Boyle v. State
Decision Date | 29 September 2005 |
Docket Number | No. CR 05-77.,CR 05-77. |
Citation | 214 S.W.3d 250 |
Parties | Patrick BOYLE, Appellant, v. STATE of Arkansas, Appellee. |
Court | Arkansas Supreme Court |
Jay Saxton, Bentonville, and Lisa Evans Parks, for appellant.
Mike Beebe, Att'y Gen., by: Vada Berger, Ass't Att'y Gen., Little Rock, for appellee.
Appellant Patrick Boyle was convicted of capital murder for shooting his live-in companion, Carol Ivanhoe. Because the State waived the death penalty before trial, Boyle was automatically sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. See Ark.Code Ann. § 5-10-101(c)(Supp.2005). Boyle raises four points on appeal: (1) the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to instruct the jury on second-degree murder and manslaughter; (2) the trial court abused its discretion in admitting the testimony of Shannon Bailey; (3) the trial court erred in excluding the testimony of Craig Davis; and (4) the trial court abused its discretion in excluding expert psychiatric testimony. We have reviewed Boyle's claims, find no error, and affirm.
In the early morning hours of March 12, 2003, Boyle shot and killed Carol Ivanhoe. Boyle and Ms. Ivanhoe had lived together for ten years. For several years before her death, Ms. Ivanhoe had been treated for various health problems that caused her chronic pain. She was admitted to the hospital for four days in January 2003 for severe abdominal and back pain, and was readmitted on February 4, 2003, for the same symptoms. While in the hospital, Ms. Ivanhoe developed pneumonia and was also diagnosed with thyroid storm, a rare condition that can be fatal if left untreated. She was treated for this condition and released on February 18, 2003.
Boyle testified that Ms. Ivanhoe continued to experience great pain after she was released from the hospital, and that he began to work the night shift in order to take care of her during the day. Boyle testified that Ms. Ivanhoe's condition worsened, and that she could not sleep or eat. He decided that she needed to be in the hospital, but knew she would not agree to go, so on March 11, 2003, Boyle took her to the doctor's office, hoping that her doctor would convince her to check herself into the hospital. When they were unable to get an appointment to see Ms. Ivanhoe's doctor, they returned home. Boyle testified that Ms. Ivanhoe continued to moan in her sleep that afternoon and evening, as if she were experiencing great pain. Boyle said that at some point during the night, he got out of bed, walked to Ms. Ivanhoe's nightstand, retrieved her pistol, and shot her twice in the head. He stated that he intentionally killed her because he knew she was going to die, and he did not want her to suffer anymore.
After shooting Ms. Ivanhoe, Boyle went to the kitchen and wrote a suicide note addressed to Ms. Ivanhoe's son, Stanley, who lived in a trailer behind Boyle's house. He then went back in the bedroom and called 911, explaining to the operator that he had shot his wife and was planning on shooting himself. The operator convinced him not to commit suicide. Boyle was later charged with, and convicted by a jury of, capital murder for killing Ms. Ivanhoe.
Boyle's first point on appeal is that the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury on the lesser-included offenses of second-degree murder and manslaughter. We have stated repeatedly that it is reversible error to refuse to instruct on a lesser-included offense when there is the slightest evidence to support the instruction. See, e.g., Flowers v. State, 362 Ark. 193, 213, 208 S.W.3d 113, 128 (2005); Morris v. State, 351 Ark. 426, 430, 94 S.W.3d 913, 915 (2003). However, we will affirm a trial court's decision not to give an instruction on a lesser-included offense if there is no rational basis for giving the instruction. Id. Finally, we will not reverse a trial court's ruling regarding the submission of such an instruction absent an abuse of discretion. Grillot v. State, 353 Ark. 294, 318, 107 S.W.3d 136, 150 (2003).
We turn first to Boyle's argument that the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to instruct the jury on manslaughter in accordance with Ark.Code Ann. § 5-10-104(a)(1)(Repl.1997), which states that a person commits manslaughter if
[h]e causes the death of another person under circumstances that would be murder, except that he causes the death under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance for which there is reasonable excuse. The reasonableness of the excuse shall be determined from the viewpoint of a person in the defendant's situation under the circumstances as he believes them to be[.]
