Brackett v. Easton Boot & Shoe Co.
| Citation | 388 S.W.2d 842 |
| Decision Date | 08 March 1965 |
| Docket Number | No. 2,No. 50332,50332,2 |
| Parties | 59 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2028, 51 Lab.Cas. P 51,275 William BRACKETT et al., Appellants (Plaintiffs), v. EASTON BOOT AND SHOE COMPANY et al., Respondents (Defendants) |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court of Missouri |
Paul J. Simon, Floyd McBride, Thomas F. McGuire St. Louis, for appellants.
William M. Howard, Thomas C. Walsh, St. Louis Bryan, Cave, McPheeters & McRoberts, St. Louis, of counsel, for respondents.
This is a class action in which alleged rights to pro rata accrued vacation pay, pay for a holiday, and other asserted rights are sought. The trial court entered judgment for defendants. A timely motion for new trial was filed and overruled, and the appeal came to this court on the basis that plaintiffs sought recovery in excess of $15,000 in accrued vacation and holiday pay.
The plaintiffs are six individuals who sue on behalf of themselves and others similarly situated. Three of the plaintiffs are officers and representatives of Local No. 7 of the United Shoe Workers of America FAL-CIO (hereinafter referred to as Local No. 7) and the other three are members of Local No. 7 and were employees of Easton Boot and Shoe Company (hereinafter referred to as Easton). One of the officers of Local No. 7 was also an employee. The other two did not testify and the record does not indicate whether or not they also were employees of Easton.
The suit was against Easton and Hamilton Shoe Company (hereinafter referred to as Hamilton). The petition sought a declaratory judgment that defendant companies had certain contractual obligations under a collective bargaining agreement to provide employment or reemployment, that they should be held to owe certain monetary amounts for vacation and holiday pay to each plaintiff and those similarly situated, and that they should be held liable for compensatory damages to Local No. 7 as lost union dues and other damages. At the conclusion of all the evidence the court found against the plaintiffs and entered judgment in favor of both defendants.
Plaintiff brief and argue only two points for reversal of the judgment, to wit: (1) Plaintiffs and those similarly situated were entitled to judgment for accumulated vacation pay on a pro rata basis for a period from April 1, 1961, to August 31, 1961, the date of liquidation of Easton; and (2) Plaintiffs and those similarly situated were entitled to holiday pay for Labor Day, 1961. The other issues in the trial below and which have not been briefed are waived. Ayres v. Keith, Mo., 355 S.W.2d 914, 919. In this opinion we shall relate only the evidence which relates to the two points briefed and which is necessary to a determination thereof.
Defendant Easton was a corporation engaged in manufacturing shoes in the City of St. Louis. Local No. 7 was a labor union and was the duly certified bargaining agent for production employees of defendant Easton. A written labor agreement between Easton and Local No. 7 dated March 25, 1959, covered a period from December 15, 1959, through December 31, 1960, and a written supplemental agreement was executed extending the agreement for a period expiring December 31, 1962.
Easton was a wholly owned subsidiary corporation of Hamilton, which also manufactured shoes in St. Louis. Easton manufactured a particular type of shoe and did so under contract exclusively for Hamilton, as did another wholly owned subsidiary of Hamilton at De Soto, Missouri. For a time Easton operated on a profitable basis but in 1960 and 1961 the demand for shoes of the type manufactured by Easton declined sharply and Easton suffered substantial losses. The decision was reached that the operation of one of the three companies would be discontinued. For reasons not material to this decision, it was concluded that the De Soto plant would not be closed. Discussions followed as to whether the Easton plant should be closed and its operations moved into the Hamilton plant, or vice versa. Each company had a different union and discussions were conducted with representatives of both unions. On August 29, 1961, after these discussions had been concluded, the decision was made that the operations of Easton would be terminated on August 31, 1961, and it would be liquidated and its assets transferred to Hamilton, which would assume its liabilities. Local No. 7 and employees of Easton were notified by letter and by notice on the bulletin board of this decision and employees were told that their employment terminated August 31, 1961. Under the arrangements any laid-off employees of Hamilton were entitled to recall, after which Easton employees could be employed as new employees by Hamilton. (Some were so employed later, but this phase of the arrangement is not material to a decision of this appeal.)
Subsequent to the shutdown of Easton on August 31, 1961, officers of the union and a committee of employees met with representatives of Easton and Hamilton asserting claims to reemployment rights, severance pay, pro rata vacation pay for the period from April 1, 1961, to August 31, 1961, and holiday pay for Labor Day, 1961. There also were certain contentions about some arbitrations of other matters. Company representatives disagreed and this suit followed.
The labor agreement contained an arbitration clause providing for arbitration of disputes upon written request of either party. Apparently representatives of Local No. 7 verbally discussed arbitration of these matters with company representatives, but the latter expressed disagreement therewith and it does not appear that any written request was made. Both plaintiffs and defendants agree that the arbitration provisions of the contract are not involved.
The first point briefed and argued by appellants is that plaintiffs, and others similarly situated, were entitled to accumulated vacation pay on a pro rata basis for the period from April 1, 1961, until the date of liquidation of Easton on August 31, 1961, and that judgment should have been entered accordingly. Appellants' brief states that: '* * * the rights of the employees to vacation pay are to be measured by the provisions of the contract,' but their brief does not discuss or analyze any of the various sections of Article XIV (). Instead, appellants argue generally that collective bargaining contracts are to be construed with the liberality necessary to accomplish their evident purpose, that vacation pay is in effect additional wages or earnings, the right to which accrues as the employee works, and that if the employer terminates his employment before the date on which the employee would be entitled to the full vacation pay, he is entitled in right and justice to a pro rata portion of such vacation pay, calculated to the time of such termination.
The pertinent provisions of the labor agreement between Easton and Local No. 7 dealing with vacations were as follows:
'VACATIONS
vacation with pay in the year 1959 and in each succeeding calendar year, provided that each such employee:
'1. Has been in the continuous service of the EMPLOYER during the fifteen-year qualifying period, which shall consist of the continuous period from April 1, 1944, to March 31, 1959, both inclusive, with respect to the year 1959, and the fifteen year period ending March 31 of each succeeding year with respect to such succeeding years; and,
'2. Has actually performed all work required to such employee by the EMPLOYER during each of the twenty-six (26) different calendar weeks during the period from April 1, 1958, through March 31, 1959, with respect to the year 1959, and during the twelve month period ending March 31, of each succeeding year with respect to such succeeding year.
'Section 2. Subject to the conditions hereinafter set forth, which are conditions precedent, each employee of the EMPLOYER, represented by said UNION, who is unable to qualify under Section 1 hereinabove set forth, shall be entitled to vacation pay equal to six (6%) percent of his straight time earnings during the period from April 1, 1958, through March 31, 1959, with respect to the year 1959, and during the twelve month period ending March 31, of each succeeding year with respect to such succeeding year, provided that such employee:
'1. Has been in the continuous service of the EMPLOYER during the fifteen-year qualifying period, which shall consist of the continuous period from April 1, 1944, to March 31, 1959, both inclusive, with respect to the year 1959, and the fifteen year period ending March 31 of each succeeding year with respect to such succeeding year; and,
'2. Has actually performed all work required of such employee by the EMPLOYER during each of the thirteen (13) different calendar weeks during the period from April 1, 1958, thru March 31, 1959, with respect to the year 1959, and during the twelve month period ending March 31 of each succeeding year with respect to such succeeding year.
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