Boykin v. Ala.
| Decision Date | 02 June 1969 |
| Docket Number | No. 642,642 |
| Citation | 395 U.S. 238,89 S.Ct. 1709,23 L. Ed. 2d 274 |
| Parties | BOYKIN v. ALABAMA |
| Court | U.S. Supreme Court |
SUMMARY:
The defendant, on pleading guilty, was convicted of common-law robbery in the Circuit Court of Mobile County, Alabama, and after a trial by jury to determine the punishment, was sentenced to die. On automatic appeal the Alabama Supreme Court affirmed, and unanimously rejected the defendant's argument that a sentence of death for common-law robbery was cruel and unusual punishment within the meaning of the Federal Constitution, but four of the seven justices on their own motion discussed the constitutionality of the process by which the trial judge had accepted the defendant's guilty plea, and three of these four justices dissented from the affirmance on the ground that the record was inadequate to show that the defendant had intelligently and knowingly pleaded guilty (281 Ala 659, 207 So 2d 412).
On certiorari, the United States Supreme Court reversed. In an opinion by Douglas, J., it was held (1), expressing the unanimous view of the court, that the federal constitutional question of the voluntary character of the defendant's guilty plea was properly before the Supreme Court notwithstanding the defendant failed to raise the question below and the state court failed to pass upon it, and (2), expressing the view of six members of the court, that there was reversible error under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment where the record did not disclose that the defendant voluntarily and understandingly entered such plea.
Harlan, J., joined by Black, J., dissented on the grounds that (1) the court's holding in effect fastened upon the states, as a matter of federal constitutional law, the rigid prophylactic requirements of Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure governing the duty of the trial judge before accepting a guilty plea; (2) this was done at the behest of a defendant who never alleged that his guilty plea was involuntary or made without knowledge of the consequences; and (3) the result of the case was wholly unprecedented and was inconsistent with recent decisions of the court.
LAWYERS' EDITION HEADNOTES:
[23 L. Ed. 2d LEdHN1]
ERROR §442
from state court -- federal question -- plain error -- showing of record --
Headnote:LEdHN[1][1]
The question of the voluntary character of the defendant's guilty plea to a robbery charge in a state court, upon which plea he was convicted and sentenced to die, or of whether the process by which the trial judge accepted such plea violated the defendant's rights under the Federal Constitution, is properly before the United States Supreme Court on review notwithstanding the defendant failed to raise such federal question below and the state court failed to pass upon it, where (1) the question was raised on oral argument in the Supreme Court, (2) the error of the trial judge in accepting the guilty plea without an affirmative showing that it was intelligent and voluntary was a plain error on the face of the record, and (3) such error, under the state procedure contained in the statute providing for automatic appeal in capital cases and requiring the state reviewing court to comb the record for any error prejudicial to the appellant even though not called to its attention in the brief of counsel, was properly before such reviewing court and was considered explicitly by the majority of the justices thereof.
[23 L. Ed. 2d LEdHN2]
guilty plea --
Headnote:LEdHN[2][2]
A plea of guilty is more than a confession which admits that the accused did various acts; it is itself a conviction, and nothing remains but to give judgment and determine punishment.
[23 L. Ed. 2d LEdHN3]
confession -- admissibility -- determination of voluntariness --
Headnote:LEdHN[3][3]
Admissibility of a confession in evidence at a criminal trial must be based on a reliable determination on the voluntariness issue which satisfies the constitutional rights of the defendant.
[23 L. Ed. 2d LEdHN4]
assistance of counsel -- presumption -- waiver --
Headnote:LEdHN[4][4]
Presuming a waiver of counsel from a silent record is impermissible; the record must show, or there must be an allegation and evidence which show, that the accused was offered counsel, but intelligently and understandingly rejected the offer.
[23 L. Ed. 2d LEdHN5]
guilty plea -- voluntariness --
Headnote:LEdHN[5][5]
Since a plea of guilty is more than an admission of conduct and is a conviction, and since ignorance, incomprehension, coercion, terror, inducements, and subtle or blatant threats might be a perfect cover-up of unconstitutionality, the standard to be applied in determining whether a guilty plea is voluntarily made is the same standard applied in determining whether an accused has made a valid waiver of the right to counsel, by which standard a presuming of waiver from a silent record is impermissible, and the record must show, or there must be an allegation and evidence which show, that the accused was offered counsel, but intelligently and understandingly rejected the offer.
