Brackin v. Anson
| Decision Date | 12 February 2014 |
| Docket Number | CASE NO. 2:12-CV-750-WKW [WO] |
| Parties | BARBARA A. BRACKIN, et al., Plaintiffs, v. KEVIN J. ANSON, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Alabama |
Before the court is Defendants Kevin J. Anson and Christopher Denson's motion for summary judgment (Doc. # 20), which has been fully briefed. (Docs. # 21-29 (Brief and Evidence); 34-35 (Responsive Brief and Evidence); and 36 (Reply).)1 After careful consideration of the parties' arguments and the relevant law, the court concludes that Defendants' motion is due to be granted.
The court exercises subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1343, and 1367. Personal jurisdiction and venue are uncontested.
To succeed on summary judgment, the movant must demonstrate "that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and [he] is entitled to judgment as amatter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The court must view the evidence and the inferences from that evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant. Jean-Baptiste v. Gutierrez, 627 F.3d 816, 820 (11th Cir. 2010).
The party moving for summary judgment "always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). This responsibility includes identifying the portions of the record illustrating the absence of a genuine dispute of material fact. Id. A genuine dispute of material fact exists when the nonmoving party produces evidence allowing a reasonable factfinder to return a verdict in its favor. Waddell v. Valley Forge Dental Assocs., 276 F.3d 1275, 1279 (11th Cir. 2001). If the movant meets its evidentiary burden, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to establish - with evidence beyond the pleadings - that a genuine dispute material to each of its claims for relief exists. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324.
Plaintiffs Barbara A. Brackin, Steven A. Buchanan, and Nyle H. Trimble are all former biologist aides who worked for the Marine Resources Division ("MRD") of the Alabama Department of Conservation and Natural Resources ("DCNR") in Baldwin County, Alabama. Defendant Anson is Chief Biologist for the MRD; Defendant Denson is the Assistant Chief Biologist. Defendants were some ofPlaintiffs' supervisors who investigated Plaintiffs, determined that Plaintiffs had falsified their time records and been derelict in their work duties, and recommended that the DCNR Commissioner terminate their employment.
While employed for the DCNR, Plaintiffs performed data collection activities that involved surveying recreational fishing activities. The MRD gathers information through surveying and other methods in order to manage species by setting creel limits, size limits, and seasons to harvest. Typically, biologist aides worked together in teams of two. Ms. Brackin and Mr. Buchanan often worked together; sometimes Ms. Brackin worked with Mr. Trimble; and sometimes Mr. Trimble worked with other employees, including Jay Gunn, who is not a plaintiff in this suit. Biologist aides documented their work on daily activity reports. Plaintiffs represent that they and other employees commonly recorded their activities after the fact.
For various reasons, Defendants aver that they came to suspect that several MRD employees - not just Plaintiffs - were failing to perform their assigned duties and that the dereliction of duties was compromising the MRD's efforts to conduct two recreational fishing survey programs. Defendants decided to acquire and use two GPS tracking devices called "track sticks" to monitor the movement of State-owned vehicles and boats used by Plaintiffs and other employees in the course of their work hours. While Defendants represent that the track sticks were useful forvalidating employees' locations and records, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants acquired and used the track sticks solely for the purpose of developing a case in support of their terminations. Plaintiffs were unaware of Defendants' suspicions and claim they were not confronted until after Defendants acquired the allegedly faulty evidence Defendants wanted.
Plaintiffs aver that Defendants never used the track sticks before using them on Plaintiffs' boats and vehicles, never tested or verified the devices, and never consulted persons with knowledge about the proper use of the track sticks. Plaintiffs claim that Defendants installed the track sticks underneath boat radio transmitters and in other concealed locations which adversely affected the track sticks' ability to provide accurate data. Defendants used the track sticks from February to April of 2010, during which time Defendants contemporaneously monitored Plaintiffs' time and activity logs for discrepancies. To summarize briefly a large volume of evidence, the track stick data confirmed Defendants' suspicions. By assessing the track stick GPS information, Defendants determined that Plaintiffs did not work as many hours as they claimed and falsely reported working before 8:00 a.m. in order to acquire compensatory time off.
