Boyer v. Vannoy

• Decision Date: 17 July 2017
• Docket Number: No. 16-30487,16-30487
• Citation: 863 F.3d 428
• Parties: Jonathan BOYER, Petitioner–Appellant v. Darrel VANNOY, Warden, Louisiana State Penitentiary, Respondent–Appellee
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

863 F.3d 428

Jonathan BOYER, Petitioner–Appellant

v.Darrel VANNOY, Warden, Louisiana State Penitentiary, Respondent–Appellee

No. 16-30487

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

FILED July 17, 2017

Richard John Bourke, Louisiana Capital Assistance Center, New Orleans, LA, for Petitioner–Appellant.

Carla Sue Sigler, Karen Christina McLellan, District Attorney's Office for the Parish of Calcasieu, Lake Charles, LA, for Respondent–Appellee.

Before JOLLY, HIGGINBOTHAM, and GRAVES, Circuit Judges.

PATRICK E. HIGGINBOTHAM, Circuit Judge:

Habeas petitioner Jonathan Boyer was convicted of second degree murder and armed robbery with a firearm. He was accused of getting into a truck with his brother, Anthony Boyer ("Anthony"), and shooting the driver dead. Jonathan Boyer later confessed. Seven years after he was arrested, his case went to trial, where Anthony testified for the State. Jonathan Boyer's defense was that Anthony—not Jonathan—pulled the trigger and that Jonathan's confession was false. Jonathan Boyer was convicted and unsuccessfully pursued direct review, including being heard by the United States Supreme Court, which ultimately dismissed the writ of certiorari as improvidently granted. Boyer then filed for federal habeas relief, which the district court denied. He now appeals from that denial, making three claims: (1) his Sixth Amendment right to speedy trial was violated; (2) his due process and Confrontation Clause rights were violated when he could not cross-examine Anthony on Anthony's alleged violence; and (3) his rights to present a complete defense and present witnesses were violated when his expert on confessions and interrogations was barred from testifying. We AFFIRM.

I.

As summarized in the Louisiana appellate court decision affirming Boyer's convictions and sentences:

Late in the evening of February 4, 2002, Defendant and his brother, Anthony Boyer, were walking along the roadway in Sulphur, Louisiana. They were given a ride by Bradlee Marsh in his truck. Defendant demanded money from Marsh. When Marsh did not comply, Defendant shot him three times in the head. Defendant then took Marsh's money and a silver chain. Marsh died as a result of the gunshot wounds

. Defendant was apprehended in Jacksonville, Florida, on March 8, 2002.¹

Boyer was questioned on the day of his arrest, during which he confessed to killing Marsh. Seven years elapsed between Boyer's arrest and trial. For the first five years, Boyer faced a first degree murder charge, which made him eligible for the death penalty and so also eligible for qualified capital defense. For the following two years, Boyer faced a second degree charge after the State reduced it.

A.

Summarizing seven years of pretrial proceedings is no simple task. Because the reason for the delay is integral to a speedy trial analysis, we review the record in detail below, with emphasis on the dates. In our review, we detect a common thread: both parties contributed to the delay.

On June 6, 2002, three months after Boyer's arrest, the grand jury issued a bill of indictment on first degree murder charges. The same day, Anthony was indicted for obstruction of justice. On June 10, 2002, the court appointed Tom Lorenzi as Boyer's counsel. Arraignment was scheduled for July 1, 2002, but at request of defense counsel was rescheduled for September 9, 2002. On September 9, 2002, Boyer pleaded not guilty and requested a trial by jury. The court scheduled the trial for February 3, 2003. Around the same time, Anthony pleaded guilty to obstruction of justice.

On November 12, 2002, Attorney Lorenzi submitted a Motion to Determine Source of Funds for Boyer's defense. For the next two and a half years, the court continuously pushed back both the funding hearing and the trial. We note that contrary to the State's insistence during oral argument, it was in agreement with many of the motions to continue. On January 10, 2003, Attorney Lorenzi submitted a letter notifying the court of scheduling problems for the January 17, 2003 hearing. The record indicates that Attorney Lorenzi sought the State's agreement in continuing the hearing. On January 17, 2003, the minutes reflect that "[o]n motion of [the] Asst. District Attorney ... the Court orders a Motion to Determine Source of Funding passed without date." On February 3, 2003, Boyer was determined "available for trial," and Attorney Lorenzi moved to continue without objection from the State. The trial was rescheduled for September 29, 2003.