[23 L. Ed. 2d LEdHN6]
waiver of constitutional rights -- federal law as controlling --
Headnote:LEdHN[6][6]
The question of an effective waiver of a federal constitutional right in a state criminal proceeding is governed by federal standards.
[23 L. Ed. 2d LEdHN7]
guilty plea -- waiver of constitutional rights --
Headnote:LEdHN[7][7]
Several federal constitutional rights are involved in a waiver that takes place when a plea of guilty is entered in a state criminal trial: (1) the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment and applicable to the states by reason of the Fourteenth; (2) the right to trial by jury; and (3) the right to confront one's accusers.
[23 L. Ed. 2d LEdHN8]
ERROR §1289
guilty plea -- waiver of constitutional rights -- presumption --
Headnote:LEdHN[8][8]
For purposes of determining the voluntary character of the defendant's guilty plea in a state court or whether the process by which the trial judge accepted such plea violated the defendant's rights under the Federal Constitution, the United States Supreme Court cannot presume from a silent record a waiver of the three important federal constitutional rights--(1) the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment and applicable to the states by reason of the Fourteenth; (2) the right to trial by jury; and (3) the right to confront one's accusers--which are involved in a waiver that takes place when a plea of guilty is entered in a state criminal trial.
[23 L. Ed. 2d LEdHN9]
guilty plea -- waiver of constitutional rights --
Headnote:LEdHN[9][9]
A defendant who enters a guilty plea simultaneously waives several constitutional rights, including his privilege against compulsory self- incrimination, his right to trial by jury, and his right to confront his accusers; for such a waiver to be valid under the due process clause, it must be an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.
[23 L. Ed. 2d LEdHN10]
due process -- guilty plea --
Headnote:LEdHN[10][10]
If a defendant's guilty plea is not voluntary and knowing, it has been obtained in violation of due process and is therefore void.
[23 L. Ed. 2d LEdHN11]
guilty plea -- voluntariness --
Headnote:LEdHN[11][11]
Because a guilty plea is an admission of all the elements of a formal criminal charge, it cannot be truly voluntary unless the defendant possesses an understanding of the law in relation to the facts.
[23 L. Ed. 2d LEdHN12]
ERROR §1010
guilty plea -- connotation -- court's function -- record for review --
Headnote:LEdHN[12][12]
What is at stake for an accused facing death or imprisonment as a result of a plea of guilty demands the utmost solicitude of which the courts are capable in canvassing the matter with the accused to make sure he has a full understanding of what the plea connotes and of its consequence; when the judge discharges that function, he leaves a record adequate for any review that may be later sought, and forestalls the spin-off of collateral proceedings that seek to probe murky memories.
[23 L. Ed. 2d LEdHN13]
ERROR §1550
guilty plea -- due process -- lack of voluntariness and understanding -- reversible error --
Headnote:LEdHN[13][13]
With respect to a state conviction on a plea of guilty to common-law robbery and a resulting death sentence, there is reversible error under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment where the record does not disclose that the defendant voluntarily and understandingly entered such plea.
Petitioner, a 27-year-old Negro, who was represented by appointed counsel, pleaded guilty to five indictments for common-law robbery. The judge asked no questions of petitioner concerning his plea, and petitioner did not address the court. Under Alabama law providing for a jury trial to fix punishment on a guilty plea, the prosecution presented eyewitness testimony and petitioner's counsel cursorily cross-examined. Petitioner did not testify; no character or background testimony was presented for him; and there was nothing to indicate that he had a prior criminal record. The jury found petitioner guilty and sentenced him to death on each indictment. The Alabama Supreme Court reviewed the sentences under the State's automatic appeal statute for capital cases, which requires the reviewing court to comb the record for prejudicial error even though not raised by counsel. Petitioner did not raise the question of the voluntariness of his guilty plea and the State Supreme Court did not pass on that question, though a majority of the court explicitly considered it in affirming his sentences of death. Held:
1. This...
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