Boyd v. State

Decision Date13 January 2022
Docket NumberNo. 81195,81195
Parties Keair Jamal BOYD, a/k/a Brian Ausie Brandon, Appellant, v. The STATE of Nevada, Respondent.
CourtNevada Supreme Court
Law Office of Christopher R. Oram

Attorney General/Carson City

Clark County District Attorney

ORDER OF AFFIRMANCE

A jury found appellant Keair Jamal Boyd guilty of the above-referenced crimes, after which the district court sentenced Boyd to an aggregate sentence of life imprisonment with parole eligibility after 256 months. On appeal, Boyd challenges several evidentiary decisions, jury instructions, and the sufficiency of evidence to support the first-degree kidnapping conviction. We address each of his arguments in turn.

Evidentiary rulings

Expert testimony

Boyd argues that the district court erred by allowing Sergeant Richard Leung to testify as an expert about the pimp-prostitute relationship because the subject matter fell within the jury's knowledge and Leung's testimony "unfairly bolstered" the victim-B.W.’s credibility. Boyd also contends that the testimony's prejudicial effect "far outweighed" its probative value.

Boyd acknowledges that we review his claim for plain error, or an "unmistakable" error based on "casual inspection of the record," because he failed to object to the expert testimony below. Garner v. State, 116 Nev. 770, 783, 6 P.3d 1013, 1022 (2000), overruled in part on other grounds by Sharma v. State , 118 Nev. 648, 655, 56 P.3d 868, 872 (2002). NRS 50.275 allows an expert witness to "testify to matters within the scope of" the witness's "scientific, technical or other specialized knowledge" if such knowledge "assist[s] the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue." A qualified expert assists the jury only if he or she provides relevant testimony, Higgs v. State, 126 Nev. 1, 19, 222 P.3d 648, 660 (2010), that "helps educate lay jurors on specific areas of expertise .... [not] within the jury's province," Shannon v. State, 105 Nev. 782, 787, 783 P.2d 942, 945 (1989) ; see also NRS 48.015 (defining relevant evidence). We have previously said that testimony on pimp-prostitution culture and argot may constitute admissible expert testimony, see, e.g., Ford v. State , 127 Nev. 608, 625 n.9, 262 P.3d 1123, 1134 n.9 (2011), and here, we conclude that Leung offered relevant testimony that assisted the jury to determine whether Boyd's behavior and communications conformed to that of a pimp.

The testimony assisted the jury to understand the pimp-prostitute relationship and the terms commonly used by pimps and prostitutes to which the public may ascribe different meanings. Because this testimony tended to prove that Boyd was a pimp, the testimony was relevant. Further, contrary to Boyd's contention, B.W. did not offer "unambiguous" testimony that obviated the need for Leung's expert testimony. Instead, the expert testimony helped the jury to understand her testimony. For example, B.W. testified that Boyd paid for her manicures and clothes; Leung's testimony helped educate the jury that pimps pay for beauty maintenance and clothes to ensure prostitutes look presentable for dates. Neither did Leung vouch for B.W., credit her allegations of abuse, or bolster her credibility. He did not testify about the facts of the case, the relationship between B.W. and Boyd, or the truthfulness of B.W.’s testimony. To the contrary, he reiterated that he knew nothing about the Boyd investigation. While Leung's testimony may have confirmed, or gave credence to, parts of B.W.’s account, it did not infringe on the jury's province to determine the facts and the culpability of the defendant. See Townsend v. State , 103 Nev. 113, 119, 734 P.2d 705, 709 (1987) (observing that experts may "characterize their findings, observations[,] and conclusions within the framework of their field of expertise, irrespective of the corroborative or refutative effect").

We also reject Boyd's contention that Leung's testimony presented an "exciting," prejudicial "summary" of the pimp-prostitute relationship and culture. Leung's explanations generalized the pimp-prostitute relationship. Indeed, some of Leung's testimony could be corroborative of Boyd's defense theory that the relationship was consensual. Even to the extent the testimony created a risk of prejudice, any risk did not substantially outweigh its probative value to explain to the jury how the pimp-prostitute relationship operates. NRS 48.035(1) (providing that relevant evidence is excluded where the "probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, of confusion of the issues or of misleading the jury"). Moreover, Boyd refuted the testimony with his own testimony that he had a consensual relationship with B.W. and that the rap culture in which he was involved imbued his communications with B.W. Thus, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion, let alone commit plain error, in admitting Leung's expert testimony.

