Boyle v. Fed. Express Corp.

• Docket Number: CIV-21-117-G
• Decision Date: 30 March 2022
• Parties: CHRISTIAN MARTIN BOYLE, Plaintiff, v. FEDERAL EXPRESS CORPORATION, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Oklahoma

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CHRISTIAN MARTIN BOYLE, Plaintiff, v. FEDERAL EXPRESS CORPORATION, Defendant.

No. CIV-21-117-G

United States District Court, W.D. Oklahoma

March 30, 2022

ORDER

CHARLES B. GOODWIN, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Plaintiff Christian Martin Boyle initially filed this action in state court, raising various claims arising from his employment with Defendant Federal Express Corporation. Defendant removed the action to this Court on February 17, 2021, and Plaintiff has twice since amended his pleading. Now before the Court is Defendant's Motion to Dismiss (Doc. No. 24) the Second Amended Complaint (“Complaint, ” Doc. No. 17), to which Plaintiff has responded (Doc. No. 25).

I. Summary of the Pleadings

Citing federal and Oklahoma law, Plaintiff's Complaint raises an assortment of claims against Defendant: (1) gender discrimination under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act (“Title VII”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq.; (2) age discrimination under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”), 29 U.S.C. §§ 621 et seq.; (3) disability discrimination under the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111 et seq.; (4) religious discrimination under Title VII; (5) national origin discrimination under Title VII; (6) state-law fraud; (7) state-law interference with a protected property interest (8) state-law breach of fiduciary duty; (9) state-law intentional interference with emotional distress; (10) violation of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”), 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968; (11) violation of the Robinson-Patman Act (“RPA”), 15 U.S.C. § 13; (12) state-law breach of contract; and (13) state-law conversion. See Compl. ¶¶ 12-57.

II. Defendant's Motion to Dismiss

Citing Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Defendant seeks dismissal of Plaintiff's claims in their entirety for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). In analyzing a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the court “accept[s] as true all well-pleaded factual allegations in the complaint and view[s] them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Burnett v. Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys., Inc., 706 F.3d 1231, 1235 (10th Cir. 2013).

“[T]o withstand a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain enough allegations of fact, taken as true, ‘to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Khalik v. United Air Lines, 671 F.3d 1188, 1190 (10th Cir. 2012) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). While the Rule 12(b)(6) standard does not require that a plaintiff establish a prima facie case in the pleading, the court discusses the essential elements of each alleged cause of action to better “determine whether [the plaintiff] has set forth a plausible claim.” Id. at 1192. A complaint fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted when it lacks factual allegations sufficient “to raise a right to relief above the speculative level on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact).” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (footnote and citation omitted). Bare legal conclusions in a complaint are not entitled to the assumption of truth; “they must be supported by factual allegations” to state a claim for relief. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009).

A. Plaintiff's Title VII Claims

Defendant first argues that Plaintiff's Title VII claims of discrimination based upon gender, religion, and national origin-Claims One, Four, and Five-should be dismissed due to Plaintiff's failure to exhaust his administrative remedies prior to bringing suit. See Def.'s Mot. at 10-12.

Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1), a plaintiff must exhaust administrative remedies prior to filing a Title VII claim challenging an unlawful employment practice. See Lincoln v. BNSF Ry. Co., 900 F.3d 1166, 1181 (10th Cir. 2018); see also Douglas v. Norton, 167 Fed.Appx. 698, 704-05 (10th Cir. 2006).

A plaintiff normally may not bring a Title VII action based upon claims that were not part of a timely-filed EEOC charge for which the plaintiff has received a right-to-sue-letter. That requirement, known as the exhaustion rule, derives from two principal purposes: 1) to give notice of the alleged violation to the charged party; and 2) to give the EEOC an opportunity to conciliate the claim, which effectuates Title VII's goal of securing voluntary compliance.

To advance these purposes . . . [a] plaintiff's claim in court is generally limited by the scope of the administrative investigation that can reasonably be expected to follow the charge of discrimination submitted to the EEOC. The EEOC charge must contain facts concerning the discriminatory and retaliatory actions underlying each claim. This court has held, time and again, that the reasonable and likely scope of the investigation is determined by the allegations contained in the Charge itself, rather than in the Charge and any responsive documents.

Sanderson v. Wyo. Highway Patrol, 976 F.3d 1164, 1170 (10th Cir. 2020) (omission and alteration in original) (emphasis, citations, and internal quotation marks omitted).

