Boyle by Boyle v. Pennsylvania Interscholastic Athletic Ass'n, Inc.

• Decision Date: 21 May 1996
• Citation: 676 A.2d 695
• Parties: 109 Ed. Law Rep. 1310 Bradley S. BOYLE, a minor by Jerome BOYLE, his Parent and Natural Guardian, v. PENNSYLVANIA INTERSCHOLASTIC ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION, INC., Appellant.
• Court: Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court

Page 695

676 A.2d 695

109 Ed. Law Rep. 1310

Bradley S. BOYLE, a minor by Jerome BOYLE, his Parent and Natural Guardian, v. PENNSYLVANIA INTERSCHOLASTIC ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION, INC., Appellant.

Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania.

Argued Feb. 9, 1996.

Decided March 22, 1996.

Reargument Denied May 21, 1996.

William M. Young, Jr., for appellant.

Nicholas E. Timperio, Jr., for appellee.

Before DOYLE and FRIEDMAN, JJ., and MIRARCHI, Senior Judge.

DOYLE, Judge.

The Pennsylvania Interscholastic Athletic Association, Inc. (PIAA) appeals from an order of the Court of Common Pleas of Fayette County, which entered a preliminary injunction enjoining PIAA from prohibiting Bradley S. Boyle from competing in interscholastic basketball at Geibel Catholic High School (Geibel) during the 1995-1996 school year.

The relevant facts are as follows. Boyle is a junior at Geibel, having transferred there after completing the 10th grade at Frazier High School (Frazier). Prior to transferring to Geibel, he participated in interscholastic basketball at Frazier, under the auspices of PIAA, during both the 1993-1994 and 1994-1995 school years.

Prior to both his freshman and sophomore years of high school, Boyle expressed unhappiness at having to continue to attend Frazier and applied to attend Geibel instead. However, due to his family's financial inability to afford the tuition at Geibel, he was unable to make the transfer at that time.

On December 17, 1994, Bradley Boyle's father, Jerome Boyle, was involved in an altercation at a local tavern with Thomas "Woody" Salisbury, the head football coach at Frazier and a teacher in the Frazier School District. Salisbury and Jerome Boyle initially only exchanged harsh words with each other, but Salisbury then threw a beer bottle at Jerome Boyle, hitting him in the face and causing a laceration under his left eye. Criminal charges were subsequently filed against Salisbury based on these actions.

Although Salisbury took a sabbatical leave for the Spring semester of the 1994-1995 school year, he was scheduled to return for the 1995-1996 school year. Boyle testified that the incident made him feel uncomfortable attending Frazier, particularly since the assistant basketball coach was a good friend of Salisbury and was present when his father was assaulted. Although Boyle testified that Salisbury had not actually bothered him since the incident with his father, he did testify that Salisbury had harassed him prior to that time. In addition, Boyle stated that Salisbury's son was a member of his class at Frazier and that attending school with him made Boyle feel uncomfortable. Furthermore, Jerome Boyle testified that the altercation between Salisbury and himself began because of a disagreement concerning his son Bradley Boyle. ¹

As a result of a financial settlement between Jerome Boyle and Salisbury stemming from the tavern incident, Boyle was financially able to transfer to Geibel for his junior year at the beginning of the 1995-1996 school year. On July 5, 1995, the principal of Geibel submitted a "Member School Form for a decision on Athletic Eligibility," requesting a decision by the District Committee of PIAA District VII regarding Boyle's eligibility for the upcoming academic year under the PIAA Transfer Rule.

The PIAA Transfer Rule is found in Article VI, Section 2 of PIAA's By-Laws, and provides in pertinent part as follows:

Except as otherwise provided in this section, a student who is not eligible under a section of this Article shall be ineligible to participate in each sport in which he participated within a period of one year immediately preceding the date of transfer.

(Reproduced Record (R.R.) at 105a.) Although Boyle conceded that he was not eligible under any of the specifically enumerated exceptions to the Transfer Rule, he alleged that the unique circumstances of his case warranted a finding of eligibility under Article VI, Section 15 of the By-Laws, a residuary "catch all" provision which provides that in "Exceptional Cases" the District Committee may confer eligibility where the transfer is not covered by any other specific provision under Article VI.

