Boyer v. Bedrosian
| Decision Date | 12 December 2012 |
| Docket Number | Nos. 2010–369–M.P., 2010–414–M.P.,s. 2010–369–M.P., 2010–414–M.P. |
| Citation | 57 A.3d 259 |
| Parties | Elizabeth BOYER et al. v. Chief Judge Haiganush BEDROSIAN et al. |
| Court | Rhode Island Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Thomas W. Lyons, Esq., Providence, for Plaintiffs.
Michael B. Forte, Esq., James R. Lee, Department of Attorney General, Providence, for Defendants.
Present: SUTTELL, C.J., FLAHERTY, ROBINSON, and INDEGLIA, JJ.
The plaintiffs include fifteen minor children and their parents 2 who participated in the Family Court's Truancy Court Diversion Calendar Program. The Diversion Program, established in 1999, allows Family Court magistrates to conduct court sessions at public schools where truancy has become an issue. The stated goal of the Diversion Program is to ensure that children not only attend school, but also that they receive necessary rehabilitative and educational services to assist them in maintaining school attendance and achieving academic success.
However, in 2010, plaintiffs brought an action in the Superior Court against the chief judge and five magistrates of the Family Court who were sitting in the Truancy Court,3 in their official capacities (collectively,the judicial defendants); two Family Court administrators,4 in their official capacities (the administrator defendants); and five municipalities and the superintendents, in their official capacities, of the public school districts for the five municipalities.5 The plaintiffs contended that their constitutional rights were being violated as a result of procedural errors occurring during the course of the administration of their cases in the Truancy Court, and they sought declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.6 The judicial defendants filed a motion to dismiss, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure,7 and a motion to strike under Rule 12(f),8 and the administrator defendants filed a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1) and Rule 12(b)(6), but the trial justice denied the motions. The administrator defendants then petitioned this Court for a writ of certiorari, as the judicial defendants also did separately at a later date. On December 10, 2010, we granted the petitions for writ of certiorari. Now before this Court are a number of arguments raised by defendants, including that the Superior Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, plaintiffs lack standing, plaintiffs' claims are moot, and the case is barred by the doctrines of judicial immunity, comity, abstention, and res judicata. For the reasons set forth herein, we quash the Superior Court's order denying defendants' motions to dismiss.
The factual background of this case is described at length in the thorough and accurate Superior Court decision denying defendants' motion to dismiss— viz., Boyer v. Jeremiah, No. 2010–1858, 2010 WL 4041812 (R.I.Super.Ct. Oct. 8, 2010). We shall summarize only the facts that are relevant to the issues raised in this matter.
In September 1999, the Truancy Court program was established by former Family Court Chief Judge Jeremiah. The program was a specialized calendar designed to allow Family Court magistrates to conduct court sessions at schools with frequently truant children.9 The Truancy Court was intended to facilitate collaboration between the Family Court, schools, and service providers to ensure that children and their parents 10 received guidance and appropriate services within their own neighborhoods, quickly, efficiently, and effectively.
