Boykin v. Gray

• Citation: 895 F.Supp.2d 199
• Decision Date: 04 October 2012
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 10–1790 (PLF).
• Parties: William BOYKIN, et al., Plaintiffs, v. Vincent GRAY, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Columbia

895 F.Supp.2d 199

William BOYKIN, et al., Plaintiffs,

v.Vincent GRAY, Defendant.¹

Civil Action No. 10–1790 (PLF).

United States District Court, District of Columbia.

Oct. 4, 2012.

Jane J. Zara, Washington, DC, for Plaintiffs.

Andrew J. Saindon, Melissa Lael Baker, D.C. Office of Attorney General, Washington, DC, for Defendant.

OPINION

PAUL L. FRIEDMAN, District Judge.

This matter is before the Court on the defendant's motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, for summary judgment, and the plaintiffs' motion to amend their complaint. After careful consideration of the parties' filings, the relevant legal authorities, and the entire record in this case, by Order of September 28, 2012, the Court granted the defendant's motion to dismiss, granted the plaintiffs' motion to amend, and dismissed all but one count of the amended complaint. See Order (Sept. 28, 2012). This Opinion explains the reasoning behind that Order.²

I. BACKGROUND

This action was commenced in October 2010 on behalf of nine individual plaintiffs who formerly inhabited La Casa Shelter, an emergency, low-barrier housing facility for the homeless that was located in the Columbia Heights neighborhood of the District of Columbia. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 2–14. La Casa, the facilities of which consisted of portable trailers, was operated by a contractor of the District of Columbia until October 15, 2010, when the shelter was closed at the direction of the District. See Memorandum Opinion and Order at 2 (Aug. 3, 2011). The District says that its closure of La Casa was part of its efforts to expand its Permanent Supportive Housing (“PSH”) program, which involves the placement of chronically homeless individuals in permanent housing where they can gain access to long-term supportive services. Id. According to the plaintiffs, the District uses the PSH program “as an excuse for closing the shelters in the predominantly white parts of the city.” Id. The plaintiffs brought claims of discrimination based on race, disability, and place of residence under the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601 et seq., the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 et seq., and the District of Columbia Human Rights Act, D.C.Code §§ 2–1401.01 et seq., alleging that the District is “systematically removing persons who are disabled, indigent, and predominantly minority” from areas inhabited by “the most affluent, white populations” in the city, and placing those homeless individuals in poorer neighborhoods “with the least resources available.” Id. at 2–3. In support of these claims, the plaintiffs have noted that La Casa was the “last remaining public shelter in Ward 1” and that Wards 2, 3, and 4 of the District already lacked public shelters. Id.

The plaintiffs' complaint was accompanied by a motion requesting a temporary restraining order and both preliminary and permanent injunctive relief. See Plaintiffs['] Motion for Temporary Restraining Order, Preliminary and Permanent Injunctions [Dkt. No. 11]. Treating the motion as a request for an immediate temporary restraining order, a motions judge promptly denied it, stating that the plaintiffs' asserted injuries “provides no basis for entering an emergency injunction before the District may be heard on the matter.” Memorandum and Order at 2 (Oct. 22, 2010). The plaintiffs filed an amended motion in November 2010, seeking preliminary injunctive relief. This Court denied that motion upon concluding that the plaintiffs had not satisfied the four-part standard necessary to obtain such relief. See Opinion (Dec. 17, 2010). In particular, the Court found no substantiallikelihood that the plaintiffs were likely to succeed on their claims. Id. at 6–11.

In December 2010, the District of Columbia filed its motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, for summary judgment. Over the next several months, however, the plaintiffs filed four separate motions to amend their complaint, which they already had amended once as of right.³ Explaining that it did not intend to review four separate and likely redundant motions, the Court denied without prejudice the motions to amend and directed the plaintiffs instead to file a single motion specifically identifying all proposed changes to the complaint. See Memorandum Opinion and Order at 3–4 (Aug. 3, 2011). The plaintiffs subsequently filed their pending motion to amend.

In their proposed second amended complaint, the plaintiffs seek to add thirty-three new plaintiffs to the action, to provide additional information relating to their claims, and to add two new claims, arising under the District of Columbia's Homeless Services Reform Act, D.C.Code § 4–751 et seq., and the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution. Mot. Am. at 2, 5–7; see 2d Am. Compl.⁴ The District opposes the plaintiffs' motion, arguing that the proposed amendment is futile.

