Boyko v. Federated Metals Corporation

• Decision Date: 16 December 1932
• Citation: Boyko v. Federated Metals Corporation, 164 A. 462, 11 N.J.Misc. 82 (N.J. Ct. Com. Pl. 1932)
• Court: New Jersey Court of Common Pleas
• Parties: FRED BOYKO, PETITIONER-APPELLANT, v. FEDERATED METALS CORPORATION, RESPONDENT-APPELLEE

164 A. 462

BOYKO

v. FEDERATED METALS CORPORATION.

Court of Common Pleas of New Jersey, Essex County.

Dec. 16, 1932.

Appeal from Workmen's Compensation Bureau.

Proceeding under the Workmen's Compensation Act by Fred Boyko, petitioner, to reopen his original case on the merits, or to recover for increased disability arising subsequent to entry of previous award approving compromise settlement, opposed by the Federated Metals Corporation, employer. From an order of the Workmen's Compensation Bureau dismissing the petition, petitioner appeals.

Reversed.

David Roskein, of Newark, for appellant.

Edwin J. O'Brien, of Newark, for appellee.

HARTSHORNE, J.

This appeal hinges upon the important and constantly recurring question as to the binding effect of a compromise settlement between employer and employee stated to be a "complete and final disposition" of the matter and thereafter approved by the bureau and entered as a formal award. The Workmen's Compensation Bureau has twice ruled such an approved agreement to be a final and complete bar even to a consideration of subsequently increased or diminished disability under section 21 (f) of the Workmen's Compensation Act, as amended by P. L. 1931, c. 279, p. 704, § 2 (Comp. St. Supp. § **236—24), Williams v. Yellow Taxi Cab, 7 N. J. Misc. 205, Mandy v. Federal Shipbuilding Co., 161 A. 837, 10 N. J. Misc. 944, in the latter of which cases the settlement agreement expressly provided that it was "in full and final settlement * * * and * * * could not be opened or reviewed by either party on account of any subsequent increase or decrease of disability."

These rulings apparently involve a misconception of the legislative intent as revealed by the acts involved. We turn to a consideration of such acts in the above regard.

The prime intent of the Legislature is that the parties shall receive what they are entitled to on the merits. In section 20(b) of the Substantive Act of 1911, as amended (Comp. St. Supp. § **236—21(b), it is provided: "No agreement between the parties for a sum other than that which may be determined to be due by the commissioner, deputy commissioner or referee, or the judge of the Court of Common Pleas upon appeal shall operate as a bar to the determination of a controversy upon its merits, or to the award of a different sum, if it shall be determined by the said commissioner, deputy commissioner, referee or judge that the amount agreed upon is less or more than the injured employee or his dependents are properly entitled to receive." P. L. 1921, c. 230, 2, p. 737 (Comp. St. Supp. § **236—21).

Furthermore, it is provided by section 4 of the Procedural Act of 1918, as amended, "Such agreement [between employer and employee] shall not bind the employer or injured employee, or the dependents of a deceased employee, unless approved by the bureau." P. L. 1918, c. 149, § 4 (Comp. St. Supp. § **236— 45). Hence no matter what the parties may agree to, no matter how final and conclusive their agreement may be in terms, it will have no binding effect at all without the approval of the bureau.

The question then becomes, What is the effect of the approval of the bureau? It requires no argument to demonstrate that the bureau, being purely a statutory body, can exercise only such powers, by approval or otherwise, as the statute gives it. The binding effect of its approval must therefore be determined in the light of the legislative intention considered as a whole. Similarly, the formal judgment of the bureau, after a hearing, is binding upon the parties, but this binding effect is subject to the remainder of the statute, which permits either its modification, its reopening, or an appeal therefrom, by sections 10 and 11 of the Procedural Act of 1918, as amended by P. L. 1921, c. 229, sections 3 and 4, at page 732 (Comp. St. Supp. §§ **236— 51, **236—52). Accordingly, the binding effect of the bureau's approval of the agreements in question, whether or not they are stated in terms by the parties to be final and conclusive, must be read in the light of the general legislative intent, particularly as expressed in section 20(b) supra. When thus considered, it is apparent that a compromise settlement between the parties, if approved by the bureau purely as a matter of form, binds the parties and is enforceable by and against them, unless and until it is determined on the timely application of either party by a consideration of the controversy on its merits that "the amount agreed upon is less or more than the injured employee or his dependents are properly entitled to receive," whereupon the merits must control on the questions both of liability and amount of compensation. By the same token, if the approval of the compromise settlement is given after a consideration of the merits, then it becomes the basis for a final judgment which is res adjudicata between the parties, subject only to the provisions of sections 10 and 11, supra. This construction gives rational effect to these two sections of the act, which it would otherwise be difficult to reconcile. Nor is this construction of the...