Boyd v. Smith
| Decision Date | 05 January 1953 |
| Citation | 372 Pa. 306,94 A.2d 44 |
| Parties | BOYD et ux. v. SMITH. |
| Court | Pennsylvania Supreme Court |
Suit by tenants of third floor apartment in tenement, against landlord, for personal injuries sustained by reason of landlord's failure to equip apartment with a satisfactory wire, chain, or other safe fire-escape. During pendency of action the landlord died, and his executor was substituted as defendant. The Court of Common Pleas No. 1 (tried in Court of Common Pleas No. 5) of Philadelphia County, March Term, 1950 No. 2530, Frank Smith, P. J., entered judgment for tenants and the executor appealed. The Supreme Court, Nos. 287, 288 January Term, 1952, Horace Stern, C. J., held that where statute requiring that the apartment be so equipped was a police measure intended for protection of human life, clause in lease relieving landlord from liability for injury or damage caused by fire, even though such injury or damage might result from his own negligence in failing to comply with such statute, was violative of public policy, legally inoperative and void.
Judgment affirmed.
Henry S. Ambler, Frank R. Ambler, Philadelphia, for appellant.
Theodore Spaulding, Carlyle M. Tucker, James K. Baker, Philadelphia, for appellee.
Before STERN, C. J., and STEARNE, JONES, BELL, CHIDSEY and MUSMANNO, JJ.
The decision in this case turns upon the question of the validity of a clause in a lease relieving the lessor from liability by reason of injury to any person in the demised premised resulting from the lessor's negligence.
The original defendant, Gus Besterman, was the owner of premises 1530 N. 19th Street, Philadelphia. This was a three story building, containing two apartments on each floor, which were rented to tenants. It was unquestionably a tenement within the meaning of the Act of June 11, 1915, P.L. 954, section 4, 53 P.S. § 3871, which defines that term as ‘ any house or building which, or a portion of which, is occupied as a residence by three or more families, living independently of each other, and doing their cooking on the premises, and having a common right in the halls, stairways yard, cellar, or water-closets thereof, or some of them.’ That same act provides, section 35, 53 P.S. § 3962, that ‘ No building of any of the grades referred to in this act shall be used for human habitation unless it is equipped with a fire- escape or fire-escapes as required by law: Provided, That any building of such grades having less than four (4) stories, and used as a rooming-house or tenement, the third story of which shall contain not more than five (5) rooms and a bath-room, and such third story is not occupied by more than ten (10) persons, and has at least one stairway therefrom, shall be exempt from the provisions of the acts of Assembly requiring fire-towers and outside fire-escapes for such buildings, if every apartment above the second floor in any of said buildings shall be equipped with a satisfactory wire, chain, or other safe fire-escape .’ Section 48 of the act, 53 P.S. § 4006, imposes a penalty of fine or imprisionment or both for violation of any of the provisions of the act.
Besterman did not equip his property with any wire, chain, or other safe fire-escape.
Plaintiffs, Mr. and Mrs. Boyd, occupied the third floor front of the premises under a written lease which contained the following clause: ‘ Lessee agrees to be responsible for and to relieve and hereby relieves the Lessor from all liability by reason of any injury or damage to any person or property in the demised premises, * * * caused by any fire, breakage or leakage in any part or portion of the demised premises, or any part or portion of the building of which the demised premises is a part * * * whether such breakage, leakage, injury or damage be caused by or result from the negligence of Lessor or its servants or agents or any person or persons whatsoever.’
On the morning of March 25, 1949 a fire broke out in the second floor rear of the building and as it mounted in intensity the flames rose through the stairway and halls and came into the Boyd apartment. Mrs. Boyd was there at the time with her two year old child. Passage through the hall and down the stairs being cut off, Mrs. Boyd went to the window seeking a means of escape, and while standing there was severely burned on her face, arms and back. First tossing her child into the arms of a man on the pavement, she herself jumped onto a canvas which, after some delay, was stretched by men in the street. In so doing she suffered severe injuries when the weight of her falling body broke the canvas.
The present suit was instituted by plaintiffs to recover damages for the injuries sustained by Mrs. Boyd. Besterman died after the suit was instituted, and Joseph Smith, the executor of his estate, was substituted in his place as defendant. Plaintiffs recovered a verdict and the court refused motions of defendant for a new trial and for judgment n. o. v.
It is obvious that Mrs. Boyd's injuries would not have occurred had Besterman complied with the provision of the Act of 1915 previously quoted, because, if a wire or chain had been installed as required by the act, Mrs. Boyd could have utilized it and quickly made her way down it to safety. The violation of that provision constituted negligence per se. Jinks v. Currie, 324 Pa. 532, 188 A. 356. It is true that the act provided a criminal penalty for the violation of its provisions, but that did not prevent the right of one injured because of such violation to recover damages for injuries sustained thereby. Danner v. Wells, 248 Pa. 105, 93 A. 871; Restatement, Torts, § 287.
Defendant relies, as previously indicated, on the exculpatory clause of the lease relieving him from liability for injury or damage caused by fire even though such injury or damage might result from his own negligence. Such a protective...
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