Plaintiff filed a charge of discrimination with the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (or “EEOC”). See EEOC Charge, Def.'s Mot. Ex. 1 (Doc. No. 24-1).^[1] On the form, however, he checked the boxes alleging “retaliation, ” “age, ” and “disability” discrimination, leaving blank any boxes that would reasonably reference discrimination on the basis of gender, religion, or national origin. See Id. at 1. Further, Plaintiff's factual averments to the EEOC are devoid of any reference to discrimination on these bases. See Id. at 1-2. Accordingly, although the Court construes the EEOC Charge “liberally, ” it agrees with Defendant that the alleged conduct underlying Claims One, Four, and Five would not “fall within the scope of an EEOC investigation [that] would reasonably grow out of the charges actually made in the EEOC charge.” Smith v. Cheyenne Ret. Invs. L.P., 904 F.3d 1159, 1164 (10th Cir. 2018) (alteration and internal quotation marks omitted); see also Sanderson, 976 F.3d at 1170.

Plaintiff responds to Defendant's Motion by supplying nearly four pages of conclusory allegations that he states should have been included in the Complaint regarding his exhaustion effort. See Pl.'s Resp. at 4-8. The gist of these broad allegations is that Plaintiff should not be penalized for failing to check all of the applicable boxes on the EEOC Charge because the facts supplied by Plaintiff provided a sufficient basis to trigger an agency investigation as to gender, religion, and national origin discrimination. See Id. at 4-5. As stated above, however, the facts set forth by Plaintiff to the EEOC do not touch upon these matters and would not reasonably have apprised the agency of such alleged conduct. See EEOC Charge at 1-2. Even assuming Plaintiff's pleading was again amended to include this language, the EEOC Charge cannot be found to have fulfilled the notice and conciliation purposes of the exhaustion requirement. See Sanderson, 976 F.3d at 1170. Claims One, Four, and Five are therefore subject to dismissal on this basis.

B. Plaintiff's ADA and ADEA Claims

In an ADEA or ADA case, the aggrieved person may bring a civil action within 90 days after notice has been given that the EEOC is not taking action and that the person has a right to sue. See 29 U.S.C. § 626(e); 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5); see also Panicker v. Compass Grp. U.S.A. Inc., 712 Fed.Appx. 784, 785 (10th Cir. 2017) (noting that the 90-day time limit is not jurisdictional but is a condition precedent to suit).

The EEOC issued its right-to-sue letter (“EEOC Notice”) on April 6, 2018. See EEOC Notice, Def.'s Mot. Ex. 2 (Doc. No. 24-2). Although the record does not reflect when Plaintiff received the Notice, it is undisputed that Plaintiff timely filed his first lawsuit raising his discrimination claims (“Boyle I”) on July 3, 2018. Def.'s Mot. at 7-8 (noting that the suit was filed 88 days after the EEOC Notice was issued). That suit, initially filed in Cleveland County District Court, was removed to this Court on July 24, 2018. See Boyle v. FedEx Corp., No. CIV-18-715-C (W.D. Okla.). On June 17, 2019, Boyle I was dismissed without prejudice after Plaintiff failed to comply with the Court's order regarding discovery. See Boyle I, 2019 WL 2503967, at *1 (W.D. Okla. June 17, 2019).

On June 17, 2020, Plaintiff filed the instant lawsuit in Cleveland County District Court. See Pet. (Doc. No. 1-1). Defendant argues that Plaintiff's Claims Two and Three, alleging discrimination on the basis of age and disability, are subject to dismissal due to Plaintiff's failure to timely bring suit after receiving his right-to-sue letter from the EEOC. See Def.'s Mot. at 12-14. Specifically, Defendant asserts that the initiation of this lawsuit on June 17, 2020, took place over 800 days from the issuance of the EEOC Notice and that Plaintiff's efforts in Boyle I and state savings provisions did not toll the 90-day limitation period. See Id. at 13-14 (citing Brown v. Hartshorne Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 926 F.2d 959 (10th Cir. 1991), abrogated on other grounds by Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101 (2002)).

In Brown, the Tenth Circuit explained that “as a general rule, a voluntary dismissal without prejudice leaves the parties as though the action had never been brought.” Brown, 926 F.2d at 961. The Court went on to hold that “[i]n the absence of a statute to the contrary, the limitation period is not tolled during the pendency of the dismissed action” and that “the filing of a complaint that is dismissed without prejudice does not toll the statutory filing period of Title VII.” Id.

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