Brackett v. SGL Carbon Corp.

• Decision Date: 03 June 2003
• Docket Number: No. COA02-965.,COA02-965.
• Court: North Carolina Court of Appeals
• Parties: Mark James BRACKETT, Plaintiff, v. SGL CARBON CORPORATION, Defendant.

580 S.E.2d 757

158 NC App. 252

Mark James BRACKETT, Plaintiff, v. SGL CARBON CORPORATION, Defendant.

No. COA02-965.

Court of Appeals of North Carolina.

June 3, 2003.

Mark James Brackett, pro se, for plaintiff-appellant.

Parker, Poe, Adams & Bernstein, L.L.P., by Jonathan M. Crotty and John B. Anderson, Charlotte, for defendant-appellee.

MARTIN, Judge.

Plaintiff filed this action alleging defendant's violation of the North Carolina Retaliatory Employment Discrimination Act ("REDA"). Plaintiff sought compensatory and punitive damages and injunctive relief. According to the allegations of the complaint, plaintiff alleges he developed skin lesions on his arm due to burns sustained at work during 1998. He reported these injuries to defendant in the fall of 1999, took medical leave, and requested that defendant pay for surgical removal of the lesions. He was released to return to work by the company doctor on 1 December 1999. Plaintiff alleged that on 2 December 1999 he was falsely accused by defendant of working for another employer during his leave. Defendant terminated plaintiff's employment, denied liability for his alleged injuries, and refused to pay for his medical expenses.

On 2 June 2000, plaintiff filed a REDA claim against defendant with the North Carolina Department of Labor ("NCDOL"), alleging he was fired because he reported an on-the-job injury. Plaintiff received a "right-to-sue" letter from the NCDOL on 22 June stating that it was dismissing plaintiff's complaint due to his failure to file the REDA claim within 180 days of the alleged discriminatory discharge as required by statute. Plaintiff was subsequently reinstated by defendant on 28 August 2000 and returned to work.

Based on the right-to-sue letter, plaintiff filed the instant civil action in Burke County Superior Court on 20 September 2000. On 22 November 2000, defendant filed a "Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law," citing G.S. § 1A-1, Rules 12(b)(6) and 56(b), asserting plaintiff's claim is time-barred. Eleven months thereafter, plaintiff filed a Motion to Amend seeking to allege that defendant had, since plaintiff's return to work, committed an additional discriminatory act under REDA. Before the motions were heard, plaintiff filed a Supplemental Motion For Leave to Amend on 21 February 2002, in which he also sought to allege a common law claim for wrongful discharge. Plaintiff appeals from the trial court's orders dismissing his complaint with prejudice and denying his Motion to Amend and Supplemental Motion for Leave to Amend.

By his assignments of error, plaintiff asserts the trial court erred in (1) granting defendant's motion and dismissing plaintiff's complaint and (2) denying plaintiff's motions to amend his complaint.

Plaintiff first asserts that although he filed his REDA claim with the NCDOL over 180 days after the alleged discriminatory discharge, his claim should not have been dismissed. We note at the outset that the trial court appears to have proceeded under Rule 12(b)(6) in dismissing plaintiff's complaint. Although the trial court must have necessarily considered plaintiff's administrative complaint and/or right-to-sue letter, documents not attached to the complaint, in ruling on the motion, because plaintiff referred to these documents in the complaint and they form the procedural basis for the complaint, the trial court did not convert the motion into one for summary judgment by doing so. See Scott v. United Carolina Bank, 130 N.C.App. 426, 428, 503 S.E.2d 149, 151 (1998)

(consideration of trust indenture referred to in complaint did not convert 12(b)(6) motion to one for summary judgment), disc. review denied, 350 N.C. 99, 528 S.E.2d 584 (1999); Brooks Distributing Co. v. Pugh, 91 N.C.App. 715, 717-18, 373 S.E.2d 300, 302 (1988) (consideration of contracts presented by defendants at pre-trial conference which were subject of action did not convert motion to one for summary judgment), reversed on other grounds, 324 N.C. 326, 378 S.E.2d 31 (1989).

To determine whether a complaint is sufficient to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the court must ascertain "`whether, as a matter of law, the allegations of the complaint, treated as true, are sufficient to state a claim upon which relief may be granted under some legal theory.'" Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint should be dismissed "`if no law exists to support the claim made, if sufficient facts to make out a good claim are absent, or if facts are disclosed which will necessarily defeat the claim.'"

Plummer v. Community General Hosp., ___ N.C.App. ___, ___, 573 S.E.2d 596, 598 (2002) (citations omitted).

G.S. § 95-242, a provision of REDA, states in pertinent part:

(a) An employee allegedly aggrieved by a violation of G.S. 95-241 may file a written complaint with the Commissioner of Labor alleging the violation. The complaint shall be filed within 180 days of the alleged violation ....

