Boyler v. City of Lackawanna, 1:15–CV–00355 EAW

• Decision Date: 27 February 2018
• Docket Number: 1:15–CV–00355 EAW
• Citation: 287 F.Supp.3d 308
• Parties: Scott A. BOYLER, Plaintiff, v. The CITY OF LACKAWANNA, Joseph Leo, individually and in his official capacity as Captain of the City of Lackawanna Police, and Brian Lakso, individually and in his official capacity as a City of Lackawanna Police Detective, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of New York

287 F.Supp.3d 308

Scott A. BOYLER, Plaintiff,

v.The CITY OF LACKAWANNA, Joseph Leo, individually and in his official capacity as Captain of the City of Lackawanna Police, and Brian Lakso, individually and in his official capacity as a City of Lackawanna Police Detective, Defendants.

1:15–CV–00355 EAW

United States District Court, W.D. New York.

Signed February 27, 2018

James Ostrowski, Buffalo, NY, for Plaintiff.

Julie P. Apter, Goldberg Segalla LLP, Buffalo, NY, for Defendants.

DECISION AND ORDER

ELIZABETH A. WOLFORD, United States District Judge

INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Scott Boyler ("Plaintiff") commenced this civil rights action against Captain Joseph Leo ("Captain Leo") and Detective Brian Lakso ("Detective Lakso") of the City of Lackawanna Police Department (collectively, the "Individual Defendants"), and the City of Lackawanna (the "City") (collectively, "Defendants"), alleging causes of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and New York State common law. (Dkt. 1). Specifically, Plaintiff claims that he was subjected to an unlawful arrest and criminal prosecution after engaging in protected speech under the First Amendment of the United States Constitution. Plaintiff asserts six claims pursuant to § 1983 against the Individual Defendants, and four common law claims against all Defendants. Plaintiff's common law claims against the City are premised upon the doctrine of respondeat superior.

Presently before the Court is Defendants' motion for summary judgment. (Dkt. 27). For the following reasons, Defendants' motion is granted, and Plaintiff's complaint is dismissed.

BACKGROUND ¹

Prior to the events underlying this action, Plaintiff "was arrested on at least two occasions and had interaction[s] with Captain Leo." (Dkt. 27–2 at ¶ 11; Dkt. 30–1 at ¶ 11). Plaintiff was displeased with his treatment by police officials during these interactions, and claimed that Captain Leo had "unlawfully confiscated" some of his personal belongings. (Id. ). As a result, Plaintiff created a website and a Facebook page where he expressed various opinions regarding the City of Lackawanna, law enforcement officials, and various authority figures, including Captain Leo. (Id. ). The website was named "Lackawanna, New York police corruption." (Dkt. 27–9 at 19 (Plaintiff's N.Y. Gen. Mun. Law § 50–h examination) ).

Plaintiff made various postings, including some that described Captain Leo as a "liar," "a sociopath, a [k]leptomaniac," "a compulsive liar," "abusive," "tormentive," and "sick." (Id. at 20). Plaintiff also posted, "you [referring to Captain Leo] and your disgusting pigpen at parasite hall are going to pay for your crime." (Dkt. 27–2 at ¶ 16; Dkt. 30–1 at ¶ 16). Plaintiff indicated that he was going to "enjoy punishing [Captain Leo] and [y]our gang in every conceivable way." (Dkt. 27–2 at ¶ 17; Dkt. 30–1 at ¶ 17; see Dkt. 27–10 at 19). Plaintiff also posted photographs of Captain Leo and called him vulgar and derogatory names, such as a "psychopathic pig fucker." (Dkt. 27–10 at 18; see Dkt. 27–2 at ¶ 15; Dkt. 30–1 at ¶ 15). Plaintiff invited others to submit comments about Captain Leo online as well. (Dkt. 27–10 at 20). Plaintiff also testified that had Captain Leo read the posted statements, he "might" find them annoying. (Id. at 19–20; see Dkt. 27–2 at ¶ 18; Dkt. 30–1 at ¶ 18).

Captain Leo testified that he does not "go on the websites," maintain a Facebook account, or frequent the Internet, and that it was an unidentified individual who initially brought these postings to his attention. (Dkt. 27–17 at 9–10; see Dkt. 27–2 at ¶ 22; Dkt. 30–1 at ¶ 22). Captain Leo then approached Detective Lakso with a screenshot of one of Plaintiff's posts, and requested that Detective Lakso review the website and Facebook postings. (Dkt. 27–2 at ¶¶ 23–24; Dkt. 30–1 at ¶¶ 23–24). Detective Lakso reviewed the website and Facebook postings in Captain Leo's presence, and had Captain Leo review certain excerpts from the web pages. (Dkt. 27–17 at 9–11, 14–15).

