Boyer v. United States
| Decision Date | 25 September 2015 |
| Docket Number | No. 14-33L,14-33L |
| Parties | BOYER, et al., Plaintiffs, v. THE UNITED STATES, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. Claims Court |
Rails-to-Trails; Fifth Amendment Takings; Oregon Law; Scope of Easement
Mark F. ("Thor") Hearne, II, Clayton, MO, with whom were Meghan S. Largent, Lindsay S.C. Brinton, Stephen S. Davis, Clayton, MO; Debra J. Albin-Riley, Los Angeles, CA, for plaintiff.
Rachel K. Roberts, Environment and Natural Resources Division, United States Department of Justice, Seattle, WA, with whom was John C. Cruden, Assistant Attorney General, Washington, DC, for defendant. Evelyn Kitay, Deputy General Counsel, Surface Transportation Board, Washington, DC, of counsel.
Pending before the court are cross-motions for summary judgment filed pursuant to Rule 56 of the Rules of the United States Court of Federal Claims ("RCFC") by the plaintiffs and the United States ("the government"). The plaintiffs claim that their property was taken without just compensation by the government when the Surface Transportation Board ("STB") issued a Notice of Interim Trail Use ("NITU") under theNational Trails System Act Amendments of 1983, 16 U.S.C. § 1247(d) ("section "1247(d)"), to allow the Union Pacific Rail Road and Benton County to negotiate a trail use agreement over a portion of rail corridor in Benton County, Oregon. The plaintiffs claim that they own the fee underlying the rail corridor and that the government deprived them of regaining use of their property unencumbered by railroad easements when the STB issued the NITU. Plaintiffs argue that the NITU gave rise to a taking of their property without just compensation, in contravention of the Fifth Amendment.
The government has moved for summary judgment with regard to certain plaintiffs on the grounds that these plaintiffs never owned the portion of the rail corridor at issue and thus there could not have been a taking of their property. Specifically, the government argues that those plaintiffs who own land adjoining the rail corridor but who received their title with the railroad corridor "excepted" from their deeds never owned the fee underlying the rail corridor. The government argues that, for this type of "excepted property," the underlying fee belongs to either the railroad or the prior property owner. The government contends that the following plaintiffs have deeds that "excepted" the rail corridor from their title: John F. Boyer; John Boyer;1 John and Susan Benninghoven;2 Matthew Brandis and Shelly Moon; Rodney and Laura Howell; Brenda Hull; Hull-OakesLumber Company;3 Frank and Sharon Nusbaum;4 Mark and Mechele Poorman; and William Sutton5 (together, the "Excepted Plaintiffs"). In response, the plaintiffs argue that Oregon law provides, in connection with railroad rights of way, that the phrase "excepted" should be read to mean only that they, as the adjacent property owners, took title "subject to" the railroad's use but still own the underlying fee to the "excepted" portion identified in the deed.
The government has also moved for summary judgment with regard to claims involving certain segments of the rail corridor that the government contends were acquired by the railroad in fee simple absolute. In the alternative, the government argues that any grants of easements to the railroad are broad enough to include trail use. The plaintiffs that the government identifies as potentially implicated include: Chintimini Land Incorporated; Venell Farms;6 Mark and Tina Miller; Walter Van Smith; Steven Schindler and Angela Hornaday; the Virginia Schrock Trust; the Greenberry Flyway; Goracke Bros.;7 the Sarah Greene and Christen Killsgaard Living Trust; Robert K. Ballard; Peggy Goracke; Crocker Farms LLC; Daniel and Thomas Goracke, et al.;Sherrie Hopper;8 the Bessie R.A. Jones Trust; Kevin and Kyleen McDaniel; John and Donald Benninghoven;9 Florence Fulgham; David Virgil Baker; John Boyer;10 Leslie and Susan Koltavary; The Rice Paddy LLC, the David C. Horning Trust; Jeffrey and Kathryn Goracke; Frank and Sharon Nusbaum;11 Donna and Donald Oakes Trust;12 Hull Oakes Lumber;13 and Carole and David Hull. It is undisputed that, if the railroad owns the fee underlying the corridor, the NITU did not "take" these plaintiffs' land. The plaintiffs argue, in response, that under Oregon law the subject deeds did not transfer a fee interest to the railroad but only an easement for rail use.