Abortion evidence

Boyd argues that the district court's refusal to admit evidence that B.W. obtained an abortion, for which he paid, hindered his ability to present his theory of defense that the two maintained a consensual relationship, and thus, infringed on his constitutional right to a fair trial. Reviewing for an abuse of discretion, Mclellan v. State, 124 Nev. 263, 267, 182 P.3d 106, 109 (2008), we conclude that the district court's decision to preclude the mention of abortion did not thwart Boyd's ability to present a full and meaningful defense. Even though the jury did not hear the exact nature of the procedure, it heard that B.W. received "a medical procedure," as well as almost all of the surrounding details, including that Boyd accompanied B.W. to the procedure, paid for the procedure, and cared for her after the procedure. Thus, the record supports that the district court otherwise gave Boyd a meaningful opportunity to present his theory of defense about their consensual relationship.1 The precise nature of the procedure does not tend to prove any fact of consequence to the State's charges or Boyd's defense of a consensual relationship. See NRS 48.015 (defining "relevant evidence"). By contrast, abortion is a politically and emotionally charged issue that presented a significant risk for its mention to distract jurors from the issues or to prejudice jurors. Thus, even if we deemed the nature of the procedure relevant, its prejudicial effect substantially outweighed its probative value. See NRS 48.035(1) (providing grounds for exclusion of relevant evidence). Accordingly, the district court acted within its discretion when it excluded the mention of B.W.’s abortion, as opposed to her medical procedure.

Jury instructions

While we review Boyd's challenges to the contents of jury instructions de novo, we review Boyd's challenges to the decisions to give or refuse to give certain instructions for abuses of discretion. Nay v. State, 123 Nev. 326, 330, 167 P.3d 430, 433 (2007). We do not reverse a judgment based on an erroneous instruction if the error did not affect the outcome. See Wegner v. State, 116 Nev. 1149, 1155, 14 P.3d 25, 30 (2000), overruled on other grounds by Rosas v. State , 122 Nev. 1258, 1269, 147 P.3d 1101, 1109 (2006).

Submitted jury instructions

Boyd challenges the contents of four instructions given by district court: (1) the reasonable-doubt instruction; (2) the equal-and-exact-justice instruction; (3) the charges instruction; and (4) the specific-intent instruction. The first three instructions, he says, minimized the State's burden of proof and allowed the jury to ignore the presumption of innocence. The last instruction, Boyd alleges, misstated the law on specific intent for first-degree kidnapping.

Reasonable-doubt and equal-and-exact-justice instructions

Boyd argues that the language in the reasonable-doubt instruction invited the jury to "inflate [ ] the constitutional standard of doubt necessary for acquittal" and to convict "based on a lesser standard of proof than the [C]onstitution requires." In a similar vein, he contends that the so-called "equal and exact justice" instruction minimized the State's burden of proof and created a potential for the jury to reject the presumption of innocence.2 Both of these arguments are foreclosed by our precedent, e.g., Johnson v. State, 118 Nev. 787, 806, 59 P.3d 450, 462 (2002) (declining to reconsider constitutionality of reasonable-doubt instruction based on purported lack of "meaningful principles or standards to guide the jury in evaluating the evidence" where the district court also instructed the jury on presumption of innocence and burden of proof), overruled on other grounds by Nunnery v. State , 127 Nev. 749, 772, 263 P.3d 235, 250-51 (2011) ; Leonard v. State, 114 Nev. 1196, 1209, 969 P.2d 288, 296 (1998) (explaining that the equal-and-exact-justice instruction "does not concern the presumption of innocence or burden of proof," and thereby, does not minimize either when the district court otherwise instructs the jury on those principles), or by the Legislature, see NRS 175.211 (defining reasonable doubt and prohibiting courts from giving any "other definition"). Additionally, we have reasoned that accompanying instructions on the presumption of innocence and the burden of proof, as the district court provided here, eliminate any "likelihood" that the jury applied the instructions in an unconstitutional manner. See Bollinger v . State, 111 Nev. 1110, 1115, 901 P.2d 671, 674, 676 (1995) (stating that the court does not reverse for an erroneous jury instruction unless "a reasonable likelihood [exists] that the jury ... appl[ied]" the instruction in an unconstitutional manner (quoting Victor v. Nebraska, 511 U.S. 1, 6, (1994) )). Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its discretion in giving the reasonable-doubt and equal-and-exact-justice instructions.3

Charges instruction

The charges instruction listed the six counts brought by the State, and...

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