Boylan v. Nagy

• Decision Date: 14 February 2023
• Docket Number: 2:19-cv-210
• Parties: DESHAWN A. BOYLAN, Petitioner, v. NOAH NAGY, Respondent.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Michigan

DESHAWN A. BOYLAN, Petitioner,
v.
NOAH NAGY, Respondent.

No. 2:19-cv-210

United States District Court, W.D. Michigan, Northern Division

February 14, 2023

OPINION

Maarten Vermaat, United States Magistrate Judge

This is a habeas corpus action brought by a state prisoner under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) and Rule 73 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the parties consented to proceed in all matters in this action under the jurisdiction of a United States magistrate judge. (ECF Nos. 20, 21.)

Petitioner Deshawn A. Boylan is incarcerated with the Michigan Department of Corrections at the Oaks Correctional Facility (ECF) in Manistee, Manistee County, Michigan. On August 12, 2016, following a four-day jury trial in the Muskegon County Circuit Court, Petitioner was convicted of one count of felony murder in violation of Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.316(b). On September 26, 2016, the court sentenced Petitioner to life in prison without the possibility of parole.

On September 30, 2019, Petitioner filed his initial habeas corpus petition.^[1] (ECF No. 1.) In an order (ECF No. 3) entered on November 14, 2019, the Court directed Petitioner to file an

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amended petition using the standard form. On December 9, 2019, Petitioner filed his amended petition raising two grounds for relief, as follows:

I. [The state court's decision was an] unreasonable application of In re Winship, and [a violation of] Petitioner's XIV Amendment Due Process Rights

II. [The state court's decision was an] unreasonable application of Strickland v. Washington, and a violation of Petitioner's VI and [X]IV Amendment Righ[t]s

(Pet., ECF No. 5, PageID.222, 223.) Respondent asserts that Petitioner's grounds for relief are not fully exhausted and lack merit. (ECF No. 10.) For the following reasons, the Court concludes that Ground II sets forth a meritorious ground for federal habeas relief. The Court, therefore, will grant Petitioner's petition for writ of habeas corpus with respect to Ground II.

Discussion

I. Factual Allegations

The Michigan Court of Appeals described the events underlying Petitioner's felony murder conviction as follows:

In the early morning hours of June 26, 2014, Robert Gee shot and killed Jacob Rameau. The evening before, Rameau and his brother, Christopher Hotz, went to DJ's Pub and Grill in Muskegon. Hotz parked his car in the lot but left his windows rolled down and his keys inside. Rameau drove separately on a motorcycle and parked nearby. That same evening, a group of men, including [Petitioner] and Gee, decided to visit DJ's Pub. The driver of their party, Harry McBride parked next to Hotz's vehicle in the parking lot.

When [Petitioner's] group left, McBride, Gee, and two other men returned to McBride's car. [Petitioner] delayed, looking inside nearby vehicles. He entered Hotz's car, found the keys, started the engine, and pulled away from the bar. McBride did not want to follow [Petitioner], but testified that Gee pressured him to do so. By this time, Hotz and Rameau had exited the bar and saw [Petitioner]

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driving away in Hotz's car. Rameau jumped on his motorcycle and took up chase while Hotz called 911 to report the theft.

[Petitioner], followed by McBride, followed by Rameau drove along at high speeds. Eventually, Rameau passed McBride and pulled alongside [Petitioner] who had stopped abruptly on a residential street. Gee pulled out a gun, leaned out the window, and fired several shots at Rameau. Rameau pulled away and McBride pulled alongside [Petitioner]. McBride heard [Petitioner] state that he had intended to “pop” Rameau before Gee started shooting.[] Gee then fired another shot in the motorcycle's direction.

Eventually, [Petitioner] abandoned the stolen car. He and Gee searched it, stole various items, and then wiped the vehicle to remove any fingerprints. A local resident found Rameau lying on her front yard next to the motorcycle. She called 911, but Rameau died before he could be transported to the hospital. The next day, [Petitioner], Gee, and two other men travelled to a pawn shop to sell the items they stole.

People v. Boylan, No. 335556, 2018 WL 1936182, at *1 (Mich. Ct. App. Apr. 24, 2018) (footnote omitted).

In the days that followed Rameau's death, police identified Petitioner, Gee, and McBride as suspects. Police also suspected Everett Glover and Steven Bailey, both of whom rode with McBride and Gee. By July of 2014, the State had charged Petitioner with unlawful driving away of an automobile (UDAA), in violation of Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.413. (ECF No. 11-2, PageID.300.) Petitioner pled guilty to that charge on October 24, 2014. (ECF No. 15-1.) During the plea hearing, the court noted that, pursuant to a Cobbs^[2] agreement, it would “cap the minimum sentence at the middle of the guidelines.” (Id., PageID.1366.)

