Boyer v. United States.
Decision Date | 22 November 1944 |
Docket Number | No. 221.,221. |
Citation | 40 A.2d 247 |
Parties | BOYER v. UNITED STATES. |
Court | D.C. Court of Appeals |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Appeal from the Municipal Court for the District of Columbia, Criminal Division.
John Leonard Boyer was convicted of obtaining money and property under false pretenses, and he appeals.
Reversed with instruction.
Alfred F. Goshorn, of Washington, D. C., for appellant.
John D. Lane, Asst. U. S. Atty., of Washington, D. C. (Edward M. Curran, U. S. Atty., and John P. Burke, Asst. U. S. Atty., both of Washington, D. C., on the brief), for appellee.
Before RICHARDSON, Chief Judge, and CAYTON and HOOD, Associate Judges.
This is an appeal from a conviction upon a charge of obtaining money and property under false pretenses. Code 1940, § 22-1301.
Appellant was arrested March 11, 1944, and arraigned March 13. The case was set for trial on March 27, and on that day was continued at the request of appellant until March 29. When the case was called for trial on the 29th, appellant requested a further continuance in order that his handwriting expert might examine the disputed check. At that time the expert was examining the check and the court refused a further continuance but granted permission to the expert to continue his examination while the trial was in progress and during the lunch hour. The expert examined the check in the morning, during the lunch hour, and for sometime in the afternoon, but was never called as a witness for appellant. Appellant assigns as error the court's refusal to grant the requested continuance and says that he was forced to go to trial without the benefit of the testimony of his handwriting expert.
We have held, in accordance with the general rule, that postponement or continuance of a trial is within the discretion of the trial court and its action will not be disturbed on appeal except for an abuse of discretion. Taylor v. Yellow Cab Co., Mun.App.D.C., 31 A.2d 683, 71 W.L.R. 380. No explanation is here offered why permission for examination of the check by the expert was not requested at an earlier date or why request for the continuance was delayed until the case was called for trial. Furthermore, the record does not show that the expert's failure to testify was due to a lack of time for examining the check. As far as the record discloses, the expert may have completed his examination prior to the close of the trial and his failure to testify may have been due to other causes. We cannot hold there was an abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court. Cf. Tomlinson v. United States, 68 App.D.C. 106, 93 F.2d 652, 114 A.L.R. 1315, certiorari denied 303 U.S. 646, 58 S.Ct. 645, 82 L.Ed. 1102.
Appellant asserts that the trial court was in error in refusing to grant his motion for a directed verdict at the close of the Government's case. Any error in that respect, however, was waived when appellant proceeded to offer evidence in his behalf. Rogers v. District of Columbia, Mun.App.D.C., 31 A.2d 649, 71 W.L.R. 655. Appellant argues that this rule ought not to be applied in criminal cases, but it is too well established in this jurisdiction to be questioned by us. Smith v. United States, 61 App.D.C. 344, 62 F.2d 1061; Murray v. United States, 53 App.D.C. 119, 288 F. 1008, certiorari denied 262 U.S. 757, 43 S.Ct. 703, 67 L.Ed. 1218.
On cross-examination of appellant the Government brought out that he had been previously convicted of embezzlement in the State of Virginia. Appellant sought to explain the circumstances of his conviction but was not allowed to do so. This is assigned as error. The evidence of the prior conviction was offered under Section 14-305 of the Code which provides, in part, that ‘No person shall be incompetent to testify, in either civil or criminal proceedings, by reason of his having been convicted of crime, but such fact may be given in evidence to affect his credit as a witness.’ The effect of this section is that ‘any person who has been convicted of a crime, i. e., a felony or misdemeanor, may have that fact given in evidence against him to affect his credit as a witness.’ Bostic v. United States, 68 App.D.C. 167, 94 F.2d 636, 637, certiorari denied 303 U.S. 635, 58 S.Ct. 523, 82 L.Ed. 1095. But, ‘a witness may not be asked if he has been indicted for a crime, or even if he has been tried and convicted, if the conviction was later set aside and a new trial granted.’ Thomas v. United States, 74 App.D.C. 167, 121 F.2d 905, 907. Though the admissibility of the conviction, and the purpose for which it is received, are clearly established, we have found no decision in this jurisdiction establishing or denying the right of the witness to explain the circumstances of his prior conviction. In other jurisdictions the courts are not in accord.
A few cases indicate that a witness may even deny his guilt of the former charge. 1 However, the great majority of cases hold that the prior conviction is conclusive of the witness's guilt and may not be rebutted by any attempted proof of innocence. These cases, however, are in wide disagreement as to whether the witness shall be allowed ‘to explain the circumstances of the offense, as extenuating the act and diminishing its significance.’ Wigmore on Evidence, 3d Ed., § 1117(3). On the one side many cases hold that no explanation of a conviction can be given, because it would lead to investigation of a matter wholly collateral to the issue to be tried. The position of these authorities is well stated in Lamoureux v. New York, N. H. & H. R. Co., 169 Mass. 338, 47 N.E. 1009, 1010, where the court, speaking through Holmes, J., said:
Other cases in accord with this position are cited below. 2
On the other hand, many authorities are to the effect that, though the witness cannot deny his guilt, he should be allowed to offer evidence as to the circumstances of the offense in mitigation of its effect upon his credibility. The position of these authorities is well stated in Donnelly v. Donnelly, 156 Md. 81, 143 A. 648, 650, where the court said:
Other cases in accord with this position are cited below. 3
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