Boyd v. State

• Decision Date: 30 December 1976
• Citation: 341 So.2d 680
• Parties: In the Matter of Alfred Lee BOYD v. STATE of Alabama. SC 1998.
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Page 680

341 So.2d 680

In the Matter of Alfred Lee BOYD v. STATE of Alabama.

SC 1998.

Supreme Court of Alabama.

Dec. 30, 1976.

Rehearing Denied Feb. 4, 1977.

Guy F. Gunter, III, of Maye, Melton, Kent & Gunter, Opelika, for appellant.

William J. Baxley, Atty. Gen. and Jane LeCroy Robbins, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State, appellee.

MADDOX, Justice.

This appeal challenges the constitutionality of the juvenile transfer of jurisdiction statute (Title 13, § 364, Code). A brief statement of the case is necessary to pose and treat in context the issue presented.

A petition was filed in the juvenile court of Lee County, Alabama on June 5, 1976, alleging that Alfred Lee Boyd, age 15, was a delinquent child. The petition contained an allegation that Boyd had committed the offense of assault with intent to ravish. The juvenile court entered an order of temporary detention of the juvenile on June 6, 1976. The State, on June 10, 1976, filed a motion in the juvenile court for the transfer of the defendant from the jurisdiction of the juvenile court to the jurisdiction of the circuit court of Lee County, Alabama. A hearing was held in the juvenile court on the State's motion for transfer. The juvenile court judge found that the State had failed to prove that the juvenile Boyd could not be made to lead a correct life and could not be properly disciplined under the provisions of Title 13, §§ 350--383, Code; therefore, the juvenile court denied the State's motion for transfer. The State appealed to the circuit court.

The juvenile, through his appointed attorney, filed a motion to dismiss the appeal in which he claimed that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction. He also filed a motion to quash, in which he attacked the constitutionality of Title 13, § 364, as follows:

'4. That the provisions of Title 13, Section 364 require the Juvenile Court to make two findings of fact: (1) That the defendant is a delinquent child and (2) The defendant is incorrigible--he can not be made to lead a correct life and can not be properly disciplined. This conclusion is supported by the case of Rudolph v. State, 286 Ala. 189, 238 So.2d 542 (1970) in which the court held: under our statute (Title 13, Section 354) the proceedings in the Juvenile Court are to determine whether the child so charged has committed unlawful acts alleged in the petition. Before a minor over 14 may be transferred from Juvenile Court and tried in court having jurisdiction over the offense with which the child is charged, and before such child may be subjected to criminal prosecution like an adult, the court must first determine whether the child is a delinquent child.

'5. The words delinquent child are defined under the provisions of Title 13, Section 350(3) as follows: A delinquent child shall mean any child while under sixteen years of age violates any penal law of the United States or of this State, or any regulation, ordinance or law of any city, town or municipality, or who commits any offense or act for which an adult could be prosecuted in a method partaking of the nature of a criminal action or proceeding; or who is beyond the control of his parents, guardian or custodian, or who is otherwise incorrigible, or who is guilty of immoral conduct; or who is leading an idle, dissolute, lude or immoral life; or who engages in any calling, occupation, or exhibition punishable by law or is found in any place permitting for which an adult may be punished by law.

'6. That in Breed v. Jones, (421 U.S. 519), 95 S.Ct. 1779 (44 L.Ed.2d 346) (1975) the United (States) Supreme Court held that a State prisoner is put in jeopardy at a Juvenile Court adjudicatory hearing, whose object is to determine whether the defendant has violated a criminal law and as a result should stand prosecution as an adult after a finding that he was unfit for treatment as a juvenile. In footnote 16 of that opinion the United (States) Supreme Court cited Alabama as a jurisdiction that requires a finding of delinquency before the transfer of the juvenile to an adult court.

'7. That as a prerequisite for this Honorable Court to order a transfer of jurisdictions, the Court would be required to find that the defendant was a delinquent child and violated a criminal statute as alleged in the petition; that is--assault with intent to ravish.

'8. That the Alabama transfer provision, Title 13, Section 364, is unconstitutional because it deprives the defendant of the constitutional protection against multiple trials in violation of the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution.'

The juvenile court denied the juvenile's motion to quash, but also denied the State's motion to transfer. The circuit court denied the juvenile's motion to dismiss the appeal and motion to quash, which the juvenile refiled in circuit court, and ordered the defendant transferred to the jurisdiction of the circuit court of Lee County for trial as an adult.