Captain Leo testified that he believed the posted statements were annoying, harassing, and threatening. (Dkt. 27–17 at 22). Detective Lakso testified that, on previous occasions, he had filed criminal charges for aggravation in the second degree based upon communications transmitted over the Internet. (Dkt. 27–18 at 8–12). On January 2, 2014, Captain Leo lodged a criminal complaint with the City of Lackawanna Police Department, asserting allegations of aggravated harassment in the second degree. (Dkt. 27–2 at ¶ 38; Dkt. 30–1 at ¶ 38). Detective Lakso drafted the complaint and reviewed it with Captain Leo before he signed it. (Dkt. 27–18 at 14–15; see Dkt. 27–14 (criminal complaint with attached screenshots) ). Detective Lakso completed a police report on the same day. (Id. ; see Dkt. 27–14 (Detective Lakso's police report) ). Detective Lakso also submitted the criminal complaint for review by a state court judge. (Dkt. 27–18 at 25).

On January 3, 2014, Lackawanna City Court Judge Frederic Marrano issued a warrant for Plaintiff's arrest pursuant to the provisions of the second degree aggravated harassment statute. (Dkt. 27–16). Subsequently, law enforcement officials in the Village of Angola, New York, arrested Plaintiff on April 30, 2014. (Dkt. 27–10 at 24–25).² Plaintiff appeared before Lackawanna City Court Judge Norman LeBlanc on May 1, 2014, where he entered a plea of not guilty. (Dkt. 27–2 at ¶ 43; Dkt. 30–1 at ¶ 43). On May 13, 2014, the New York Court of Appeals struck down the aggravated harassment in the second degree provision at issue as unconstitutionally vague under the New York State and Federal Constitutions. See People v. Golb, 23 N.Y.3d 455, 466–68, 991 N.Y.S.2d 792, 15 N.E.3d 805 (2014).³ On May 27, 2014, the prosecution moved to voluntarily dismiss Plaintiff's charges during a proceeding in Lackawanna City Court, and Judge Marrano dismissed the case. (Dkt. 27–21; see Dkt. 27–2 at ¶ 46; Dkt. 30–1 at ¶ 46).

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On April 23, 2015, Plaintiff commenced this action against Defendants, alleging various causes of action for the deprivation of his constitutional rights pursuant to § 1983, as well as several claims under New York State common law. (Dkt. 1). Under the framework of § 1983, Plaintiff asserts claims for malicious prosecution (first cause of action), false arrest (second cause of action), failure to intercede to prevent an unconstitutional act (third cause of action), violation of his right to free speech (fourth cause of action), assault (fifth cause of action), and battery (sixth cause of action). (Dkt. 1 at 6–11). These claims are only asserted against the Individual Defendants. Under state common law principles, Plaintiff alleges companion claims for malicious prosecution (seventh cause of action), false arrest (eighth cause of action), assault (ninth cause of action), and battery (tenth cause of action). The common law claims are asserted against all Defendants.⁴ Defendants answered the complaint, and raised a number of affirmative defenses, including the doctrine of qualified immunity. (Dkt. 3). After discovery was completed, Defendants filed the instant motion requesting that summary judgment be granted in their favor. (Dkt. 27). Plaintiff opposes the motion. (Dkt. 30). Oral argument was held before the undersigned on December 13, 2017, at which time the Court reserved decision.

DISCUSSION

I. Defendants' Motion For Summary Judgment

A. Legal Standard

Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that summary judgment should be granted if the moving party establishes "that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The Court should grant summary judgment if, after considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, the court finds that no rational jury could find in favor of that party. Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380, 127 S.Ct. 1769, 167 L.Ed.2d 686 (2007) (citing Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586–87, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986) ).

"Where the non-moving party will bear the burden of proof at trial, the party moving for summary judgment may meet its burden by showing the ‘evidentiary materials of record, if reduced to admissible evidence, would be insufficient to carry the non-movant's burden of proof at trial.’ " Rowe v. Wal–Mart Stores, Inc., 11 F.Supp.2d 265, 266 (W.D.N.Y. 1998). Once the moving party has met its burden, the opposing party " ‘must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.... [T]he nonmoving party must come forward with specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial .’ " Caldarola v. Calabrese, 298 F.3d 156, 160 (2d Cir. 2002) (quoting Matsushita Elec., 475 U.S. at 586–87, 106 S.Ct. 1348 ). "[T]he mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment...." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 247–48, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986).

B. Any § 1983 Claims Asserted Against the Individual Defendants in their Official Capacity Must be Dismissed

Defendants argue that Plaintiff's § 1983 claims asserted against the Individual Defendants, while acting in their official capacity, must be dismissed pursuant to the Eleventh Amendment. (Dkt. 27–23 at 10–11). "[C]laims against municipal officials in their official capacities are really claims against the municipality...." Wallikas v. Harder , 67 F.Supp.2d 82, 83 (N.D.N.Y. 1999) ; see Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165, 105 S.Ct. 3099, 87 L.Ed.2d 114 (1985) ("Official-capacity suits ... generally represent only another way of pleading an action against an entity of which an officer is an agent." (quotation marks and citation omitted) ). "More is required in an official-capacity action, ... for a governmental entity is liable under § 1983 only when the entity itself is a...