In late April and early May of 2010, Defendants confronted and interrogated Plaintiffs individually about the disparities between the track stick data and Plaintiffs' activities as logged in their activity reports. Because the interrogationsinvolved events that occurred 45-60 days earlier, Plaintiffs say they could not recall accurately their reported work or explain discrepancies between their reports and the track stick reports.2 Defendants recommended to then-Director of the MRD, Vernon Minton, that Plaintiffs be terminated, and the same recommendations were forwarded to DCNR Commissioner Barnett Lawley. Commissioner Lawley notified Plaintiffs of their pre-termination conference and that they were charged with falsification of records, insubordination, dereliction of duties, and improper claims of compensatory time.
Defendants also confronted other employees, too, including Jay Gunn, who received a pre-termination notice like Plaintiffs did. Gunn immediately challenged the track stick information as unreliable. He produced photographic evidence, a signed letter from a field interview witness, and other eyewitness testimonies that corroborated Gunn's presence in places not recorded by the track sticks. When Defendants were not persuaded, Gunn met with other higher-ups in the MRD - Vernon Minton and Chris Blankenship - to challenge Defendants' recommendation of dismissal. Minton recommended that Gunn be suspended and demoted rather than terminated. Plaintiffs claim that Gunn successfullyundermined the reliability of the track stick data, but Defendants continued to endorse the recommendation that Plaintiffs be dismissed from their jobs.
The Commissioner of the DCNR held Plaintiffs' pre-dismissal conference in Montgomery, Alabama, at DCNR headquarters on July 29, 2010. He heard the Defendants' evidence against Plaintiffs and accepted Defendants' recommendation to terminate employment effective August 6, 2010. Plaintiffs appealed to the State Personnel Board where the Board conducted a de novo review, and Plaintiffs had the opportunity to cross examine Defendants about the track sticks' margin for error and Defendants disregard for Plaintiffs' exemplary records as employees prior to the records falsification charges.3 In March 2011, the administrative law judge ("ALJ") recommended that the Personnel Board uphold Plaintiffs' terminations. It did.
In July 2012, Plaintiffs brought this suit in state court against Defendants, suing them in their official and individual capacities. Defendants removed the case to this court. Plaintiffs' complaint sets forth five counts against Defendants: (1) 42 U.S.C. § 1983 equal protection violation; (2) 42 U.S.C. § 1983 due process violation; (3) 42 U.S.C. § 1985 conspiracy; (4) defamation; and (5) civilconspiracy. Plaintiffs request unspecified equitable and declaratory relief, as well as compensatory and punitive damages. Defendants request summary judgment on all claims against them in both their official and individual capacities.
Defendants argue that Eleventh Amendment immunity bars Plaintiffs' § 1983 and § 1985 claims against them in the official capacities. The Eleventh Amendment provides that "[t]he Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State." "[B]y its terms the Amendment applies only to suits against a State by citizens of another State," but the Supreme Court "ha[s] extended the Amendment's applicability to suits by citizens against their own States." Bd. of Trustees of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 363 (2001). Moreover, "[l]awsuits against a state official in his or her official capacity are suits against the state when 'the state is the real, substantial party in interest.'" Carr v. City of Florence, Ala., 916 F.2d 1521, 1524 (11th Cir. 1990) (quoting Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 101 (1984)). This is because the state would be responsible for paying any award of damages to the plaintiff. Id.
There are two exceptions to Eleventh Amendment immunity: where Congress abrogates state immunity pursuant to its power to enforce Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, or where a state expressly waives its immunity through legislative action. Id. at 1524-25. Neither exception applies in this case.
Additionally, in accord with Eleventh Amendment immunity jurisprudence, states are not "persons" subject to suit under § 1983, and a suit under § 1983 against a state official "is no different from a suit against the State itself." Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58,...
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