Boyer v. Clinton Cnty. Sheriff's Office
| Decision Date | 09 December 2022 |
| Docket Number | 1:22-cv-212 |
| Parties | TIM BOYER, Plaintiff, v. CLINTON COUNTY SHERIFF'S OFFICE, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Ohio |
OPINION AND ORDER
This cause comes before the Court on Defendants Clinton County Sheriff's Office, Dispatcher Lori Elkins, Sheriff Ralph D. Fizer, and Sheriff's Deputy Michelle Smith's Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 6) Plaintiff Tim Boyer's Amended Complaint (Doc. 3). For the reasons discussed below, the Court GRANTS Defendants' Motion (Doc. 6) and DISMISSES Boyer's Amended Complaint (Doc. 3) WITH PREJUDICE.
Plaintiff Tim Boyer alleges Defendants Clinton County Sheriff's Office, Dispatcher Lori Elkins, Sheriff Ralph D. Fizer, and Sheriff's Deputy Michelle Smith violated his constitutional rights stemming from an incident occurring at his home on October 7, 2019. (Doc. 3, #57). According to Boyer, his ex-girlfriend and his ex-wife together entered his home and began removing his personal property. (Id.). At the time, he alleges he could not lawfully enter the structure because a protection order prohibited him from doing so. (See id. at #59). After a neighbor notified him of the alleged ongoing theft, Boyer contacted the Clinton County Sheriff's Office to request help. (Id.). Boyer spoke with Dispatcher Lori Elkins, who sent Sheriff's Deputy Melissa Smith. (Id. at #59-60). But according to Boyer, Smith proceeded to improperly arrested Boyer for violating his protection order, in effect permitting his ex-girlfriend and ex-wife to continue pilfering his belongings. (Id. at #61). In connection with that arrest, Deputy Smith also searched and seized Boyer's truck. (Id. at #62). As a result, the women allegedly took some $60,000 of Boyer's property. (Id.). And after all this, the prosecutor ultimately dropped the charges against Boyer for violating the protection order. (Id. at #79).
Boyer responded by filing this pro se lawsuit in state court on March 24, 2022, proceeding under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and (apparently) 42 U.S.C. § 12132. (Doc. 2, #47). On April 11, Boyer filed an Amended Complaint, but his only meaningful amendment was to add the text of various Ohio statutes he believed Defendants had also violated. (Doc. 3).
Read in the light most favorable to Boyer, Boyer's Amended Complaint asserts § 1983 claims based first on three underlying Fourth Amendment violations: (1) false imprisonment/unlawful arrest; (2) unreasonable search and seizure; and (3) excessive use of force (in arresting him). (Doc. 3, #62, 78). Second, Boyer alleges that Elkins and/or Smith[1] further violated his constitutional rights when they “aid[ed] in the crime of burglary.” (Id. at #77-78). And third, he alleges that Sheriff Fizer and his Office also violated Boyer's constitutional rights (or at least bear independent liability for the Deputies' conduct) by failing to discipline Elkins and/or Smith following the incident. (Id.). Finally, Boyer appears to believe Defendants violated his rights under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act. (Id. at #58). For the harm he suffered because of these alleged violations, Boyer seeks $1,590,020 in monetary relief. (Id. at #79).
Not long after Boyer amended, Defendants removed to this Court citing federal question jurisdiction. (Doc. 1). Then, on April 28, 2022, Defendants moved to dismiss under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). (Doc. 6). They argue the statute of limitations bars each of Boyer's claims. (Id. at #95). Defendants also assert that 42 U.S.C. § 12132 is not relevant to this matter based on Boyer's factual allegations. (Id. at #97). Boyer responded (Doc. 8) and Defendants replied in support. (Doc. 10). The matter is now ripe.
Defendants have moved to dismiss Boyer's Amended Complaint under Rule 12(b)(6). This requires the Court to consider whether Boyer has “fail[ed] to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). In making that determination, the Court must “construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, accept its allegations as true, and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff.” Bassett v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 528 F.3d 426, 430 (6th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted). That is so, however, only as to well-pled factual allegations. The Court need not accept “‘naked assertions' devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (brackets omitted) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 557 (2007)). Likewise, the Court need not accept as true any legal conclusions alleged in a complaint; “labels and conclusions” or a “formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action” will not suffice. Id.
