Boykin v. Law

• Decision Date: 09 June 2006
• Docket Number: 1041058.
• Citation: 946 So.2d 838
• Parties: Ruby BOYKIN v. Louise LAW and Manufacturers Life Insurance Company.
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court

946 So.2d 838

Ruby BOYKIN v. Louise LAW and Manufacturers Life Insurance Company.

1041058.

Supreme Court of Alabama.

June 9, 2006.

John L. McClung of Lindsey & McClung, Elba, for appellant.

Gypsy Morrow Smith, Elba, for appellee Louise Law.

On Application for Rehearing

SEE, Justice.

The opinion of February 10, 2006, is withdrawn, and the following is substituted therefor.

Ruby Boykin, the designated primary beneficiary of an annuity owned by the now deceased annuitant, Eric Woodrow Boykin, appeals from the trial court's order commuting the annuity after Eric's death to satisfy a restitution order in favor of his judgment creditor, Louise Law. We reverse and remand.

I.

On October 4, 1996, Eric Boykin pleaded guilty to the third-degree burglary and arson of a store owned by Louise Law. As part of his sentence, the trial court ordered Eric to pay Law $184,635.18 in restitution in the form of monthly payments of $750. Eric defaulted on the payments.

In 1999, Law learned that Eric was the owner and annuitant of a $400,000 annuity controlled by Manufacturers Life Insurance Company. Eric's mother, Ruby Boykin, had purchased the annuity in 1992 using the proceeds Eric had received from the settlement of a personal-injury lawsuit.¹ The annuity contract named Ruby Boykin as the primary beneficiary of the annuity in the event of Eric's death and named Eric's sisters, Shanetha Boykin and Seresa Boykin, as secondary beneficiaries. On October 22, 1999, Law filed a writ of garnishment against Manufacturers Life seeking to seize the payments due Eric under the annuity to recover her restitution judgment. Although Eric received notice of the writ of garnishment, Ruby, Shanetha, and Seresa were not made parties to the garnishment proceeding.

Manufacturers Life answered Law's writ of garnishment by admitting that it had in its control "[a]n annuity owned by Mr. Boykin with an income stream. . . ." Manufacturers Life's admission prompted Law to move the trial court to enter an order condemning the funds from the annuity. In her motion, Law asked the trial court to order Manufacturers Life to commute the annuity by converting the future monthly payments due under the annuity contract into a lump-sum payment due immediately and to pay her the commuted value of the annuity as restitution. Law also asked the trial court, in the alternative, to order Eric to assign to her all of his rights, title, and interest in the annuity and to designate Law and her heirs as the primary and secondary beneficiaries of the annuity contract.

Eric opposed Law's motion to condemn the funds, arguing that his annuity payments were wages, salary, or other compensation under § 6-10-7, Ala.Code 1975,² and that, therefore, 75% of each payment was exempt from garnishment. Eric also argued that the trial court could not commute the annuity as Law had requested because the annuity contained a provision prohibiting commutation before Eric's death and also designated his mother and sisters as the primary and secondary beneficiaries. Citing § 27-14-32, Ala.Code 1975,³ Eric argued that the trial court could not order him to exercise any of the rights, privileges, or options conferred to him under the annuity or allow Law to interfere with or to modify the terms of his annuity contract with Manufacturers Life.

Law responded to Eric's brief in opposition to her motion to condemn funds by arguing that, notwithstanding "any provision of any law of this state to the contrary," the Alabama Restitution Withholding Act, § 15-18-140 et seq., Ala.Code 1975, mandates that

"any decree, judgment or order requiring the payment of restitution may include . . . an order requiring that any asset or other income or any portion thereof to which a defendant is or may be entitled be withheld or attached, and such order may also require any person in real or constructive possession, custody, or control thereof to pay over, deliver, convey, transfer or assign the same to the clerk of the court for disbursement, transfer or assignment to the victim in accordance with the defendant's restitution obligation."

§ 15-18-144, Ala.Code 1975. Law argued that the definition of "other income" in § 15-18-142, Ala.Code 1975, includes an annuity and, therefore, that § 15-18-144, Ala.Code 1975, empowered the trial court to condemn the annuity as Law had requested. Law also argued that, if the trial court found that the annuity could not be commuted, § 27-14-32(a), Ala.Code 1975, contained an exception to the exemption of an annuity from attachment by a judgment creditor. It states that an annuitant's "periodic payments in excess of $250.00 per month shall be subject to garnishment." § 27-14-32(a)(2), Ala.Code 1975. Quoting § 27-14-32(a)(3), Ala.Code 1975, Law argued that the trial court had authority to order Eric, as an annuitant, "to pay to a judgment creditor or apply on the judgment, in installments, such portion of such excess benefits as to the court may appear just and proper." Law asked the trial court also to consider awarding her, in addition to her previously requested forms of relief, the full amount of Eric's monthly annuity payments from Manufacturers Life less the $250 exempted from garnishment by § 27-14-32, Ala.Code 1975.

