Brackett v. Focus Hope, Inc., Docket No. 135375.

Citation482 Mich. 269,753 N.W.2d 207
Decision Date30 July 2008
Docket NumberDocket No. 135375.
PartiesPatricia D. BRACKETT, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. FOCUS HOPE, INC., and Accident Fund Insurance Company of America, Defendants-Appellants.
CourtSupreme Court of Michigan

Charters, Heck, O'Donnell & Petrulis, P.C. (by Margaret A. O'Donnell), Troy, for the plaintiff.

Lacey & Jones (by Gerald M. Marcinkoski), Birmingham, for the defendants.

Daryl Royal, Dearborn, for the Michigan Association for Justice.

Opinion

CORRIGAN, J.

This case requires us to consider whether plaintiff's refusal to attend an employer-mandated event constituted "intentional and wilful misconduct" under MCL 418.305, thereby barring her recovery of benefits under the Worker's Disability Compensation Act, MCL 418.101 et seq. The magistrate found that plaintiff willfully refused to attend the event, despite having been informed that the event was essential in promoting the employer's goal of racial reconciliation. In light of that finding, we conclude that plaintiff's refusal to attend the mandatory event constituted intentional and willful misconduct, thereby barring workers' compensation benefits under MCL 418.305. We thus reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals.

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Defendant Focus Hope, Inc., hired plaintiff as a full-time employee in January 2001. Defendant's cofounder and chief executive officer, Eleanor Josaitis, told plaintiff that the mission of Focus Hope is to seek racial equality and reconciliation. Josaitis further explained that the most important function of the year is the Martin Luther King, Jr., birthday celebration, and that each employee was expected to attend the event. If the employee had a legitimate excuse for not attending, the employee was to inform the human resources department.

The King Day event was ordinarily held in Detroit, but in 2002, Josaitis decided to hold it in Dearborn. Plaintiff told her immediate supervisor, David Lepper, that she would not attend the event in Dearborn because she and her family had bad experiences there as African-Americans and because she believed the history of race relations in Dearborn was not in keeping with Dr. King's aspirations. Lepper advised plaintiff that she would be docked one day's pay for refusing to attend. Plaintiff did not tell Josaitis or the human resources department of her decision not to attend.

After the King Day event, Josaitis met with plaintiff, Lepper, and a human resources manager. Josaitis asked plaintiff why she had not attended the King Day celebration. Plaintiff explained that she believed the site of the event in Dearborn was not appropriate. Josaitis responded that plaintiff had been informed when she was hired that attendance at the King Day event was mandatory, and that the purpose of Focus Hope was to promote acceptance and tolerance. Josaitis advised plaintiff that she would be docked for two days' pay. Subsequently, some of plaintiff's job responsibilities were taken away.

Plaintiff and Josaitis then exchanged memos explaining their respective positions. Josaitis wrote in her memo that plaintiff's failure to attend the King Day event had reduced her confidence in plaintiff's commitment to Focus Hope's goals. Josaitis explained:

The purpose of the Civil Rights movement was to change the negative perception and prejudice of any individual towards another, based on race, gender, religion, color, or creed through the use of non-violent action. Father [William] Cunningham and I started Focus: HOPE based on this same philosophy that Dr. King gave his life for. Just as I stated to you in your orientation, I expect Every Focus: HOPE Colleague to abide by these same principles.

To harbor such feelings of the past without thinking how our MLK mandatory staff development day helps to move Focus: HOPE into the future, reduces my confidence in your commitment to help us fulfill our mission statement.

In her memo, plaintiff admitted that she understood that attendance at the King Day event was mandatory, but stated that she "felt offended by the celebration being in a city that I do not frequent and that I would be extremely uncomfortable celebrating Martin Luther King's birthday [in]." She added, "I did not attend the celebration and expressed [in the meeting] that I spent it with my family and with no regrets accepting the day off with no pay!" Plaintiff then wrote, "I do not accept [Josaitis's] judging and wrongfully degrading my character as a[sic] `untrustworthy person.'"

Plaintiff claims that a second meeting occurred in which Josaitis allegedly reiterated her disappointment in plaintiff, shook her finger in plaintiff's face, and said that plaintiff did not deserve to receive a paycheck from Focus Hope. When plaintiff asked if she was being fired, Josaitis shrugged her shoulders and let her out of the office. Josaitis testified that she remained calm and that she did not yell or threaten to fire her.