At the pleadings stage, a complaint must “state[] a claim for relief that is plausible, when measured against the elements” of a claim. Darby v. Childvine, Inc., 964 F.3d 440, 444 (6th Cir. 2020) (citing Binno v. Am. Bar Ass'n, 826 F.3d 338, 34546 (6th Cir. 2016)). “To survive a motion to dismiss, in other words, [Boyer] must make sufficient factual allegations that, taken as true, raise the likelihood of a legal claim that is more than possible, but indeed plausible.” Id. (citations omitted). In sum, the well-pled facts must be sufficient to “raise a right to relief above the speculative level,” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, such that the asserted claim is “plausible on its face.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
Under the Iqbal/Twombly plausibility standard, courts play an important gatekeeper role, ensuring that claims meet a threshold level of factual plausibility before defendants endure the potential rigors (and costs) of the discovery process. Parties engage in discovery not to determine whether a claim exists, but instead to gather evidence for an already plausibly stated claim. Green v. Mason, 504 F.Supp.3d 813, 827 (S.D. Ohio 2020).
Boyer appears to seek relief under two statutes, § 1983 and Title II of the ADA (42 U.S.C. § 12132). Defendants argue that both theories (assuming Boyer is in fact asserting an ADA claim) suffer a common defect-each is untimely under the relevant statute of limitations. (Doc. 6). Defendants also argue that Boyer's ADA claim, even if timely, is insufficiently pled. (See id. at 6).
As discussed below, the Court agrees that the statute of limitations bars each of Boyer's § 1983 claims. Moreover, even assuming Boyer intended to plead an ADA claim, the Court concludes that he failed to meet the Iqbal/Twombly plausibility standard. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Defendants' Motion (Doc. 6).
In seeking to dismiss Boyer's § 1983 claims on statute of limitations grounds at the pleading stage, Defendants face a daunting task. Dismissal on limitations grounds is appropriate only “if the allegations in the [Amended Complaint] affirmatively show that the claim is time-barred.” Snyder-Hill v. Ohio State Univ., 48 F.4th 686, 698 (6th Cir. 2022) (internal quotations omitted). Moreover, “the statute of limitations is an affirmative defense, and it is the defendant's burden to show that the statute of limitations has run.” Id. In determining whether the defendant has met that burden, the Court generally must consider: (i) the applicable statute of limitations time period, (ii) when the action accrued (and thus set that time period in motion), and (iii) whether any tolling period exists. See, e.g., Hollis v. Erdos, 480 F.Supp.3d 823, 829-30 (S.D. Ohio 2020).
Start with the applicable limitations period. Because Congress did not provide a statute of limitations in the text of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the law of the state in which the incident occurred provides the applicable period. Sevier v. Turner, 742 F.2d 262, 272 (6th Cir. 1984). Here, that is Ohio. And, “[i]n Ohio, causes of action premised upon 42 U.S.C. § 1983 are subject to a two-year statute of limitations.” Basista Holdings, LLC v. Ellsworth Twp., 710 Fed.Appx. 688, 691 (6th Cir. 2017) (citing Trzebuckowski v. City of Cleveland, 319 F.3d 853, 855-56 (6th Cir. 2003)).
On the other hand, federal law controls the time at which a § 1983 action accrues. Sevier, 742 F.2d at 272. And it provides that accrual occurs “when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury which is the basis of his action.” Id. at 273 (emphasis added). “A plaintiff has reason to know of his injury when he should have discovered it through the exercise of reasonable diligence.” Id. Here, as of October 7, 2019, Boyer knew that the two women had allegedly stolen his property, and that Defendants had not prevented it (or perhaps even facilitated it). He also knew that Deputy Smith instead arrested him and searched and seized his truck.
Based on the events of that day and the consequences of those events, Boyer asserts three overarching theories of § 1983 liability. First, he claims Elkins and/or Smith violated his Fourth Amendment rights in three separate, but related ways- in falsely imprisoning/unlawfully arresting him, in using excessive force to do so, and in unreasonably searching and seizing his truck. (Doc. 3, #57). Second, he argues Elkins and/or Smith violated his rights by “aid[ing] in the crime of burglary” that same evening. (Id. at #78-79). Fi...
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