Defense counsel submitted a motion to continue the funding hearing because "the issue may be deemed premature pending a decision by the 14^th Judicial District Indigent Defender Board which will not meet until August 26, 2003 to consider defense counsel's statement for services rendered and a proposed agreement for payment." The motion to continue was granted. The minutes from August 15, 2003 reflect that "[o]n motion of [the] Asst. District Attorney ... upon request of defense counsel ... the Court orders a Motion to Determine Source of Funding refixed for September 19, 2003[.]"

On September 12, 2003, the court ordered that the funding hearing and trial be continued, based on defense counsel's motion "for the reason that the Indigent Defender Board ... is not scheduled to meet to make a decision critical to the determination of a source of funds until September 30, 2003." The order states that defense counsel "was authorized by ... [the] Assistant District Attorney, to advise this Honorable Court that the State of Louisiana does not object to the granting of a continuance" on the funding hearing or trial.

From November 2003 to January 2004, the funding hearing was repeatedly continued.² On February 9, 2004, the minutes reflect that "[o]n motion of [the] Asst. District Attorney ... the Court orders motions fixed for hearing on April 2, 2004" and moreover, "the State ... announced its intent to seek the death penalty." On April 2, 2004, the minutes reflect that "[o]n motion of [the] Asst. District Attorney ... the Court orders the Motion to Determine Source of Funding passed without date." On June 21, 2004, the minutes reflect that "[o]n motion of [the] Asst. District Attorney ... the Court orders the Notice of Intent Funding hearing fixed for August 19, 2004[.]"

On August 17, 2004, defense counsel submitted a letter to the court advising that counsel for the Calcasieu Parish Police Jury moved to continue the funding hearing scheduled for July 19, 2004 due to a family member's medical treatment. Defense counsel noted that he did not oppose the motion. On August 19, 2004, the minutes reflect that the assistant district attorney "advise[d] the Court that a Motion to Continue the funding hearing was previously filed and the funding hearing will be rescheduled at a later date." On July 1, 2005, the minutes reflect that "[o]n motion of [the] Asst. District Attorney ... the Court orders the funding hearing in this matter refixed for July 15, 2005 ... with the Clerk's Office to notify defense counsel[.]"

On July 7, 2005, Boyer submitted a motion to quash the indictment based on the state statutory time limit (the "prescription claim") and a constitutional speedy trial violation (the "constitutional claim"). Since it had been more than three years since his indictment, Boyer argued, "the statutory prescription period [under Louisiana law] for the commencement of the trial for the 2002 killing [had] now run." Boyer contended the delay was "due to the state's egregious failure to locate money to pay for Mr. Boyer's defense," and that Boyer "ha[d] filed no motions on his own behalf other than a motion to identify a source of funding as required by State v. Wigley , 624 So.2d 425, 426 (La. 1993)." Boyer maintained that the delay also violated his constitutional right to a speedy trial.

On July 15, 2005, the court ordered the funding motion, the motion to enforce the plea bargain, and the motion to quash "refixed without date." Boyer made the motion to continue based on needing sufficient time to issue subpoenas, which the State did not oppose. Almost a week later on July 21, 2005, on the State's motion, the court scheduled the funding hearing to September 22, 2005. Hurricane Katrina struck in August 2005 followed by Hurricane Rita in September 2005, and as a result of difficulties subpoenaing witnesses and contacting co-counsel in New Orleans, the hearing was pushed back again. On February 22, 2006, on the State's motion, the court scheduled the funding hearing for March 27, 2006. This date—more than three years after defense counsel first filed the Motion to Determine Source of Funding—stuck.

After the funding hearing, during which only defense counsel called witnesses and introduced evidence, the court deferred its ruling and stated it would schedule another hearing for a later date. Defense counsel objected.

On November 20, 2006, a hearing was held on Boyer's Motion to Quash based on the delay, during which Attorney Lorenzi argued only the statutory claim. The defense moved to dismiss without prejudice its constitutional claim, arguing that "to do otherwise makes us even more ineffective counsel by virtue of trying to go forward with the hearing that we cannot be prepared to go forward with." Attorney Lorenzi expressed that his office had been "cobbling together as best [they] [could]," but that it was the State's obligation to fund the defense. An attorney for the State responded that Boyer was not ready to begin trial, and that "[e]verything that's been done to delay this case has been done by the Defense." The State also noted its consideration of amending the charges to second degree murder and armed robbery, which would "greatly decrease the amount of funds that are necessary."

The trial court denied Boyer's motion to quash, finding that the defense had caused the funding motion to be delayed by asking for continuances, and that the motion to determine source of funding constituted a preliminary plea suspending the...