Boyle v. Town of Bristol
| Decision Date | 22 November 2000 |
| Docket Number | C.A. 96-5817 |
| Parties | HEIDI ZACHER BOYLE v. TOWN OF BRISTOL, BRISTOL POLICE DEPARTMENT, MICHAEL McGREEVY, ET ALS |
| Court | Rhode Island Superior Court |
DECISION
The facts upon which the plaintiff's motions are predicated may be summarized as follows:
The plaintiff, Heidi Zacher Boyle, brought an action for damages in the Superior Court against the Town of Bristol Michael McGreevy ("McGreevy"), Stephen Annarumo ("Annarumo") and Joseph Diniz ("Diniz") (collectively, the "defendants"), alleging negligence and excessive force. On November 13, 1993, the plaintiff and her then boyfriend, Keith Boyle, were patrons at The Clubhouse in Bristol. Keith Boyle, a musician, was performing with his band that evening. While on stage, Mr Boyle picked up a large amplifier and threw it into the audience. A fight ensued between Mr. Boyle and several other patrons. At this time, several of the band members escorted Mr. Boyle out of the bar and onto the porch. Mr. Boyle was intoxicated and very agitated. The plaintiff approached Mr Boyle in an attempt to calm him down. She testified she tripped and fell to the ground and appeared to be unconscious. The bartender contacted the Bristol Police Department and requested that they escort Mr. Boyle from the premises. Defendant McGreevy arrived at the scene and proceeded to remove Boyle from The Clubhouse. The plaintiff regained consciousness and at temped to assist Mr. Boyle. At this time, defendant McGreevy sprayed the plaintiff and Mr Boyle with pepper gas and called for assistance. Defendant McGreevy wrestled the plaintiff to the floor, kneeled on her back and placed her in handcuffs. Defendants Diniz and Annarumo arrived and assisted defendant McGreevy in arresting both the plaintiff and Mr. Boyle. After arriving at the police station, the plaintiff complained of arm pain and was transported to the Newport Hospital emergency room. The plaintiff was treated for contusions and lacerations to the face and a humeral shaft fracture to the arm. The plaintiff claimed that she sustained the fracture as a result of the defendants' negligence and use of excessive force.
On Thursday, September 21, 2000, a Superior Court trial jury found in favor of the plaintiff on her negligence claim against defendant McGreevy. The jury awarded the plaintiff $7,500.00, which included both medical expenses and pain and suffering. On that same date, the trial jury returned verdicts in favor of defendants - Town of Bristol, Annarumo and Dinizon all claims and in favor of defendant McGreevy on the plaintiff's 42 USC § 1983 claim.
The plaintiff now moves for an additur of $142,500. or, in the alternative, a new trial on the issue of damages. The plaintiff also moves for a new trial as to the excessive force claims against defendants McGreevy, Annarumo and Diniz, and the negligence claims against defendants Annarumo and Diniz. The plaintiff is seeking sanctions, pursuant to Rule 37(c) of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure, against all defendants for refusing to admit to certain admissions. And, the plaintiff submits a bill for the taxation of costs.
Defendant McGreevy objects to the plaintiff's motion for a new trial as to damages and argues that the jury award was adequate. The defendants - Annarumo, McGreevy and Diniz - object to the plaintiff's motion for a new trial as to the excessive force and negligence claims, contending that the grounds are insufficient to grant a new trial. The defendants object to the plaintiff's motion for sanctions, arguing that the admissions were of no substantial importance, that they had reason to believe that they might prevail on the issues and that the plaintiff did not prove the admissions. The defendants also object to the plaintiff's bill of taxation of costs, contending that the costs are non-recoverable and that the defendants - Town of Bristol, Annarumo and Diniz - should not have to pay costs since they prevailed against the plaintiff. In addition, the Town of Bristol moves for attorney's fees pursuant to 42 USC § 1988 as the prevailing party in the plaintiff's § 1983 claim.
