BP Amoco Corp. v. Szymanski

• Decision Date: 18 May 2004
• Docket Number: No. 45A05-0307-CV-363.,45A05-0307-CV-363.
• Citation: 808 N.E.2d 683
• Parties: B P AMOCO CORPORATION, Appellant-Plaintiff, v. Robert SZYMANSKI, Lake County Board of Commissioners and Lake County Auditor, Appellees-Defendants.
• Court: Indiana Appellate Court

808 N.E.2d 683

B P AMOCO CORPORATION, Appellant-Plaintiff, v. Robert SZYMANSKI, Lake County Board of Commissioners and Lake County Auditor, Appellees-Defendants.

No. 45A05-0307-CV-363.

Court of Appeals of Indiana.

May 18, 2004.

Kathryn D. Schmidt, Todd A. Etzler, Burke Costanza & Cuppy LLP, Merrillville, IN, Attorneys for Appellant.

Richard P. Komyatte, Richard P. Komyatte & Associates PC, Highland, IN, Attorney for Appellees.

OPINION

RILEY, Judge.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Appellant-Plaintiff, B.P. Amoco Corporation (Amoco), appeals the trial court's Orders in favor of Appellees-Defendants, Robert Szymanski (Szymanski) and the Lake County Board of Commissioners (Commissioners), with regard to Amoco's Complaint to Set Aside Deed and to Quiet Title.

We reverse and remand with instructions.¹

ISSUE

Amoco raises three issues in this consolidated appeal, one of which we find dispositive: whether the trial court erred in finding it lacked subject matter jurisdiction under Ind. Trial Rule 12(B)(1) to hear Amoco's contest of a tax deed by way of an independent action pursuant to T.R. 60(B).

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Amoco filed a consolidated appeal to two separate Orders of the Lake County Circuit Court. The first appeal, brought in cause number 45C01-0104-CP-466, is an independent action filed by Amoco to challenge the procedure by which a tax deed was issued. (Challenge Case). The second appeal, under cause number 45C01-9908-MI-1916, disputes the trial court's Order in the tax sale procedure issuing a tax deed to the Commissioners. (Deed Case).

Amoco owned the real estate legally described as:

Lot 25, Block 2, and the South½ of the vacated alley North of and adjoining, in Calumet Heights, as per plat thereof recorded in Plat Book 6, page 31, in the Office of the Recorder of Lake County, Indiana.

(Appellant's App. p. 54). Due to delinquent taxes, the Lake County Auditor attempted to sell this property at a tax sale in September of 1998. Because of irregularities in the sale, the property was removed from the tax sale. A year later, on September 29, 1999, the Lake County Auditor again unsuccessfully tried to sell the property.

In March of 2000, the Auditor attempted for a third time to sell the property for delinquent taxes. Since nobody elected to purchase the property, the Commissioners acquired a lien on the property on March 16, 2000. On October 3, 2000, the Commissioners filed a petition in the Deed Case for the issuance of a tax deed, which was granted on November 15, 2000. Subsequently, on December 20, 2000, the Commissioners conveyed the property to Szymanski by a Quit-Claim Deed.

On April 25, 2001, after realizing that its property was acquired by the Commissioners and then deeded to Szymanski, Amoco filed the Challenge Case in the Lake Circuit Court. Following the filing of this independent action, Amoco, on February 13, 2002, filed a Motion to Consolidate the Challenge Case with the Deed Case, which was denied by the trial court. In its Order of May 28, 2002, denying the consolidation, the trial court stated, in pertinent part:

[t]he [c]ourt having considered the pleadings and the arguments contained therein finds [Amoco's] Request for Nunc Pro Tunc Order is not in compliance with Trial Rule 42(A) and further finds there is no factual basis for entering a consolidation order of the causes of action for purposes of joint hearing or trial and therefore denies [Amoco's] Motion to Consolidate.

(Appellant's App. p. 6).

On October 16, 2002, Amoco filed its Motion for Summary Judgment in the Challenge Case. Szymanski responded by filing its Motion for Summary Judgment on February 20, 2003. On May 6, 2003, the trial court conducted a hearing on both motions for summary judgment and issued its Order on June 13, 2003. The trial court's Order stated, in pertinent part:

[a]rguments heard on Motion for Summary Judgment filed by [Amoco]. Arguments heard on Motion for Summary Judgment filed by [Szymanski]. The [c]ourt now finds that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction of this cause and hereby grants Motion for Summary Judgment filed by [Szymanski]. The [c]ourt further finds that since it lacks subject matter jurisdiction in this cause, Motion for Summary Judgment filed by [Amoco] is moot.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED, that [Amoco] take nothing on its [c]omplaint. Judgment for [Szymanski].

(Appellant's App. p. 7) (emphasis added).