We have held repeatedly that, in order for a jury to be instructed on extreme-emotional-disturbance manslaughter, there must be evidence that the defendant killed the victim in the moment following some kind of provocation, such as "physical fighting, a threat, or a brandished weapon." Kail v. State, 341 Ark. 89, 94, 14 S.W.3d 878, 881 (2000); see also Spann v. State, 328 Ark. 509, 944 S.W.2d 537 (1997). Passion alone will not reduce a homicide from murder to manslaughter. Spann, 328 Ark. at 514, 944 S.W.2d at 540.
In Kail we held that the defendant, who was convicted by a jury of capital murder for killing his father-in-law, was not entitled to an instruction on extreme-emotional-disturbance manslaughter where there was no evidence that he killed his father-in-law in the moment following provocation. Kail, supra. We stated that
[d]espite feelings of individuals who are suffering marital discord, the frustration, anger, and resentment that can result fails to constitute, on its own, a rational basis for giving an instruction on voluntary manslaughter. Whether expressed in terms of "heat of passion," (as it was formerly referred) or scientifically defined as "extreme emotional disturbance," see Rainey, 310 Ark. at 424, 837 S.W.2d at 456, the instruction requested by the appellant requires a basis in fact indicating that the appellant killed Larry Chappell in the moment following "provocation in the form of physical fighting, a threat, or a brandished weapon," as we stated in Spann.
* * *
The evidence adduced at trial is clear that appellant armed himself, invaded the victim's home, and shot him dead. It is true that his divorce from Mr. Chappell's daughter may have aroused unbalancing passion within the appellant, but absent any provocation, no rational basis existed upon which the trial court could instruct the jury on manslaughter due to extreme emotional disturbance.
Id. at 94-95, 14 S.W.3d at 880-81.
In spite of his admission that our case law holds otherwise, Boyle contends that proof of extreme emotional disturbance should not require evidence of provocation. While he points to no evidence of extreme emotional disturbance on appeal, either of provocation or anything else, his basis for the instruction in the trial court was his mental state resulting from Ms. Ivanhoe's illness: that is, he was in emotional distress from watching someone he loved suffer. In other words, he seems to be asking this court to establish a "mercy-killing" exception to the provocation requirement for extreme-emotional-disturbance manslaughter.1 We reject his request. Absent a legally-recognized defense, where a person intentionally causes the death of another, his act constitutes murder, and it is completely irrelevant that the act was motivated by love rather than malice. A humanitarian purpose is neither a defense to murder nor a substitute for the passion and provocation necessary to establish extreme-emotional-disturbance manslaughter.
Boyle has offered no evidence of provocation. Indeed, Ms. Ivanhoe was incapable of provoking Boyle as she was asleep when he shot her. Therefore, there was no rational basis for giving the manslaughter instruction. We affirm the trial court's ruling.
We now turn to Boyle's argument that the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to give the second-degree murder instruction. Because the jury in this case convicted Boyle of capital murder and was instructed on both capital murder and first-degree murder, this claim is barred by the "skip rule." See, e.g., Fudge v. State, 341 Ark. 759, 20 S.W.3d 315 (2000); Branscomb v. State, 299 Ark. 482, 774 S.W.2d 426 (1989). This rule provides that when an instruction on a lesser-included offense has been given, and the jury convicts of the greater offense, error resulting from the failure to give an instruction on another still lesser-included offense is cured. Fudge, 341 Ark. at 767, 20 S.W.3d at 319. In other words, the defendant cannot prove that he was prejudiced by the alleged error, so it was harmless. In this case, the skip rule operates to preclude Boyle's claim with regard to the second-degree-murder instruction.2
Boyle next contends that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting the testimony of Shannon Bailey, a guard at the Benton County detention facility where Boyle was taken after his arrest. Apparently, while Boyle was standing at the booking counter, he overheard Ms. Bailey's conversation with a male deputy in which Ms. Bailey stated that, if the deputy needed a place to stay for a few days, he could stay with her. According to Ms. Bailey, Boyle responded to this statement by smiling at Ms. Bailey and saying, "I'm available." During discovery, the State disclosed this information in Ms. Bailey's report of the event. The report indicated that the conversation took place five days after Boyle's arrest. Just before Ms. Bailey testified, however, the State notified the court and Boyle that the conversation actually took place immediately after Boyle was arrested and brought to the detention facility. Boyle objected to this testimony as irrelevant, prejudicial, and inadmissible hearsay. The trial court allowed the testimony, holding that it was relevant, not unduly prejudicial, and not hearsay, as it was a...
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