Boykin v. State

• Decision Date: 03 July 1905
• Citation: 86 Miss. 481,38 So. 725
• Court: Mississippi Supreme Court
• Parties: WILLIAM BOYKIN v. STATE OF MISSISSIPPI

38 So. 725

86 Miss. 481

WILLIAM BOYKIN v. STATE OF MISSISSIPPI

Supreme Court of Mississippi

July 3, 1905

FROM the circuit court of Clarke county, HON. ROBERT F. COCHRAN Judge.

Boykin the appellant, and another were indicted for the murder of one Marvin Long. The prosecution was dismissed as to the other person, and Boykin was tried and convicted of manslaughter, and appealed to the supreme court. The facts are fully stated in the opinion of the court.

The court below refused the following instruction asked by defendant:

"The court instructs the jury that if they believe from the evidence the sugar cane testified about was cane which had been banked on Boykin's land by Long as the tenant of Boykin, and that Boykin forbade the said Jackson Long from removing said cane from the premises until such time as a settlement between the parties should be had, and that said Long, together with the deceased, attempted to remove said cane from said premises without the consent of Boykin, then such attempted removal amounted to a trespass, and Boykin had the right to employ such reasonable force as might be necessary to prevent the trespass, and that in such case neither Jackson Long nor the deceased had the lawful right to resist such force. And if the jury believe that either Jackson Long or the deceased, or both, employed such means in resisting such force as was likely to produce death or to inflict great bodily harm on the defendant, then the defendant had the lawful right to meet such resistance; and if, in so doing, the defendant wounded the deceased by cutting him with a knife, from which wound the deceased died such killing was justifiable, and the jury should find the defendant not guilty."

Instructions Nos. 1, 3, 19, and 20, as asked by defendant, were as follows:

"No 1. The court instructs the jury that if they believe from the evidence that Marvin Long assaulted the defendant with a deadly weapon--to wit, a stick--the defendant had the right under the law of the land, to repel such an assault by the use of a deadly weapon; and if, in repelling such assault, the defendant wounded the deceased by cutting him with a knife, from which deceased died, then such killing was justifiable, and the jury should find the defendant not guilty."

The court below modified this instruction by adding, after the word "stick," in the third line, the following: "And not in necessary self-defense."

"No. 3. The court instructs the jury that they are not called upon to determine in this case which of the parties was the aggressor in the fight between Jackson Long and the defendant. But the jury is to determine whether or not at the time the defendant cut Marvin Long the said Marvin Long was in the act of committing an assault upon the defendant with a deadly weapon; and if the jury believe that, at the time Boykin cut deceased, the deceased was in the act of so assaulting the defendant, then such cutting was justifiable, and the jury should find the defendant not guilty; or, if the jury entertain a reasonable doubt as to whether the cutting was justifiable or not, they should resolve such doubt in favor of the defendant, and acquit him."

The court below modified this instruction by adding after the word "weapon," in the seventh line, the words, "and not in his necessary self-defense."

"No. 19. The court instructs the jury that if they believe from the evidence that Jackson Long began the assault upon the defendant with his fist, and if they further believe from the evidence that, while Jackson Long was thus assaulting defendant, Marvin Long began beating defendant with a deadly weapon, then defendant had a right to defend himself against such attacks, even to the point of taking the life of either or both of the said Longs, if actually or apparently necessary to save his own life or limb; and if the jury entertain a reasonable doubt as to this, they should resolve said doubt in favor of the defendant, and acquit him."

The court below modified this instruction by adding after the word "weapon," in the sixth line, the following: "At a time when defendant was not cutting Jackson with his knife."

"No. 20. Even though the jury should believe from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was the aggressor in the difficulty between himself and Jackson Long, and even though the jury should further believe from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that Marvin Long began beating the defendant with a deadly weapon to prevent the defendant from committing a felony upon Jackson Long, still the said Marvin Long had no right to continue beating defendant after said defendant had ceased such attack upon said Jackson Long; and if the jury believe from the evidence that Marvin Long did so continue to boat the defendant with a deadly weapon, then the defendant had a right to defend himself against such continued attack, even to the point of taking the life of said Marvin Long, if actually or apparently necessary to save himself from great bodily harm; or, if the jury are in doubt as to this, they should acquit."