Following this Order, on May 16, 2003, Amoco filed its Motion for Relief from Judgment and to Set Aside the Tax Deed, including a Complaint to Quiet Title, pursuant to T.R. 60(B) in the Deed Case. On July 29, 2003, Szymanski filed his response and answer, which included his Complaint to Quiet Title. Subsequently, on August 6, 2003, the trial court entered its Order denying Amoco's T.R. 60(B) Motion for Relief. In its Order, the trial court held, in pertinent part:

[t]he [c]ourt having carefully considered the pleadings and the arguments contained therein hereby denies [Amoco's] Trial Rule 60(B) Motion, specifically finding that [Amoco's] filing of an independent action seeking relief from judgment was an improper legal process to challenge by appeal the validity of the tax deed and further finds that the Trial Rule 60(B) Motion was not timely filed.

(Appellant's App. p. 9) (emphasis added).

By way of a consolidated appeal, Amoco now appeals the trial court's Order in both the Deed Case and the Challenge Case. Additional facts will be provided as necessary.

DISCUSSION AND DECISION

First, Amoco contends that the trial court erred by declaring that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction in the Challenge Case and, thereby, finding its Motion for Summary Judgment to be moot. Specifically, Amoco asserts that an independent action, filed in the same court that issued the original tax deed, is a valid cause of action pursuant to T.R. 60(B) to appeal the issuance of a tax deed. Thus, Amoco maintains, the trial court did have jurisdiction to adjudicate the Challenge Case. Conversely, Szymanski asserts that the only procedure available to contest a tax deed is by filing a T.R. 60(B) motion in the Deed Case. Therefore, Szymanski alleges, the trial court properly ruled that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction in the Challenge Case.

I. Standard of Review

In the instant case, the trial court determined that Amoco's Motion for Summary Judgment was moot due to the trial court's lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to T.R. 12(B)(1). Lack of subject matter jurisdiction can be raised at any time, and either the trial court or this court is required to consider the issue sua sponte if it is not properly raised by the party challenging jurisdiction. See Stewart v. Kingsley Terrace Church of Christ, Inc., 767 N.E.2d 542, 544 (Ind.Ct.App. 2002)

. A close reading of the trial court's order of June 13, 2003, leaves us confused as to whether the trial court characterized its adjudication as a dismissal of the cause of action based on the lack of subject matter jurisdiction or as a grant of summary judgment for Szymanski. Nevertheless, even if the trial court erred in treating the issue as a matter of summary judgment, this court would treat the parties' motions for summary judgment as a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See id.; Brazauskas v. Fort Wayne-South Bend Diocese, Inc., 714 N.E.2d 253, 259 (Ind.Ct.App.1999),

trans. denied; Albright v. Pyle, 637 N.E.2d 1360, 1364 (Ind.Ct.App.1994) (where we held that when there is a lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, the court has been said to be without jurisdiction to do anything in the case except to enter an order of dismissal). However, because the trial court considered matters outside the pleadings to reach its decision, the trial court's determination must be reviewed under the standard of review for summary judgment as provided in T.R. 56. See T.R. 12(B); T.R. 56.

Thus, in reviewing the propriety of a trial court's ruling of summary judgment, we apply the same standard as the trial court. Schoknecht v. Hasemeier, 735 N.E.2d 299, 301 (Ind.Ct.App.2000). We do not reweigh the evidence designated by the parties. Id. Instead, we liberally construe the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Id. Summary judgment is appropriate only if the pleadings and evidence show: 1) the absence of a genuine issue of material fact, and 2) the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id. at 301-02. A trial court's grant of summary judgment is clothed with a presumption of validity. Id.

II. Independent Action Pursuant to T.R. 60(B)

Amoco now contends that the issuance of a tax deed may be challenged by filing an independent cause of action pursuant to T.R. 60(B) in the same trial court that awarded the original tax deed. Thus, Amoco asserts, since it filed its independent cause of action in the trial court that issued the tax deed to the Commissioners, the trial court had subject matter jurisdiction in the Challenge Case. Indiana Code Section 6-1.1-25-4.6(h) (2001) stipulates that [a] tax deed issued under this section is incontestable except by appeal from the order of the court directing the county auditor to issue the tax deed. However, our legislature did not detail the appropriate procedure for an appeal under this statute, and no reported decisions have addressed this issue squarely on point. As such, the question presented by Amoco is a matter of first impression.

The interpretation of a statute by a trial court is a question of law to which this court owes no deference. Breece v. Lugo, 800 N.E.2d 224, 226 (Ind.Ct.App. 2003). Appellate courts review questions of law under a de novo standard and owe no deference to a trial court's legal conclusions. Id. In this regard, our supreme court has previously stated that when a statute does not provide its own procedures, Indiana Trial Rules are applicable. Ball Stores, Inc. v. State Bd. of Tax Comm'rs, 262 Ind. 386, ...