On February 7, 2001, the trial court issued an order awarding Law 65% of any monthly annuity payment due Eric under the Manufacturers Life annuity contract. The trial court's order also stated:

"This Income Withholding Order attaches to the monthly annuity payments as per the annuity contract/policy and is binding upon the annuitant and/or his beneficiaries."

The trial court denied Law's request to commute the annuity but stated in its order that "if said annuity is ever commuted then the balance of said restitution plus interest shall attac[h] to the commuted balance of the annuity and shall be paid to the Circuit Court for payment to the said Louise Law and her heirs or beneficiaries." None of the parties to the garnishment proceeding appealed the trial court's order.

Eric died on April 24, 2004. On May 3, 2004, Law moved the trial court to commute the balance of the annuity and requested that the trial court allow her to receive the commuted value as payment of her judgment.⁴ In support of her motion, Law quoted the language from the trial court's February 7, 2001, order awarding her the commuted value of the annuity and argued that, under the terms of the contract, the annuity could now be commuted because Eric was no longer alive. Ruby Boykin, Shanetha Boykin, and Seresa Boykin moved the trial court to allow them to intervene to contest Law's motion to commute the annuity. The trial court granted the Boykins' motion.

Ruby moved the trial court to dismiss Law's action and to order that the annuity be turned over to her. Ruby's motion was based on the argument that, as the primary beneficiary under the annuity contract, she became the rightful owner of the annuity upon Eric's death. Ruby argued that she owed Law no restitution and, therefore, that the value remaining in the annuity at the time of Eric's death could not be subjected to Law's restitution claim.

Law responded to Ruby's motion to dismiss by pointing to the language in the trial court's 2001 income-withholding order making her attachment of the monthly annuity payments "binding upon the annuitant and/or his beneficiaries" and argued that the language entitled her to payments from the annuity after Eric's death. Law argued that, under the terms of the annuity contract, any person entitled to payments from the annuity after the annuitant's death could commute the annuity. Law also argued that, even though Ruby was not a party to the garnishment proceeding, she knew of the proceeding and had attended a hearing in the proceeding. Law asserted that the time for challenging the February 7, 2001, order had expired without Ruby's intervening and, therefore, that Ruby could not now contest the February 7, 2001, order.

On February 14, 2005, the trial court denied Ruby's motion to dismiss Law's action to commute the annuity. In explaining its decision, the trial court stated that the February 7, 2001, order

"not only established a garnishment of the monthly payments due to the defendant Mr. Boykin in accordance with the restitution [statutes] and Title 27-14-32, Code of Alabama, 1975, it also pursuant to the restitution statutes provided for the attachment of the commutation value of the annuity if that occurred."

The trial court granted Law's motion to commute the annuity and ordered Manufacturers Life to pay the commuted value of the annuity to the circuit court clerk so that the funds could be disbursed to Law. Ruby appeals.

II.

Ruby argues that the trial court exceeded its authority in the February 7, 2001, order by making the income-withholding aspect of that order binding upon Ruby, as a beneficiary of the annuity, and by awarding Law the commuted value of the annuity. Ruby also argues that to allow the trial court to use the February 7, 2001, order to commute the annuity after Eric's death and to award Law the commuted funds violates her right to due process because it deprives Ruby of her property even though she owed no restitution to Law and was not a party to the February 7, 2001, garnishment proceeding. Conversely, Law argues that this Court lacks jurisdiction to hear Ruby's appeal because, she says, the appeal contests the February 7, 2001, order and is therefore untimely.

The facts relevant to this appeal are undisputed; both Law and Ruby raise questions of law. Accordingly, our review is de novo. See George v. Sims, 888 So.2d 1224, 1226 (Ala.2004) ("Because the facts are undisputed and we are presented with pure questions of law, our standard of review is de novo.").

III.

Law asserts that Ruby's appeal is untimely because, she argues, the appeal challenges the correctness of the trial court's February 7, 2001, order. Specifically, Law argues that this Court's...