Based solely on Boyle's school records and a letter from his parents, the District Committee found that Boyle was ineligible to play basketball in the 1995-1996 academic year. ² In response to this decision, Boyle requested a hearing before the District Committee. On September 13, 1995, the District Committee held a hearing at which it again found that Boyle was ineligible to participate in basketball under the Transfer Rule. ³

Boyle appealed this decision to PIAA's Board of Control. In addition to the testimony of Boyle, Boyle's parents, the principal of Geibel, and the athletic director of Geibel, the Board of Control considered a crime report of the North Belle Vernon Police Department relating to the incident between Boyle's father and Frazier's football coach, a letter from the Victim/Witness Coordinator for Westmoreland County, and letters from the principals of both Geibel and Frazier. By a letter dated October 27, 1995, the Board of Control affirmed the decision of the District Committee.

The Board of Control based its decision in large part on a letter from Dr. Richard Martin, the Principal of Frazier, as well as guidelines which it had established (Section 15 Guidelines) to help District Committees interpret and implement the Exceptional Cases exception (Article VI, Section 15) to the Transfer Rule. These guidelines provide that a transferring student may be declared eligible in the following three circumstances:

1. Involuntary transfers, such as where a student is expelled from school and must therefore necessarily transfer to another school.

2. Where a student attending a school at which he must pay tuition (either public or private) transfers to another school because of financial inability to continue to pay the tuition.

3. Where the principal of the sending school and the principal of the receiving school inform the District Committee in writing, or orally at a hearing, that each believes that the transfer was not a result of recruiting and was not in whole or in part for any athletic purpose. (Emphasis added.)

(PIAA's Exhibit G; R.R. at 143a.) However, the three examples listed above do not constitute the sole reasons which may justify granting an exception under Article VI, Section 15 of PIAA's By-Laws. The guidelines expressly state that the above "list is not intended to be exhaustive, or to limit the District Committee's use of Section 15 in other situations in which the cause of transfer is not covered by the specific provisions of the transfer rule." (PIAA's Exhibit G; R.R. at 143a.)

Dr. Martin, the principal at Frazier, in his letter stated in relevant part:

First, I cannot say one way or another whether recruiting was involved. There are rumors to that effect; however, neither I nor my athletic staff are in a position to offer any proof one way or another. Officially, Frazier High School does not formally raise the issue of recruiting.

Second, as to the athletic intent and purpose, I must report that my athletic department is not willing to say that this transfer was without athletic intent. It is our understanding that previous efforts to enroll [Boyle] at Geibel included discussions of basketball.

Third, as principal, I assure you and the PIAA Board of Control, just as I did [Boyle's] family at the District VII hearing, that [Boyle] was not, and would not ever be, subjected to any kind of harassment or other inappropriate treatment here at Frazier High School.

(Dr. Edward Martin's letter, 10/5/95; R.R. at 139a.) (Emphasis added.) Based on this letter, the Board of Control concluded that Boyle had failed to establish that he should be declared eligible under the third exception to the Transfer Rule listed in the Section 15 Guidelines, since Dr. Martin was unwilling to unequivocally state that Boyle's transfer was not the result of recruiting and was not for an athletic purpose. ⁴ While the Board of Control did not conclude that Boyle had in fact been recruited or that he transferred to Geibel for an athletic purpose, it denied him a Section 15 exception because of Dr. Martin's inability or unwillingness to state that Boyle had transferred for a non-athletic purpose. ⁵

On November 14, 1995, Boyle filed a complaint and a petition seeking injunctive relief in the Court of Common Pleas of Fayette County in which he sought to prevent PIAA from denying him eligibility under the Transfer Rule contained in Article VI of its By-Laws. On November 28, 1995, a preliminary injunction hearing was held at which the trial judge heard testimony and received documents into evidence substantiating the facts as summarized above. By an order dated November 30, 1995, the court of common pleas granted Boyle's request for a preliminary injunction against PIAA. On December 7, 1995, PIAA appealed that decision to our Court. ⁶

Initially, before addressing the merits of PIAA's appeal, we must stress that the present case involves the granting of a preliminary, as opposed to a permanent injunction. The prerequisites to obtaining a preliminary injunction were set forth by our Supreme Court in Albee Homes, Inc. v. Caddie Homes, Inc., 417 Pa. 177, 181, 207 A.2d 768, 770-71 (1965), as follows:

[F]irst, that it is necessary to prevent immediate and irreparable harm which could not be compensated by damages; second, that greater injury would result by refusing [to grant the preliminary injunction] than by granting it; and third, that it properly restores the parties to their status as it existed immediately prior to the alleged wrongful conduct. Even more essential, however, is the determination that the activity sought to be restrained is actionable, and that the injunction issued is reasonably suited to abate such activity. And unless the plaintiff's right is clear and the wrong is manifest, a preliminary...