Finally, the government has moved for summary judgment with regard to certain claims related to parcels that adjoin segments of the rail corridor that the government agrees involve grants of easements to the railroad on the grounds that the easements for these properties were not abandoned prior to issuance of the NITU and, thus, there was no taking. The plaintiffs that are potentially implicated include: Venell Farms;14Goracke Bros.;15 Donald and Donna Oakes;16 Sherrie Hopper;17 Heidi Sutton, personal representative of Donald F. Benninghoven, and Susan Benninghoven, personal representative of the estate of John C. Benninghoven18 (together, the "Easement Plaintiffs"). In response, the plaintiffs argue that, contrary to the government's contentions, the uses authorized by the NITU go beyond the scope of the easements granted to the railroad and as a result the issue of abandonment is not relevant.19
The following facts are not in dispute. In the early 1900s, the Corvallis and Alsea River Railway and later its successor—the Portland, Eugene, and Eastern Railway—obtained the disputed property interests in land to construct the Bailey Branch and Hull Oakes Lead rail corridors in Benton County, Oregon. See Pls.' Mot. Partial Summ. J. & Mem. in Supp. ( ), Exs. B-FF; Def.'s Cross-mot. Partial Summ. J. & combined Mem. in Supp. & in Resp. to Pls.' Mot. (Def.'s Br.), App. 1. The deeds used variedconsiderably from each other. Some of the deeds are entitled "right of way" or use the term "right of way" to describe the interest conveyed. See Pls.' Br., Exs. Q-T. Some deeds conveyed irregularly-shaped parcels described with a metes and bounds description, see, e.g., Pls.' Br., Ex. T, others conveyed a strip of land on either side of the centerline of an already-established or staked track on the grantor's property, see Pls.' Br., Exs. B-F. In a few cases, the centerline itself was described using a metes and bound description, see Pls.' Br., Exs. Q-S. All of the deeds at issue in this case use "across" or "over and across" to describe the interest granted. See Pls.' Br., Exs. B-FF. Except as noted, the deeds at issue did not contain express language limiting use of the land to "railroad purposes."20
The initial part of the Bailey Branch, from Corvallis to Alpine Junction, as well as the Hull Oakes line from Alpine Junction to Dawson, was constructed in 1909 and 1910 by the Corvallis and Alsea River Railway. See Compl., Ex. 2 at 4. The remaining portion of the Bailey Branch line was built by the Corvallis and Alsea River Railway's successor, the Portland, Eugene, and Eastern Railway in 1913. See id. Together, these portions represent the rail line at issue in this case. See Compl. 4; Compl., Ex. 2 at 2.
The line was eventually purchased by Southern Pacific and later by Union Pacific. See Compl., Ex. 1 at 3. In 1993, the line was leased to Willamette and Pacific Railroad ("WPRR"), which operated the line. See id. at 5. The line was not maintained regularlyand derailments occurred. See id. at 5-6. The line was embargoed by WPRR in 2007.21 See id. at 6-7. Union Pacific and WPRR sought an exemption from the STB under 49 U.S.C. § 10502 and 49 C.F.R. § 1152.50 for the Bailey Branch from milepost 682.25, near Greenberry, to milepost 671.58, near Monroe; and the Hull Oakes Lead from milepost 673.21, near Alpine Junction, to milepost 680.06, near Dawson. See id. at 2. Together, this comprised a total of 17.86 miles. See id.
In response to Union Pacific's petition, Benton County requested that the STB issue an NITU stating that the railroad corridor was suitable for railbanking. See Compl., Ex. 3. Union Pacific then filed a statement that it was willing to negotiate with Benton County for a trail use/railbanking condition. See Compl., Ex. 1. On September 9, 2011, the STB issued the NITU. See Compl., Ex. 4. On March 4, 2014, Union Pacific and Benton County filed a notice they had reached an agreement. See Compl., Ex. 7.
Summary judgment is proper "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and that movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." RCFC 56(a). A material fact is one that could affect the outcome of the suit, and a genuine issue is one that could permit a reasonable jury to enter a verdict in the non-moving party'sfavor. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). The party moving for summary judgment bears the initial burden of establishing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact and can satisfy this burden by presenting evidence that negates an essential element of the non-moving party's case. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23, 331 (1986). In evaluating motions for summary judgment, courts must draw any inferences from the underlying facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and may not engage in credibility determinations or weigh the evidence. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255; Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986).
This takings case arises from the application of section 8(d) of the National Trails System Act (the "Trails Act") as amended by the National Trails System Act Amendments of 1983 and codified at 16 U.S.C. § 1247(d) ("section 1247(d)"). See generally Preseault v. Interstate Commerce Comm'n ("Preseault I"), 494 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1990) (...
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