Brach v. Chief Justice of Dist. Court Dept.

• Citation: 386 Mass. 528,437 N.E.2d 164
• Parties: . 2 Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Suffolk
• Decision Date: 21 June 1982
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts

Page 164

437 N.E.2d 164

386 Mass. 528

Kenneth S. BRACH et al. ¹ v. CHIEF JUSTICE OF the DISTRICT COURT DEPARTMENT et al.

²

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts,

Suffolk.

Argued Dec. 8, 1981.

Decided June 21, 1982.

David G. Sacks, Holyoke (Geraldine Murphy Mortell, Springfield, with him), for plaintiffs.

Joan C. Stoddard, Asst. Atty. Gen., for defendants.

Before WILKINS, ABRAMS, LYNCH and O'CONNOR, JJ.

LYNCH, Justice.

In this action, the plaintiffs challenge the validity of Administrative Regulation No. 2-79 (AR 2-79) (promulgated by the Chief Justice of the District Court Department) under which, upon conviction of certain motor vehicle offenses, they were required to surrender their drivers' licenses to the court. We hold that the challenged regulation, although it is a sensible solution to a serious public problem, is invalid. ³

1. Background and statutory scheme. General Laws c. 90, § 24(1)(a ) and (2)(a ), as amended, lists a number of motor vehicle offenses and the respective penalties for conviction thereof. General Laws c. 90, § 24(1)(b ), states that "[a] conviction [of one of the offenses listed in § 24(1)(a )] ⁴ shall be reported forthwith by the court or magistrate to the registrar, who shall revoke immediately the license or the right to operate of the person so convicted." Subsection (2)(b ), imposes substantially the same obligations ⁵ upon the court or magistrate and Registrar with respect to convictions of the offenses listed in subsection (2)(a ). ⁶ General Laws c. 90, § 22, requires the Registrar to notify in writing any person whose license or right to operate is or will be suspended or revoked.

Prior to promulgation of AR 2-79 by the Chief Justice of the District Court Department, three to four months usually elapsed between the date of conviction and the date a license suspension or revocation, required or permitted by the statute, became effective. After studying the situation, a joint task force of the District Court Department and the registry recommended measures to speed up this process. The recommendations of the task force resulted in promulgation of AR 2-79.

The regulation states that a defendant who is convicted of certain motor vehicle offenses listed in G.L. c. 90, § 24(1)(a ) and (2)(a ), ⁷ "shall surrender his Massachusetts operator's license to the court immediately, for further transmittal to the Registry" (emphasis supplied). AR 2-79, § 5(A). The regulation directs court officials to prepare an abstract of the offense on the same day as the event being reported, id. at § 4(A), and states that the registry will send an official to visit the court at scheduled intervals to take possession of prepared abstracts of convictions and surrendered licenses. ⁸ Id. at §§ 4(C) & 5(C). Following the implementation of AR 2-79, the time period between conviction and subsequent license revocation by the registry averaged three to four weeks.

On December 8, 1980, plaintiff Brach was convicted in the Holyoke Division of the District Court Department of operating under the influence of intoxicating liquor (G.L. c. 90, § 24[a ] ), and surrendered his license to court personnel only after being ordered to do so by the judge. The directive to surrender his license was not part of the judge's sentencing procedure, but was given pursuant to AR 2-79. Brach appealed his conviction to the jury session of the Springfield Division of the District Court Department and, on February 24, 1981, he was again convicted of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor. He was ordered by the judge to pay a fine. His license was revoked by the registry on January 20, 1981, for an indefinite period. He took no appeal from that revocation.

On December 11, 1980, plaintiff Corbin pleaded guilty to and was convicted of going away without stopping and making known his name, residence, and registration number after knowingly colliding with or otherwise causing injury to property. G.L c. 90, § 24(2)(a ). He, too, surrendered his license only after being ordered to do so by the judge. The directive to surrender his license was not part of the usual sentencing or probation procedure, but was given pursuant to AR 2-79. Corbin appealed his sentence to the jury session of the Springfield Division of the District Court Department. On appeal, his sentence was reduced from two months to seven days in the Hampden County House of Correction, and he was placed on two years' probation. Corbin's license was revoked on February 5, 1981, for an indefinite period, but his right to operate a motor vehicle has since been reinstated.

