Boyle v. United States
| Citation | 259 F. 803 |
| Decision Date | 04 April 1919 |
| Docket Number | 2573-2585,2590. |
| Parties | BOYLE v. UNITED STATES. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit |
Rehearing Denied June 30, 1919.
Plaintiffs in error were convicted of a violation of section 1 of the so-called Sherman Anti-Trust Act (Act July 2, 1890, c. 647 26 Stat. 209 (Comp. St. Sec. 8820)). The indictment included nine counts, four charging conspiracy, three, combination and two, contract, all to restrain trade or commerce among the several states.
Prior to 1910 certain manufacturers located outside of the city of Chicago were engaged in making switch and panel boards and other electrical appliances which were sold and shipped in interstate commerce finding a market in Chicago. Other of the plaintiffs in error were either officers and agents of the home manufacturing companies or of the labor unions. Prior to 1910 all products were made by nonunion labor.
In 1909 efforts were made to unionize the shops of the Chicago manufacturers, a detailed statement of the campaign being unimportant. The employers insisted that they could not compete with the foreign manufacturer who employed nonunion labor. As a result strikes were called-- some shops unionized, others held out. At this point a conference was arranged and a plan proposed to avoid the competition of nonunion shops. On or about April 1, 1911, an agreement was reached between the manufacturing companies and the representatives of the labor unions whereby the shops were unionized and a scale of wages adopted. The government contends that the agreement also unlawfully provided for the restraint of interstate trade by eliminating the competition of the foreign manufacturer. This elimination of competition was to be accomplished by means of coercion, boycott, threat of strike, and destruction of property wherever switchboards or panel boards made by the foreign corporations were installed. The agreement as reduced to writing expired at the end of a year, but new agreements were subsequently made. During the period covered by the indictment very few switchboards made by the manufacturers outside of Chicago found their way into the city. The malicious destruction of property and the interference with the work of construction were effective weapons that eliminated outside competition. Plaintiffs in error denied making any agreement that was unlawful or that called for anything but a bona fide effort to unionize all shops in and out of Chicago engaged in making electrical appliances, and especially denied that the agreement contemplated any destruction of property, the use of the boycott or blackmail, etc.
Error is assigned:
Albert Fink, John S. Miller, and David D. Stansbury, all of Chicago, Ill., for plaintiffs in error.
Charles F. Clyne and Albert L. Hopkins, both of Chicago, Ill., and Robert T. Neill, of El Paso, Tex., for the United States.
Before BAKER, MACK, and EVANS, Circuit Judges.
EVANS Circuit Judge (after stating the facts as above).
Section 1 of the Anti-Trust Act reads:
'Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several states, or with foreign nations, is hereby declared to be illegal.'
The government charged plaintiffs in error (in four counts) with a conspiracy to restrain trade or commerce among the several states (in three counts), with a combination to restrain such trade, and (in two counts) with a contract to restrain such trade.
Plaintiffs in error contend that none of the counts set forth an offense under the statute; it being claimed, among other contentions, that the means by which the object of the conspiracy or combination was to be accomplished were not set forth. Without considering the means that are set forth in the indictment, it is sufficient to say that the pleader was not required to set forth any means. Where the object of the conspiracy is unlawful, as in this case, it is unnecessary to set forth the means by which the object is accomplished. Jelke v. United States, 255 F. 364, . . . C.C.A. . . . .
It is also claimed that the government failed to show that the object of the combination was to interfere with interstate trade; that it affirmatively appeared that the object was to prevent the installation in Chicago of certain electrical appliances, an alleged intrastate transaction. This contention is contrary to the ruling of the court in Eastern States Retail Lumber Dealers' Association v. United States, 234 U.S. 600, 34 Sup.Ct. 951, 58 L.Ed. 1490, L.R.A. 1915A, 788; United States v. Patten, 226 U.S. 525, 33 Sup.Ct. 141, 57 L.Ed. 333; Loewe v. Lawlor, 208 U.S. 274, 28 Sup.Ct. 301, 52 L.Ed. 488, 13 Ann.Cas. 815; Lawlor v. Loewe, 235 U.S. 522, 35 Sup.Ct. 170, 59 L.Ed. 341; Montague & Co. v. Lowry, 193 U.S. 38, 24 Sup.Ct. 307, 48 L.Ed. 608. In the first Lawlor Case the court announces the rule in the following language:
'If the purposes of the combination were, as alleged, to prevent any interstate transportation at all, the fact that the means operated at one end before physical transportation commenced and at the other end after the physical transportation ended was immaterial.'
There can be no question but what the government charged the plaintiffs in error with a combination--
'the nature of which is now here described, to restrain said trade and commerce of said concerns, corporations and firms located in states other than the state of Illinois, in the manner and by the means now here set forth.'
Then follows a statement of the means by which the object was to be accomplished, namely:
'Said defendants were to hinder, restrain, and prevent the installation in the city of Chicago of any electrical appliances not manufactured by the members of the said association in said city of Chicago,' etc.
The object of the combination being to prevent interstate transportation (that is, prevent the shipment of switchboards, etc., from a point outside the state of Illinois to the city of Chicago), the mere fact that the means by which this object was to be accomplished was limited to interference with their installation in Chicago cannot relieve the transaction of its interstate character.
Does the evidence support the verdict? It is hardly necessary to restate all of the evidence upon which the government relied in answer to this challenge made by the plaintiffs in error. An examination of the record convinces us that there is credible evidence in the record sufficient to support the verdict. That the parties entered into a combination, that they reduced their agreement in part to writing, is conceded. That the parties combined to restrain the shipment of commodities from points outside of the state of Illinois to the city of Chicago is fairly inferable from a part of the...
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