Petitioner appeared before the court for sentencing on the UDAA charge on December 1, 2014. (ECF No. 11-4.) During sentencing, the parties disputed the scoring on three Offense Variables (OVs): OV-1, OV-2, and OV-3. (Id., PageID.314-323.) Those OVs relate to the use of a weapon (OV-1); the potential lethality of any weapon possessed or used (OV-2); and physical

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injury that resulted to any victims (OV-3). See Mich. Comp. Laws §§ 777.31-33. OV-1 and OV-2 direct that points should be assessed even if another offender used or possessed a weapon during the offense. See id. §§ 777.31(2)(b); 777.32(2). The sentencing court did not assess any points for OVs 1 and 2, stating, “I don't find this to be a multiple offender case.” (ECF No. 11-4, PageID.323.) The court did, however, assess 100 points for OV-3, finding that Petitioner's offense resulted in the death of a victim. (Id., PageID.320-321.) The court ultimately sentenced Petitioner to a minimum of 3 years, 2 months, with a maximum of 10 years' incarceration. (Id., PageID.331.)

More than a year later, in early 2016, the State charged Petitioner with open murder.^[3] (ECF No. 11-1, PageID.294.) The State based the open murder charge on a theory of felony murder. (ECF No. 11-7, PageID.479.) Specifically, the State premised the felony murder theory on a predicate felony of either larceny of a motor vehicle or larceny of property within the car (e.g., the items taken to the pawn shop). (Id., PageID.480.) Jury selection began on August 9, 2016. (ECF No. 15-2.) Over the course of two days, the jury heard testimony from numerous witnesses, including law enforcement officials, Hotz, McBride, Glover, and Bailey. (Trial Tr. II & III, ECF Nos. 11-10, 11-11, 11-12.) The jury reached a guilty verdict on August 12, 2016. (Trial Tr. IV, ECF No. 11-13, PageID.1082.) Petitioner appeared before the trial court for sentencing on September 26, 2016. (ECF No. 11-14.)

Petitioner, with the assistance of counsel, subsequently filed a motion for an evidentiary hearing and a new trial, which the trial court denied. (ECF No. 11-16, PageID.1158-1182.) Petitioner, with the assistance of counsel, then directly appealed his conviction and sentence, raising the following grounds for relief: (1) the prosecution presented insufficient evidence to

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establish that Petitioner was the factual and proximate cause of Rameau's death because Gee's decision to shoot was not foreseeable; (2) trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by (a) being unprepared for trial, (b) failing to file a motion to quash the information on the basis that Petitioner's decision to unlawfully drive Hotz's car away did not foreseeably cause Rameau's death, (c) failing to file a motion to quash on the ground that the open murder charge violated the doctrine of res judicata and amounted to a piecemeal prosecution that violated due process, and (d) only meeting with Petitioner twice and failing to better explain plea offers; and (3) the trial court erred in several ways when it instructed the jury on the elements of felony murder and an aiding and abetting theory. The court of appeals noted that Petitioner's trial “was not perfect,” but rejected all of Petitioner's arguments and affirmed his conviction and sentence. See Boylan, 2018 WL 1936182, at *1. Petitioner subsequently filed a pro per application for leave to appeal to the Michigan Supreme Court. (ECF No. 11-17, PageID.1276-1321.) The Michigan Supreme Court denied leave to appeal on December 21, 2018. (Id., PageID.1353.) This § 2254 petition followed.

II. Exhaustion and Procedural Default

Respondent contends that Petitioner's grounds for relief appear to be unexhausted and procedurally defaulted. (ECF No. 10, PageID.265-266, 275 n.6.) There are two types of procedural default. First, procedural default can occur pursuant to state law. When a state law default prevents further consideration of a federal issue by the state, the federal courts ordinarily are precluded from considering that issue on habeas corpus review. See Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 801 (1991). To determine whether a petitioner procedurally defaulted a federal claim in state court, the Court must consider whether (1) the petitioner failed to comply with an applicable state procedural rule, (2) the state court enforced the rule so as to bar the claim, and (3) the state procedural default is an “independent and adequate” state ground properly foreclosing federal habeas review of the federal constitutional claim. See Hicks v. Straub, 377 F.3d 538, 551 (6th Cir. 2004). To determine whether

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a state procedural rule was applied to bar a claim, a reviewing court looks to the last reasoned state-court decision disposing of the claim. See Ylst, 501 U.S. at 803; Guilmette v. Howes, 624 F.3d 286, 291-92 (6th Cir. 2010).

Second, procedural default may occur if Petitioner failed to raise a federal issue in the state courts. Before the Court may grant habeas relief to a state prisoner, the prisoner must exhaust remedies...