N.C. Gen.Stat. § 95-242(a) (2002) (emphasis added). Citing Commissioner of Labor v. House of Raeford Farms, 124 N.C.App. 349, 477 S.E.2d 230 (1996), disc. review improv. allowed, 347 N.C. 347, 492 S.E.2d 354 (1997), plaintiff contends the 180-day statutory time limit should not be strictly construed. Plaintiff relies, in particular, on the Court's statement that:

Generally, "statutory time periods are ... considered to be directory rather than mandatory unless the legislature expresses a consequence for failure to comply within the time period." Mandatory provisions are jurisdictional, while directory provisions are not.

Id. at 353-54, 477 S.E.2d 230, (citations omitted). Because G.S. § 95-242(a) provides no express consequence for failure to file a REDA claim with the NCDOL within 180 days, plaintiff asserts the time limit is merely "directory, not mandatory."

Plaintiff's reliance on House of Raeford Farms is misplaced. House of Raeford Farms dealt with a claims processing time limit imposed on the NCDOL, the agency responsible for reviewing REDA claims under the statute. In declaring the time limit was not mandatory, the Court specifically expressed concern about interpreting the statute to allow agency delay to prejudice the claims of private citizens, id. at 356, 477 S.E.2d at 234, and cited similar decisions regarding statutory time limits on the actions of governmental authorities processing private claims. See, e.g., Brock v. Pierce County, 476 U.S. 253, 106 S.Ct. 1834, 90 L.Ed.2d 248 (1986)

; State ex rel. Utilities Comm. v. Empire Power Co., 112 N.C.App. 265, 435 S.E.2d 553 (1993),

disc. review denied, 335 N.C. 564, 441 S.E.2d 125 (1994). Thus, we decline to extend the rationale of House of Raeford Farms to the filing time limit at issue in the present case.

Although there is no express statutory consequence for failing to meet the 180-day time limit set forth in G.S. § 95-242(a), case law precedent indicates the limit is a mandatory one. For example, G.S. § 95-243 contains a time limit provision similar to the one at issue:

(a) An employee who has been issued a right-to-sue letter ... may commence a civil action in the superior court....

(b) A civil action under this section shall be commenced by an employee within 90 days of the date upon which the right-to-sue letter was issued....

N.C. Gen.Stat. § 95-243 (2002) (emphasis added). In Telesca v. SAS Inst., Inc., 133 N.C.App. 653, 516 S.E.2d 397, disc. review denied, 351 N.C. 120, 540 S.E.2d 749 (1999), this 90-day limit was interpreted as mandatory, though the statute contains no express consequence for failure to meet the deadline. In addition, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) uses similar language to describe the time for filing charges of employment discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964:

(1) A charge under this section shall be filed within one hundred and eighty days after the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred....

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1) (2003) (emphasis added). In Amtrak v. Morgan, the United States Supreme Court declared this 180-day limitation to be mandatory, holding that "a claim is time barred if it is not filed within [this] time limit[ ]." 536 U.S. 101, 108-09, 122 S.Ct. 2061, 2070, 153 L.Ed.2d 106, 119 (2002) ("`strict adherence to the procedural requirements specified by the legislature is the best guarantee of evenhanded administration of the law'" (citations omitted)). We believe the 180-day time limit for filing a REDA claim with the NCDOL should be similarly construed. Thus, we hold the 180-day time limit for filing a REDA claim with the NCDOL is mandatory.

Plaintiff's remaining argument that where the time limits of REDA conflict with G.S. § 1-52, § 1-52 should control, is clearly without merit. See N.C. Gen.Stat. § 1-52(2) (2003) (civil action must be commenced within three years "[u]pon a liability created by statute, ... unless some other time is mentioned in the statute creating it"). Because plaintiff's administrative REDA complaint and right-to-sue letter show clearly that plaintiff filed his REDA claim with the NCDOL over 180 days after the alleged discriminatory discharge, the trial court did not err in concluding that plaintiff's complaint failed to state a claim under REDA and the dismissal of that claim with prejudice is affirmed.

Plaintiff next argues the trial court erred in denying his motions for leave to amend the complaint by adding (1) a REDA claim based on alleged retaliatory conduct by defendant after the original complaint was filed and (2) a claim for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy based on the original alleged discriminatory discharge. "A party may amend his pleading once as a matter of course at any time before a responsive pleading is served.... Otherwise a party may amend his pleading only by leave of court...; and leave shall be freely given when justice so requires." N.C. Gen.Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 15(a) (2003). In contrast, "[u]pon motion of a party the court may, ... upon such terms as are just,...