Brach commenced this action on December 9, 1980, in the Superior Court in Hampden County. Three days later, he amended his complaint to add Donald Corbin, Jr., as a plaintiff, to strike the presiding justice of the Holyoke Division of the District Court (the original defendant) as party defendant, and to add the Chief Justice of the District Court Department (Chief Justice), and the Registrar of Motor Vehicles (Registrar) as defendants. The plaintiffs also sought certification as a class, pursuant to Mass.R.Civ.P. 23(b), 365 Mass. 767 (1974).

On December 18, 1980, on motion of the defendants, the case was transferred to this court pursuant to G.L. c. 211, § 4A. After a hearing before a single justice of this court, the plaintiffs' requests for preliminary and temporary injunctive relief and for certification as a class were denied. The parties submitted a statement of agreed facts and, later, an addendum to that statement. On June 1, 1981, on a joint motion by all parties, the single justice reserved and reported the case to the full court.

The plaintiffs have requested injunctions against the defendants restraining them permanently from carrying out the duties detailed in AR 2-79, and have asked for a determination that this regulation be declared null and void. We hold that the regulation is invalid. We do not, however, find it necessary to grant the injunctive relief requested.

2. "Standing" and "mootness." The defendants ask that we dismiss the case on the ground that, since the plaintiffs' licenses have now been revoked by the Registrar, the case is moot. In addition, they point out that Corbin's license has been reinstated. The defendants argue, in essence, that since the plaintiffs are no longer suffering a legally cognizable injury resulting from the operation of AR 2-79, they now lack standing to maintain this action.

Several considerations persuade us that dismissal on standing or mootness grounds would be inappropriate here. First, the issue raised by the plaintiffs is one "capable of repetition, yet evading review." Wolf v. Commissioner of Pub. Welfare, 367 Mass. 293, 298, 327 N.E.2d 885 (1975), and cases cited. Accord, Superintendent of Worcester State Hosp. v. Hagberg, 374 Mass. 271, 274, 372 N.E.2d 242 (1978). "An issue apt to evade review is one which tends to arise only in circumstances that create a substantial likelihood of mootness prior to completion of the appellate process." First Nat'l Bank v. Haufler, 377 Mass. 209, 211, 385 N.E.2d 970 (1979). Since the parties have stipulated that only three to four weeks now elapse between the surrender of licenses, as required by AR 2-79, and the revocation of those licenses by the Registrar, this case clearly falls in that category. Second, declaratory relief is appropriate where, as here, the issue of the validity and application of the challenged regulation presents repetitive problems of "public interest beyond the parties." See Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Commissioner of Corps. & Taxation, 363 Mass. 685, 688, 296 N.E.2d 805 (1973). Finally, the issues raised by the plaintiffs have been fully argued to us in an adversary proceeding. Cf. Superintendent of Worcester State Hosp. v. Hagberg, supra; Karchmar v. Worcester, 364 Mass. 124, 136, 301 N.E.2d 570 (1973). None of the reasons generally offered by courts for declining to decide cases on the ground of mootness (see Wolf v. Commissioner of Pub. Welfare, supra ) is applicable here. We think it is appropriate to express our opinion on the issues presented.

3. Power of District Court Department to issue AR 2-79. The plaintiffs assert that the defendant Chief Justice had neither explicit statutory nor inherent power to promulgate AR 2-79. We consider these arguments below.

a. Statutory power. We review briefly the statutes pursuant to which the defendant Chief Justice of the District Court Department may be authorized to exercise rule making power.

General Laws c. 211B, § 1, inserted by St.1978, c. 478, § 110, created the office of Chief Administrative Justice of the Trial Court of the Commonwealth and that of Administrative Justice of the District Court Department, the position now held by the defendant Chief Justice. Section 9 of that statute allows the Chief Administrative Justice, "after consultation with the administrative justice of a [particular] department, [to] promulgate administrative rules or directives concerning the transfer of cases entered for trial in one division to another division of the department in the same or an adjoining county. All rules promulgated by said chief administrative justice shall be subject to the approval of the justices of the supreme judicial court" (emphasis supplied). St.1978, c. 478, § 110.

Section 10 of G.L. c. 211B sets forth the responsibilities of the defendant Chief Justice acting in his capacity as Administrative Justice of the District Court Department. The Chief Justice "shall exercise his powers ... subject to the approval and direction of the ... chief administrative justice [of the trial court]" and "shall have responsibility for the administrative management of the personnel, staff services and business of [his] department[ ], including financial administration and budget preparation, record-keeping, information systems and statistical controls, purchasing, planning,...