on the basis of state procedural grounds, but also reaches the merits of a case, the state court must make a stronger showing that it relied on its rules of procedure to reach its conclusion and not on the merits of the federal claim.⁹

In responding to Scott's claim that Boyd's petition was barred procedurally, the magistrate judge found that, even though the state court noted that Boyd's failure to object specifically to the language complained of on appeal ("you are that jury") was barred procedurally pursuant to state law, ¹⁰the court also reached the merits of the issue based on federal law to conclude that the Allen charge did not have a coercive effect on the jury.The magistrate judge concluded that, as the state court decision was interwoven with federal law, and did not express clearly that its decision was based on state procedural grounds, Boyd's claim was not procedurally barred from review.¹¹

Our de novo review of the state appellate court opinion confirms the findings of the magistrate judge.Thus we conclude that the issue is not procedurally barred from federal habeas review, so the district court did not...