Section 364, in pertinent part, provides:

'If, at any time, after thorough investigation or exercise of its disciplinary measures, the juvenile court . . . shall be convinced that a delinquent child, more than fourteen years of age, brought before it under the terms of this chapter cannot be made to lead a correct life and cannot be properly disciplined under the provisions of this chapter, the juvenile court . . . shall have authority to transfer the care of such delinquent to the jurisdiction of any other court in the county having jurisdiction of the offense with which said child is charged, there to be proceeded against according to law. . . .'

This section makes no reference to right of appeal by either party. The State claims the right of appeal of the juvenile court's adverse ruling pursuant to § 362, which, in pertinent part, provides:

'Any party aggrieved may take an appeal from any judgment or order of the court arising under provisions of this chapter to the circuit court of the county sitting as a court of equity . . . Upon appeal, the circuit court shall try the case de novo and shall proceed, under and in pursuance of the intent and terms of this chapter, to render such judgment as to it shall seem just and for the best interest of the child. . . .'

The State cites as authority the following cases: Seagroves v. State, 279 Ala. 621, 189 So.2d 137 (1966); Duck v. State 278 Ala. 138, 176 So.2d 497 (1965). In each of these cases, the juvenile defendant appealed from the juvenile court's order of transfer. The introductory phrase, 'Any party aggrieved,' of § 362 indicates, on the surface that the right of appeal is available to either the defendant from an order of transfer or to the State from an order denying transfer.

As is apparent from the juvenile's motion to quash, he believes that the juvenile court was Required by statute to find him delinquent because he had committed the offense of assault with intent to ravish before it could order a transfer. See paragraph No. 7 of his motion which is quoted above. If the juvenile is correct, the State could never proceed against a juvenile as an adult when he had committed a criminal offense because any adjudicatory finding in juvenile court that he had violated a criminal statute would cause jeopardy to attach. He could not then be prosecuted as an adult. Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519, 95 S.Ct. 1779, 44 L.Ed.2d 346 (1975).

The record filed here is silent as to whether there was an adjudicatory finding of delinquency that Boyd had committed the crime of assault with intent to ravish. However, every indication is that there was no such adjudicatory finding.

As we read Breed v. Jones, the State is required to determine whether it wants to treat a juvenile within the juvenile court system before entering upon a proceeding that may result in an adjudication that he has violated a criminal law. As the Supreme Court noted in Breed v. Jones, 95 S.Ct., at page 1790:

'We note that nothing decided today forecloses States from requiring, as a prerequisite to the transfer of a juvenile, substantial evidence that he committed the offense charged, so long as the showing required is not made in an adjudicatory proceeding. See Collins v. Loisel, 262 U.S. 426, 429, 43 S.Ct. 618, 625, 67 L.Ed. 1062 (1923); Serfass v. United States, 420 U.S. 377, 391--392, 95 S.Ct. 1055, 43 L.Ed.2d 265 (1975). The instant case is not one in which the judicial determination was simply a finding of, e.g., probable cause. Rather, it was an adjudication that respondent had violated a criminal statute.'

Our review of the record does not show that either the juvenile court or the circuit court made an adjudicatory finding that Boyd was delinquent because he had committed the offense of assault with intent to ravish. If, in fact, there was an adjudication of delinquency on this charge which does not appear of record, the juvenile can file a plea of double jeopardy in the trial on the criminal charge, as was done in Breed v. Jones.

The judgment of the trial court is due to be affirmed.

AFFIRMED.

HEFLIN, C.J., and BLOODWORTH, FAULKNER, ALMON, EMBRY and BEATTY, JJ., concur.

JONES and SHORES, JJ., dissent.

JONES, Justice (dissenting):

I respectfully dissent. I agree with defendant's contention that the legal impediment to the conclusion urged by the State is the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy.

'That no person shall, for the same offense, be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; but courts may, for reasons fixed by law, discharge juries from the consideration of any case, and no person shall gain an advantage by reason of such discharge of the jury.' Art. 1, § 9, Constitution of Alabama of 1901.

The constitutional dilemma faced by the State is dramatized in its own brief. Under 'Statement of the Facts' appears the following:

'(T)he chief probation officer of the Lee County Juvenile Court testified that according to the school records of Boyd, Boyd had been in trouble at school for fighting, bothering other students, sticking...