Boyd v. State
Decision Date | 01 September 1995 |
Docket Number | 41,Nos. 40,s. 40 |
Citation | 341 Md. 431,671 A.2d 33 |
Parties | Zayde BOYD v. STATE of Maryland. Trevor BROOKS v. STATE of Maryland. , |
Court | Maryland Court of Appeals |
Nancy S. Forster, Assistant Public Defender (Stephen E. Harris, Public Defender, on brief) Baltimore, for Petitioner.
Gary E. Bair, Assistant Attorney General (J. Joseph Curran, Jr., Attorney General, on brief) Baltimore, for Respondent.
Argued before MURPHY, C.J., and ELDRIDGE, RODOWSKY, CHASANOW, KARWACKI, BELL and RAKER, JJ.
We granted certiorari in both of these cases to review the identical narrow question: is it an abuse of discretion for a trial judge to refuse a party's request that the judge ask on voir dire whether any of the prospective jurors has a physical impairment hindering his or her performance as a juror? Under the common law of this State this Court will prescribe the juror voir dire process only as much as is necessary to establish that jurors meet minimum qualifications for service and to uncover disqualifying bias. Because Maryland statutory law requires that a thorough assessment of a juror's physical ability to serve take place at earlier stages in the jury selection process, we hold that such a question is not necessary and therefore not mandatory when requested at the voir dire stage. The refusal of the trial judge in each of the instant cases to ask such a question was not an abuse of discretion.
Zayde Boyd, one of the petitioners, was convicted in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City of attempted armed robbery and related offenses and sentenced to four fourteen-year terms and one five-year term of imprisonment, all to be served concurrently. Trevor Brooks, the other petitioner, was convicted in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City of second-degree murder and handgun offenses and sentenced to concurrent terms of imprisonment of thirty and fifteen years.
During both trials, the defendants' attorneys requested the judges to ask the jurors on voir dire: "Does any member of the jury have a physical impairment or ailment that would hinder them in performance as a juror (i.e., bad eyesight, poor hearing)?" In both trials, the judges refused to ask the question. In Boyd's case, Judge David Ross gave no explanation for his refusal to ask the question. Judge Thomas Ward, who presided at Brooks' trial, explained his refusal:
Both defendants appealed their convictions to the Court of Special Appeals, contending that the judges' refusal to ask the requested question concerning potential jurors' physical infirmities constituted reversible error. The defendants theorized that they could have been deprived of minimally qualified jurors, each with full physical faculties necessary to see and hear the evidence, as a result of the judges' refusal to ask the question on voir dire. There was no evidence to suggest that any juror who was impaneled on either trial actually had any physical impairments whatsoever.
Our intermediate appellate court rejected the defendants' arguments and affirmed both convictions in separate unreported opinions. We granted defendants' petitions for certiorari to consider their contention that they have a right, upon request, to have the specific question on physical impairments posed to potential jurors on voir dire. We disagree.
Our analysis of the instant cases requires a brief review of the evolution and requirements of the voir dire process in Maryland. Both the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article XXI of the Maryland Declaration of Rights guarantee to criminal defendants the right to trial by an impartial jury. The process of voir dire of potential jurors has been developed to ensure juror impartiality:
"Undergirding the voir dire procedure and, hence, informing the trial court's exercise of discretion regarding the conduct of the voir dire, is a single, primary, and overriding principle or purpose: 'to ascertain "the existence of cause for disqualification." '
. . . . .
"Thus, the purpose of the voir dire examination is to exclude from the venire those potential jurors for whom there exists cause for disqualification, so that the jury that remains is 'capable of deciding the matter before [it] based solely upon the facts presented, "uninfluenced by any extraneous considerations." ' "
Hill v. State, 339 Md. 275, 279, 661 A.2d 1164, 1166 (1995) (citations omitted). See also Davis v. State, 333 Md. 27, 633 A.2d 867 (1993); Bedford v. State, 317 Md. 659, 566 A.2d 111 (1989); Casey v. Roman Catholic Archbishop, 217 Md. 595, 143 A.2d 627 (1958); Adams v. State, 200 Md. 133, 88 A.2d 556 (1952).
The task of the trial judge is to impanel an impartial jury, and thus we have emphasized many times before that "the scope of voir dire and the form of the questions propounded rest firmly within the discretion of the trial judge." Davis, 333 Md. at 34, 633 A.2d at 870-71, citing Casey, 217 Md. at 605, 143 A.2d at 631 (1958); Bedford, 317 Md. at 670, 566 A.2d at 116-17; McGee v. State, 219 Md. 53, 58, 146 A.2d 194, 196 (1959); Adams, 200 Md. at 140, 88 A.2d at 559. Despite the broad discretion of the trial judge, however, we have defined a limited arena of mandatory questioning on voir dire:
Davis, 333 Md. at 35-36, 633 A.2d at 871 (emphasis in original) (citations omitted). In other words, we have held that the well-settled "right" to examine potential jurors, inherent in the constitutional right to a fair trial and an impartial jury, translates into a defendant's right to have certain questions propounded to the jurors where the proposed questions "concern a specific cause for disqualification." Hill, 339 Md. at 280, 661 A.2d at 1166.
In virtually all our previous cases, however, the proposed questions concerning specific cause for disqualification were related to the biases, such as racial or religious interests or prejudices, of the prospective jurors. As a result, in discussing what type of questions must be asked on voir dire, we have defined the proper focus of the voir dire examination to be only "the venireperson's state of mind and the existence of bias, prejudice, or preconception, i.e., 'a mental state that gives rise to cause for disqualification....' " Hill, 339 Md. at 280, 661 A.2d at 1167, citing Davis, 333 Md. at 37, 633 A.2d at 872. Although we did make a general statement in Davis that the minimum statutory qualifications for jurors would be included in the mandatory scope of voir dire, that case pertained solely to possible biases the venirepersons might have had in favor of law enforcement personnel, and our analysis and application of the rules of voir dire involved primarily the search for bias.
The voir dire question requested by the defendants in both Boyd and Brooks is unrelated to bias or a venireperson's state of mind; defendants maintain nonetheless that their proposed question concerns "a specific cause for disqualification," and therefore under the case law, particularly Davis and Casey, trial judges do not have the discretion to refuse to ask the question. The cases sub judice present us with the opportunity to apply our holdings in Casey, Davis, and other cases concerned with the voir dire process to a requested inquiry concerning the minimum physical qualifications of venirepersons.
In Casey, the plaintiff sustained serious injuries when, while praying at her parish church, she slipped and fell on a waxed floor. She sued the Roman Catholic Archdiocese for negligence, and at trial requested a voir dire question regarding any particular bias a venireperson might have for or against the Roman Catholic Church or a member of the Church. The trial judge refused to ask the specific question and instead asked a general question on religious corporations. We held, in reversing the trial judge, that the general nature of the question was not sufficient to identify the specific bias the plaintiff...
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