II. LEGAL STANDARDS

“Whether to grant a motion to amend is within the sound discretion of the district court.” Gerlich v. United States DOJ, 828 F.Supp.2d 284, 290–91 (D.D.C.2011). Under Rule 15(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a court should “freely give leave” to amend a pleading “when justice so requires.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a). “However, a district court may properly deny a motion to amend if the amended pleading would not survive a motion to dismiss.” In re Interbank Funding Corp. Sec. Litig., 629 F.3d 213, 218 (D.C.Cir.2010) (citing Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182, 83 S.Ct. 227, 9 L.Ed.2d 222 (1962)); accord Nat'l Wrestling Coaches Ass'n v. Dep't of Educ., 366 F.3d 930, 945 (D.C.Cir.2004). Where granting a motion to amend would “waste time and judicial resources” because the complaint “must fail, as a matter of law, in light of the record in the case,” justice does not require permitting amendment. Ross v. DynCorp, 362 F.Supp.2d 344, 364 n. 11 (D.D.C.2005). “In other words, if the proposed amendment would still render the complaint deficient, courts need not grant leave.” S.K. Innovation, Inc. v. Finpol, 854 F.Supp.2d 99, 106–07 (D.D.C.2012). Leave to amend also may be denied based on “undue delay, bad faith, undue prejudice to the opposing party, [or] repeated failure to cure deficiencies.” Richardson v. United States, 193 F.3d 545, 548–49 (D.C.Cir.1999).

Rule 12(b)(6) allows dismissal of a complaint if a plaintiff fails “to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). “Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only ‘a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,’ in order to ‘give the defendant fair notice of what the ... claim is and the grounds upon which it rests[.]’ ” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957)). Although “detailed factual allegations” are not necessary to withstand a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, id., the complaint “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ ” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (quotations omitted). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” In re Interbank Funding Corp. Sec. Litig., 629 F.3d 213, 218 (D.C.Cir.2010) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937). The Court “must accept as true all of the factual allegations contained in the complaint.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94, 127 S.Ct. 2197, 167 L.Ed.2d 1081 (2007); see also Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955. The complaint “is construed liberally in the [plaintiff's] favor, and [the Court should] grant [the plaintiff] the benefit of all inferences that can be derived from the facts alleged.” Kowal v. MCI Commc'ns Corp., 16 F.3d 1271, 1276 (D.C.Cir.1994). Nevertheless, the Court need not accept inferences drawn by the plaintiff if those inferences are unsupported by facts alleged in the complaint, nor must the Court accept the plaintiff's legal conclusions. See id.;Browning v. Clinton, 292 F.3d 235, 242 (D.C.Cir.2002).

In deciding a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court “may consider the facts alleged in the complaint, documents attached to the complaint as exhibits or incorporated by reference, and matters about which the [C]ourt may take judicial notice.” Cole v. Boeing Co., 845 F.Supp.2d 277, 283 (D.D.C.2012) (citing Abhe & Svoboda, Inc. v. Chao, 508 F.3d 1052, 1059 (D.C.Cir.2007)). “In determining whether to dismiss, courts treat documents attached to a complaint as if they are part of the complaint.” In re Cheney, 406 F.3d 723, 729 (D.C.Cir.2005) (citing EEOC v. St. Francis Xavier Parochial Sch., 117 F.3d 621, 624–25 (D.C.Cir.1997)).⁵

III. DISCUSSION

A. Disparate Treatment Based on Race under the FHA (Count I)⁶

1. “Dwellings” under the FHA

The Fair Housing Act prohibits discrimination in the sale and rental of properties and also makes it unlawful to “otherwise make unavailable or deny [ ] a dwelling to any person because of race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 3604. If La Casa qualifies as a “dwelling” under this provision, then its closure would appear to “make [it] unavailable” to its former inhabitants and “deny” them a dwelling there within the meaning of the FHA. Cf. 2922 Sherman Ave. Tenants' Ass'n v. District of Columbia, 444 F.3d 673, 685 (D.C.Cir.2006) (holding that instructing tenants that their occupancy is prohibited and that they must seek alternative housing qualifies as making a dwelling “unavailable” under the FHA); Greater New Orleans Fair Hous. Action Ctr. v. U.S. Dept. of Hous. & Urban Dev., 723 F.Supp.2d 14, 22–23 (D.D.C.2010) (“[T]he D.C. Circuit has made clear that ‘make unavailable’ means not just preventing access to new housing by prospective...