Boyle v. Alum-Line, Inc., No. 8-407/07-0372 (Iowa App. 8/27/2008), 8-407/07-0372
| Decision Date | 27 August 2008 |
| Docket Number | No. 8-407/07-0372,8-407/07-0372 |
| Parties | JULIE M. BOYLE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ALUM-LINE, INC., Defendant-Appellee. |
| Court | Iowa Court of Appeals |
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Howard County, John Bauercamper, Judge.
Plaintiff appeals from a district court ruling awarding her damages and attorney fees on her sexual discrimination and retaliatory discharge claims.
AFFIRMED.
Mark B. Anderson, Cresco, Karl G. Knudson, Decorah, and James P. Moriarty, Cedar Rapids, for appellant.
Donald H. Gloe of Miller, Pearson, Gloe, Burns, Beatty & Cowie, P.L.C., Decorah, for appellee.
Considered by Vogel, P.J., and Zimmer and Miller, JJ.
Julie Boyle appeals from a district court ruling awarding her damages and attorney fees on her sexual discrimination and retaliatory discharge claims under the federal and state civil rights acts against her former employer, Alum-Line, Inc. We affirm the judgment of the district court.
In 2003 Boyle filed a petition against her former employer, Alum-Line, under the Iowa Civil Rights Act (ICRA) and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, alleging sexual discrimination and retaliatory discharge claims. Her federal claims were tried to a jury while the state claims were simultaneously tried to the district court. Following a trial, the court entered judgment for Alum-Line denying Boyle's hostile work environment claims under both the ICRA and Title VII. The jury was not instructed as to the Title VII retaliatory discharge claim, and the court refrained from making any findings as to the ICRA retaliatory discharge claim.
Boyle appealed and our supreme court reversed and remanded the district court's judgment on her ICRA retaliatory discharge claim for further findings of fact, conclusions of law, and judgment as to that claim on the existing trial record. Boyle v. Alum-Line, Inc., 710 N.W.2d 741, 752 (Iowa 2006). Our supreme court also directed the district court to enter an order granting judgment to Boyle on her ICRA and Title VII hostile work environment claims and to determine damages based upon the existing trial record. Id.
On remand the district court found Boyle was subjected to sexual harassment by her coworkers and was discharged by Alum-Line in retaliation for her sexual harassment complaints. The court awarded Boyle $30,000 in back pay, $10,000 in past emotional distress, $5000 in front pay, $5000 in future emotional distress, and $50,000 in punitive damages.
Following entry of the judgment in her favor, Boyle filed an application for attorney fees. She requested that she be awarded $46,264.50 and $41,215.50 respectively for her trial attorneys, Mark Anderson and James P. Moriarty, and $98,793 for her appellate attorney, Karl G. Knudson. She further requested the court to allocate the award of attorney fees among her attorneys. After an evidentiary hearing, the district court awarded Boyle $25,000 in trial attorney fees and $25,000 in appellate attorney fees, in addition to the expenses incurred by each attorney throughout the proceedings.
Boyle appeals. She claims the district court abused its discretion in its award of back pay and front pay. She also claims the court abused its discretion in its award of attorney fees and in failing to allocate the award between each attorney.
The trier of fact determines the amount of damage attributable to a defendant's conduct. Lynch v. City of Des Moines, 454 N.W.2d 827, 836 (Iowa 1990). We review for an abuse of discretion. Id. We will not interfere with a damage award unless it appears flagrantly excessive or lacks evidentiary support. Id. (citation omitted). We likewise review an award of attorney fees in a civil rights action under ICRA and Title VII for an abuse of discretion. Landals v. George A. Rolfes Co., 454 N.W.2d 891, 897 (Iowa 1990).
Among the myriad of remedies that are available to successful plaintiffs under ICRA and Title VII are lost wages and benefits, also referred to as "back pay," and future lost wages and benefits, or "front pay." See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5; Iowa Code § 216.15(8)(a)(8) (2003); Landals, 454 N.W.2d at 895; Channon v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 629 N.W.2d 835, 847-48 (Iowa 2001). In computing awards in discrimination cases, we follow two basic principles: (1) an unrealistic exactitude is not required and (2) any uncertainties in determining what an employee would have earned before the discrimination should be resolved against the employer.1 Hy-Vee Food Stores, Inc. v. Iowa Civil Rights Comm'n, 453 N.W.2d 512, 530-31 (Iowa 1990); see also Van Meter Indus. v. Mason City Human Rights Comm'n, 675 N.W.2d 503, 514 (Iowa 2004).