Plaintiff claimed that Josaitis's alleged comments traumatized her. Plaintiff left work and never returned. Her psychologist opined that plaintiff suffered a major depression precipitated by work events and that she is unable to work. A defense psychiatrist found no evidence of a continuing mental disability and opined that plaintiff could return to work without restrictions.

The workers' compensation magistrate credited the testimony of plaintiff and her psychologist. The magistrate found that plaintiff's mental disability arose from actual employment events and that plaintiff's perception of those events was reasonable.1 Although the magistrate found that plaintiff had willfully refused to attend the King Day event, and that her disability had resulted from that willful refusal, the magistrate nonetheless rejected the defense argument that plaintiff's misconduct barred her recovery of benefits under MCL 418.305. The magistrate stated that "[t]he kind of `misconduct' plaintiff engaged in here is a far cry from the alleged misconduct [i.e., sexual harassment] alleged in Daniel [v. Dep't. of Corrections, 468 Mich. 34, 658 N.W.2d 144 (2003)], and for that reason I decline to follow" Daniel.

The Workers' Compensation Appellate Commission (WCAC) affirmed. It chastised defendant as "insensitive" for failing to recognize that plaintiff's agreement to attend King Day celebrations would not require her to attend such events in Dearborn. Thus, the WCAC found "absolutely no merit to defendants' claim that plaintiff's behavior should disqualify her for benefits pursuant to the doctrine set forth in" Daniel.

The Court of Appeals denied leave to appeal for lack of merit,2 but this Court remanded the case to the Court of Appeals for consideration as on leave granted, in light of Daniel.3 On remand, the Court of Appeals affirmed the WCAC decision.4 The Court of Appeals determined that sufficient evidence supported the finding that plaintiff's conduct was a "far cry" from the misconduct in Daniel. Citing Andrews v. Gen. Motors Corp., 98 Mich.App. 556, 296 N.W.2d 309 (1980), the Court of Appeals concluded that plaintiff's conduct fell within the realm "in which a claimant perhaps violates a workplace rule or expectation but is not precluded by § 305 from recovering benefits for a resulting injury."5

Defendants again applied for leave to appeal to this Court. We scheduled the case for oral argument on the application, directing the parties to address "whether plaintiff's injury resulted from her willful misconduct."6

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

In the absence of fraud, this Court must consider the WCAC's findings of fact conclusive if any competent evidence in the record supports them. MCL 418.861a(14); Mudel v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 462 Mich. 691, 698, 614 N.W.2d 607 (2000). We review de novo questions of law, including statutory interpretation. Karaczewski v. Farbman Stein & Co., 478 Mich. 28, 32, 732 N.W.2d 56 (2007); Daniel, supra at 40, 658 N.W.2d 144.

III. ANALYSIS

MCL 418.305 provides: "If the employee is injured by reason of his intentional and wilful misconduct, he shall not receive compensation under the provisions of this act." "This provision has remained essentially unchanged since it was first adopted by the Legislature in 1912 as part of the original workers' compensation legislation. See 1912 (1st Ex. Sess.) PA 10, part 2, § 2." Daniel, supra at 41, 658 N.W.2d 144. The question here is whether plaintiff's refusal to attend an employer-mandated event, a refusal that the magistrate specifically found to be "willful," constitutes "intentional and wilful misconduct" that bars recovery of workers' compensation benefits.

Our fundamental obligation when interpreting a statute is to discern the legislative intent that may reasonably be inferred from the words expressed in the statute. Koontz v. Ameritech Services, Inc., 466 Mich. 304, 312, 645 N.W.2d 34 (2002). An undefined statutory term must be accorded its plain and ordinary meaning. MCL 8.3a; People v. Thompson, 477 Mich. 146, 151, 730 N.W.2d 708 (2007). A lay dictionary may be consulted to define a common word or phrase that lacks a unique legal meaning. Id. at 151-152, 730 N.W.2d 708. A legal term of art, however, must be construed in accordance with its peculiar and appropriate legal meaning. MCL 8.3a; Mayberry v. Gen. Orthopedics, PC, 474 Mich. 1, 7, 704 N.W.2d 69 (2005). In this case, we need not determine whether the statutory phrase "intentional and wilful misconduct" is a common phrase or a legal term of art because the terms in the phrase are similarly defined in both a lay dictionary and a legal dictionary.

"Intentional" is defined as "done with intention or on purpose." Random House Webster's College Dictionary (1991). "Willful" is defined as "deliberate, voluntary, or intentional." Id. "Willful implies opposition to those whose wishes, suggestions, or commands ought to be respected or obeyed: a willful son who ignored his parents' advice." Id. "'"[W]il...

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