The court below modified this instruction by adding after the word "weapon," in the eleventh line, the following: "And not in his necessary self-defense."

The fifth and sixth instructions given for the state are sufficiently set out in the opinion of the court.

Case reversed and remanded.

Amis & Dunn, for appellant.

In view of the principal facts of the case, we insist that the court should have granted the instruction requested by the defendant, which was refused.

Jackson Long, as well as the deceased, was clearly guilty of trespass upon the property of Boykin; and, according to the testimony of Jackson Long himself, he was proceeding to commit further acts of trespass, against the protests of Boykin, at the very instant the fight ensued between himself and Boykin. This being true, even though Boykin may have been the actor in the beginning of the actual combat, he was not the aggressor, and his right of self-defense in the combat depended largely upon this circumstance, and it was the duty of the court to have advised the jury of this lawful right of Boykin by the instruction, as requested. Ayers v. State, 60 Miss. 709.

In view of the testimony of the defendant and his witnesses, we insist that it was error on the part of the court, and that such error was prejudicial to the cause of the defendant, for the court to modify instructions 1, 3, 19, and 20, as requested by the defendant. By the first instruction the court was asked to inform the jury that if they believed from the evidence that deceased assaulted the defendant with a deadly weapon, the defendant had the right, under the law, to repel such assault by the use of a deadly weapon; and that if, in repelling the assault, the defendant cut the deceased with a knife, from which cut or wound the deceased died, then, in that event, such killing was justifiable, and the jury should find the defendant not guilty. And by the third instruction the court was requested to inform the jury that if, at the very time the defendant cut Marvin Long, he, Marvin Long, was committing an assault upon the defendant with a deadly weapon, then, in that event, Boykin was justifiable in cutting the deceased. Both of these instructions were designed to inform the jury that if the facts therein assumed had been proven, the defendant acted in selfdefense in the killing. and was justifiable. The instruction fairly summarized the facts, as insisted upon by the defendant, and he had the right to have same given to the jury as presenting his theory of the case, untrammeled by the proviso inserted by the court--to wit, that this would be true unless the jury should believe that Marvin Long's assault upon Boykin was rendered necessary in his own self-defense. The modification in both of these instructions was confusing and misleading, and the effect of the same was to deprive the defendant of a clear-cut enunciation of the law as applied to the practically undisputed facts and in presenting the theory of his defense; and likewise was modification of instructions 19 and 20 by the court confusing and misleading.

Whether the modification of the instructions did more than to merely confuse their meaning, we are not sure, but we insist that, as originally drafted, they fairly presented the defendant's theory of the case. He had the right to have them thus given to the jury, unless, without the modification, the instructions would have been erroneous in announcing the law applicable to the facts of the case. If the state desired a modification of the rule announced by the instructions, it was its privilege to request the court for an instruction on the point. Such course is undoubtedly the better practice. Mask v. State, 7 Ga., 77; Archer v. Sinclair, 49 Miss. 343; Lamar v. State, 64 Miss. 498.

The circumstances under which the fifth and sixth instructions were given by the court, even if both of said instructions should be correct announcements of the law, are sufficient to condemn both of them. This a much stronger case than the Montgomery Case, 85 Miss. 331 (s.c., 37 So. 835).

Whatever the extent of our deference for the presiding judge, we cannot concur in his characterization of the incident as being a frivolous circumstance. Nor do we believe that this court will unite in such conclusion, because it seems to us to be impossible that any unbiased mind can confidently assert that this kind of circumstance, though frivolous it may be to some, did not prejudice the cause of the defendant.

J. N. Flowers, assistant attorney-general, for appellee.

As to the giving of instructions five and six asked for by the state at the time they were given, it is sufficient to say that it...