These principles are consistent with our ultimate goal of compensating an injured person, which is to place that person in the position he or she would have been in had there been no injury. Hy-Vee, 453 N.W.2d at 531. They are also consistent with our obligation to construe ICRA liberally to effectuate its purpose. Id.
We further recognize that determining the amount of damages attributable to a defendant's conduct is a matter for the trier of fact. Lynch, 454 N.W.2d at 836. Thus we will not interfere with a damages award unless it clearly appears the verdict is flagrantly inadequate or lacks evidentiary support. Id. at 837.
With these principles in mind, we turn to Boyle's claims that the district court's award of damages for back pay and front pay are not supported by the record.
An employee who has been discriminated against is entitled to be reinstated to the position previously held and given back pay. Paxton v. Union Nat'l Bank, 688 F.2d 552, 574 (8th Cir. 1982). The back pay award should be determined by measuring the difference between actual earnings for the relevant time period and those which would have been earned absent the unlawful discrimination. Id. The latter calculation includes back pay from the date of discharge to the present and any increases that would have been received within that period. Id.
Boyle argues the district court's award of back pay is inadequate because the court erred in its calculation of the number of hours she worked per week and her hourly wage. We do not agree.
The district court "has broad equitable discretion to fashion back pay awards in order to make the Title VII victim whole." E.E.O.C. v. Dial Corp., 469 F.3d 735, 743 (8th Cir. 2006); Hy-Vee, 453 N.W.2d at 531. The mechanics of computing back pay can be difficult and alternative figures might be used by the court in fashioning a remedy. HyVee, 453 N.W.2d at 531. "In such cases, it suffices for the trial court to determine the amount of back wages as a matter of just and reasonable inferences." Id. (citation omitted). We conclude the record discloses a reasonable basis from which the district court's award of back pay can be inferred or approximated. Hawkeye Motors, 541 N.W.2d at 918.
Boyle earned $9 per hour following a favorable sixty-day review until her termination in April 2002. She worked an average of 37.7 hours per week with an additional 1.75 hours of overtime, although the court also noted that "[m]ost weeks" she worked forty hours with some overtime. Employees of Alum-Line "usually" received annual performance evaluations after their first year with the company, which could result in a "standard raise" of fifty cents depending on the evaluation. Boyle also received bonuses averaging $15 dollars per week in addition to an employee benefits package valued at $4.10 per hour.
Following her discharge from Alum-Line, Boyle received unemployment compensation of $3898. She eventually obtained employment in August 2002 and earned $7.25 per hour until she quit in October 2002. She remained unemployed until September 2003 when she accepted a job as a nurse's aid. She was earning $8.70 per hour at the time of the trial. See Iowa Code § 215.16(8)(a)(1) (). We believe the district court's award of $30,000 in back pay is within an acceptable range of the evidence presented at the trial, taking all of these facts into account. See Van Meter Indus., 675 N.W.2d at 514 ().
We reject Boyle's argument that the "damage award for lost back pay should really be calculated to the time of the decision, which was entered September 14 2006," more than two years after the trial. In remanding this case to the district court, our supreme court specified that damages should be determined "based upon the existing trial record." Boyle, 710 N.W.2d at 752. In order to award Boyle back pay damages beyond the date of the trial, the district court would have been required to consider evidence outside of the existing trial record, such as whether she was employed while her appeal was pending. See Landals, 454 N.W.2d at 895 ().2 We therefore affirm the district court's award of back pay damages.
Front pay is an equitable remedy that may be awarded in lieu of, but not in addition to, reinstatement. Channon, 629 N.W.2d at 848. It is not so much a monetary award for the salary the employee would have received but for the discrimination, but rather the monetary equivalent of reinstatement, to be given in situations where reinstatement is impractical or impossible. Kramer v. Logan County Sch. Dist., 157 F.3d 620, 626 (8th Cir. 1998). The calculation of front pay is necessarily uncertain and is a matter within the sound discretion of the trial court. Rasmussen v. Quaker Chem. Corp., 993 F. Supp. 677, 684 (N.D. Iowa 1998).
Boyle argues that the district court's award of $5000 in front pay is inadequate because the court should have presumed...
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