As set forth in the later-issued Family Court Administrative Order 2010–2, discussed infra, Part I, section C, “[t]he purpose of the Rhode Island Family Court Truancy calendar [was] to reduce truancy statewide,” and “ensure that students not only attend[ed] school but also receive[d] the rehabilitative services and educational services that [would] help to assure school attendance and academic success.” To effectively carry out the purpose of the program, each child alleged to have been truant was given a choice between admitting to a truancy violation, thereby gaining acceptance into the Truancy Court program, or having a full trial in the Family Court. Even if a child, with his or her parents, opted for the Truancy Court program, the child and parent could elect to transfer a case to the Family Court by requesting a trial or hearing before the Family Court at any time. Additionally, a child or parent could appeal a Truancy Court magistrate's order to the chief judge of the Family Court under a statutory right of appeal pursuant to G.L.1956 § 8–10–3.1(d),11 further amplified by Family Court Administrative Order 2008–1.12 The children and parents also were imbued with a statutory right to file a declaratory judgment in the Family Court under G.L.1956 § 9–30–1. 13 Finally, a child and parent could seek further review in this Court under G.L.1956 § 8–1–214 or G.L.1956 § 14–1–52(a).15
On March 29, 2010, plaintiffs initiated an action in the Superior Court by filing a proposed class action complaint 16 and civil rights lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The plaintiffs demanded declaratory relief under § 9–30–1, injunctive relief under Rule 65 of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure, and attorneys' fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988. On the same day, plaintiffs filed separate motions: one for preliminary injunction and one for class certification pursuant to Rule 23 of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure.17 In addition to bringing suit against the various judicial and administrator defendants, plaintiffs sued several municipalities that had participated in the Truancy Court program. They alleged that all defendants had administered and operated the Truancy Court in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, and article 1, section 2 of the Rhode Island Constitution, the Rhode Island General Laws, the Family Court Rules of Juvenile Proceedings, and the Supreme Court Rules of Judicial Conduct.
“[2] fail[ed] to provide adequate information regarding individual rights at the arraignment, * * *
“[3] permitt[ed] children members of the Plaintiff class to waive their right to counsel without first consulting with counsel, * * *
“[4] engag[ed] in ex parte determinations regarding whether Plaintiff children ha[d] violated the terms and conditions of Truancy Court, * * * [and]
“[5] fail[ed] to keep and provide to the Plaintiffs a verbatim record of all proceedings before the Truancy Court.”
The plaintiffs also specifically alleged that former Chief Judge Jeremiah, Administrator Pagliarini, and Director Richard
“[1] fail[ed] to ensure that interpreters [were] available as necessary to individuals appearing before the Truancy Court, * * * [and]
“[2] fail[ed] to conduct a preliminary investigation to determine whether submitted petitions [were] legally sufficient on their face and whether further action [was] in the best interest of the public and the child * * *.”
On May 24, 2010, the administrator defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint, alleging that the Superior Court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over plaintiffs' claims and that plaintiffs had failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. SeeRule 12(b)(1), (6). On May 25, 2010, the judicial defendants also moved to dismiss the complaint, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1),18 and moved to strike three of plaintiffs' claims for injunctive relief 19 and plaintiffs' request for attorneys' fees under Rule 12(f). The trial justice heard oral arguments on defendants' motions to dismiss and motion to strike, but before he rendered a decision, Chief Judge Bedrosian 20 promulgated administrative order 2010–2 on September 10, 2010.
Chief Judge Bedrosian's administrative order set out written procedures that dramatically reformed the Truancy Court Diversion Calendar Program. With regard to the intake guidelines for truancy petitions, administrative order 2010–2 mandated that “all truancy petitions shall be referred to the RI Family Court Intake Department for a preliminary investigation.” If the Intake Department concluded that there was insufficient “evidence and/or documentation * * * to bring a student within the jurisdiction of the court, the Intake Department [would] not authorize the petition.”
If, on the other hand, a conclusion was reached after preliminary investigation that there existed sufficient evidence and documentation to assert the court's jurisdiction, “the Intake Department [should] determine the most appropriate level of judicial action,” which included referring the case to the truancy calendar or to the formal juvenile calendar. Administrative order 2010–2 also added a threshold requirement that a student must “[have] at least 10 days of absences and/or [the petition] state[d] that a student [was] habitually late or absent from school” before the Intake Department could refer a case to the truancy calendar.
Under the terms of the order, if a petition was determined to be suitable for the truancy calendar, it was to be assigned to a school location, and written notice would be sent to the parents. That notice would inform the parent that the child had been referred to the Family Court on a “wayward status offense of truancy,” and that the parents would have the opportunity to give valid excuses for the absences at the hearing. The notice would also set the location, time, and date of an initial meeting with a magistrate. If the child or parent did not appear at the truancy calendar, order 2010–2 stated, “a summons may be issued for the child and parent/guardian to appear.” See § 14–1–16. 21
The administrative order further required...
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