A jury's award may be cast aside and a new trial granted only if the award shocks the conscience, strongly suggests that it was affected by passion or demonstrates that the jury calculated the amount of the award upon some clearly erroneous basis. Silva v. Spooner, 692 A.2d 336 (R.I. 1997). We permit the jury substantial latitude in computing damages to be awarded for pain and suffering. See id . Pursuant to Rule 59 of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure, when a trial justice believes that the jury verdict is either grossly excessive or inadequate, he can, before ordering a new trial on the issue of damages, give the plaintiff an opportunity for remittitur or the defendant an auditor. 1 Kent R.I. Civil Pract. § 59.4 at 440 (1969). A trial justice may use a remittitur or auditor to avoid unnecessary re-litigation of the issues. This way, the trial justice may prevent the burdensome cost, delays and harassment that may accompany the re-litigation of the same issues.
If a party refuses to accept the reapportionment of damages, in this case an additur, then the trial justice may properly consider granting a motion for a new trial. In ruling on a motion for a new trial as to the adequacy of damages, after weighing the material evidence and passing on the credibility of witnesses, the trial justice should grant a new trial if there is a demonstrable disparity between the award and the damages sustained; so that the verdict is not truly responsive to the merits of the case and fails to do substantial justice between the parties. Kelaghan v. Roberts, 433 A.2d 226, 229 (R.I. 1981).
The plaintiff contends the jury award for pain and suffering in the amount of $3,000. was inadequate and failed to do substantial justice to the parties. The plaintiff requests an additur in the amount of $142,500. The plaintiff argues that she endured extreme pain and suffering as a result of the humeral shaft fracture she received from defendant McGreevy. She mentions that she was confined to a "body jacket" for a four-week period. During that time, the plaintiff claims that she was unable to care for herself and required assistance. She was required to sleep in a prone position and could not use the toilet on her own. The plaintiff states that she still experiences some discomfort from the fracture, even though it has healed. The plaintiff also offers trial testimony of Edward Fink, M.D., an orthopedic surgeon, who states that the humeral shaft is one of the largest bones in th e arm and among the most painful fractures. Defendant McGreevy contends that the amount awarded by the jury was adequate and that an additur or new trial is not warranted. The defendant then argues that if the trial justice should give her an opportunity for an additur, the amount requested by the plaintiff is excessive.
The amount sought by the plaintiff is more than twenty times the total jury award. The plaintiff supports the amount of her additur by citing Kelaghan v. Roberts, 433 A.2d 226 (R.I. 1981) and Richardson v. Pedorella, 694 A.2d 755 (R.I. 1997). In Kelaghan, the plaintiff sustained severe injuries, which included a fractured knee, a fractured hip and pelvis, fractured ribs and head injuries. Furthermore, the plaintiff in Kelaghan was hospitalized for three months, was not able to walk without assistance, and suffered permanent damage preventing her from standing for more than 20 minutes at a time. Similarly, in Richardson, the plaintiff suffered injuries from an automobile accident. The plaintiff, as a result, developed convulsive syncope, which caused convulsions and loss of consciousness. In each of these cases, the courts ordered an additur in an amount of no more than five times the original jury award.
The evidence presented by the plaintiff, as it relates to her pain and suffering, is compelling. The jury award in the amount of $3,000. for pain and suffering does not appear to be truly responsive to the merits of the case. If the award were allowed to stand, it would fail to do substantial justice between the parties. However, the plaintiff's request for additur in the amount of $142,500. does seem excessive, since the plaintiff was never hospitalized and sustained no permanent damage to her arm. Nevertheless, the plaintiff was confined to a "body jacket" for a month and endured pain and suffering from her injury for which she should be adequately compensated. It would be inappropriate for this court to reasonably justify an additur in an amount 20 times the jury award. Rather, this court believes, after hearing and observing the plaintiff testify, that the pain and suffering she experienced from having her arm broken, the humiliation of having her very basic needs attended to by others, the discomfort she endured while in a body cast for four weeks and the pain she testified she continues to experience, support an additur in the amount of $30,000.00.
In deciding a motion for a new trial, a trial justice sits as a seventh juror and is required to independently weigh evaluate and assess the credibility of the trial witnesses and the evidence presented. If the trial justice determines that the evidence is evenly balanced or is such that reasonable minds, in considering the same evidence, could come to different conclusions, then the trial justice should allow the verdict to stand. Morrocco v. Piccardi, 716 A.2d 250, 253 (R.I. 1998) (citing Barbato v. Epstein, 196 A.2d 836, 837 (R.I. 1964)). If the trial justice finds that the jury's verdict is against the fair preponderance of the evidence, or fails to do...
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