Bracewell v. State
Decision Date | 08 March 2019 |
Docket Number | CR-17-0014 |
Citation | 329 So.3d 29 |
Parties | Debra BRACEWELL v. STATE of Alabama |
Court | Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals |
Alicia A. D'Addario and Rachel P. Judge, Montgomery, for appellant.
Steve Marshall, atty. gen., and Jack W. Willis, asst. atty. gen., for appellee.
Debra Bracewell appeals her resentencing, pursuant to Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 132 S.Ct. 2455, 183 L.Ed.2d 407 (2012), to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole for her 1981 conviction for murder made capital because it was committed during the course of a robbery. See Bracewell v. State, 447 So.2d 815 (Ala. Crim. App. 1983), aff'd, 447 So.2d 827 (Ala. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 980, 105 S.Ct. 382, 83 L.Ed.2d 318 (1984).
For purposes of this opinion, an extensive statement of the facts of the crime is not required. Late in the evening on August 14, 1977, Bracewell, who was 17 years old at the time, and her husband Charles Bracewell,1 who was at least 10 years her senior, entered a gasoline station/convenience store owned and operated by Rex Carnley. Once inside, Charles brandished a gun and demanded money from Carnley, and Bracewell, at Charles's direction, walked behind the checkout counter and retrieved a pistol Carnley kept in a drawer under the cash register. Bracewell then stood on the rungs of a stool behind the counter and shot Carnley in the back of the head from approximately 18 inches away. Charles took the pistol from Bracewell, and Bracewell left the store. Charles then shot Carnley seven more times and took over $ 1,000 in cash from Carnley's person. Bracewell subsequently confessed to the murder, was convicted of murder made capital because it was committed during the course of a robbery, and was sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole.2
In June 2013, after the United States Supreme Court issued its opinion in Miller, 567 U.S. at 465, 132 S.Ct. 2455, holding that a sentence of "mandatory life without parole for those under the age of 18 at the time of their crimes violates the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on ‘cruel and unusual punishments,’ " Bracewell filed a Rule 32, Ala. R. Crim. P., petition for postconviction relief challenging the constitutionality of her sentence. In June 2016, after the United States Supreme Court issued its opinion in Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 U.S. 190, 136 S.Ct. 718, 193 L.Ed.2d 599 (2016), holding that the rule announced in Miller applied retroactively on collateral review, the circuit court granted Bracewell's petition, set aside her sentence, and scheduled a resentencing hearing.
The trial court conducted a sentencing hearing on August 28, 2017, and August 30, 2017, during which Bracewell presented evidence that she was intellectually disabled; that she had been physically and sexually abused by her father during her childhood and adolescence; and that she had spent her time in prison bettering herself. The State presented evidence regarding the circumstances of the crime; the impact the crime had on Rex Carnley's wife and children; Bracewell's repeated attempts over the years to place the blame for the crime on other people, including Carnley's own wife; and Bracewell's 1990 conviction for first-degree escape. At the conclusion of the hearing, the court resentenced Bracewell to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. The court, after summarizing pertinent portions of the opinion in Miller, stated:
(R. 269-71.)
Subsequently, on September 29, 2017, the trial court issued a written sentencing order. That order consisted of six parts. In the first part, the trial court set out the facts of the crime, including Bracewell's confession to the murder, and in the second part, the trial court set out the procedural history of the case. In the third part, the trial court set out the law under Miller, supra, and the Alabama Supreme Court's subsequent opinion in Ex parte Henderson, 144 So.3d 1262 (Ala. 2013), in which that Court, in accordance with Miller , identified 14 factors a sentencer must consider in determining whether to sentence a juvenile offender convicted of a capital offense to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole:
"(1) the juvenile's chronological age at the time of the offense and the hallmark features of youth, such as immaturity, impetuosity, and failure to appreciate risks and consequences; (2) the juvenile's diminished culpability; (3) the circumstances of the offense; (4) the extent of the juvenile's participation in the crime; (5) the juvenile's family, home, and neighborhood environment; (6) the juvenile's emotional maturity and development; (7) whether familial and/or peer pressure affected the juvenile; (8) the juvenile's past exposure to violence; (9) the juvenile's drug and alcohol history; (10) the juvenile's ability to deal with the police; (11) the juvenile's capacity to assist his or her attorney; (12) the juvenile's mental-health history; (13) the juvenile's potential for rehabilitation; and (14) any other relevant factor related to the juvenile's youth."
144 So.3d at 1284.3 In the fourth part of its order, the trial court listed each of the Ex parte Henderson factors and recited the evidence presented at the sentencing hearing that it believed was relevant to each factor.
In the fifth part of its order, the trial court, out of "[a]n abundance of caution" and because "[s]entencing for a juvenile convicted of capital murder has become less clear in the aftermath of Miller and its progeny," conducted an analysis pursuant to § 13A-5-47(b), Ala. Code 1975, which is part of Alabama's adult capital-sentencing scheme.4 (C. 221.) The court found the existence of three aggravating circumstances under § 13A-5-49, Ala. Code 1975 -- that the murder was committed during a robbery, see § 13A-5-49(4), Ala. Code 1975; that the murder was committed for pecuniary gain, see § 13A-5-49(6), Ala. Code 1975;5 and that the murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel as compared to other capital offenses, see § 13A-5-49(8), Ala. Code 1975. The court found two statutory mitigating circumstances to exist under § 13A-5-51, Ala. Code 1975 -- Bracewell's lack of prior criminal activity, see § 13A-5-51(1), Ala. Code 1975, and Bracewell's age at the time of the offense, see § 13A-5-51(7), Ala. Code 1975 -- and three nonstatutory mitigating circumstances to exist under § 13A-5-52, Ala. Code 1975 -- Bracewell's diagnosis of mild intellectual disability; the physical and sexual abuse Bracewell suffered at the hands of her father and her difficult home and family life; and "[t]he influence of the co-defendant over [Bracewell] given her age and intellectual disability." (C. 222.)
In the final part of its order, the court stated:
(C. 222-23; capitalization in original.)
On appeal, Bracewell presents several issues for our review. We remand this case for clarification on one of those issues, and we pretermit discussion of the remaining issues pending the trial court's return to our remand.
Bracewell contends that the trial court erred in conducting an analysis pursuant to § 13A-5-47(b), Ala. Code 1975,...
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