Bradbury v. State
| Citation | 180 N.E.3d 249 |
| Decision Date | 01 October 2021 |
| Docket Number | Supreme Court Case No. 21S-PC-441 |
| Parties | Tyre BRADBURY, Appellant/Petitioner, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee/Respondent. |
| Court | Supreme Court of Indiana |
ATTORNEY FOR APPELANT: John Kindley, South Bend, Indiana
ATTORNEY FOR AMICUS CURIAE: Victoria Bailey Casanova, Casanova Legal Services, LLC, Indianapolis, Indiana
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE: Theodore E. Rokita, Attorney General of Indiana, Justin F. Roebel, Supervising Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, Indiana
On Petition to Transfer from the Indiana Court of Appeals, No. 20A-PC-620
In this murder case, defendant alleges counsel was ineffective in several ways. However, reviewing the facts and circumstances here, we find that counsel was not ineffective and affirm the post-conviction court.
Fifteen-year-old Tyre Bradbury was charged as an adult and convicted of murder as an accomplice with a gang enhancement after his nineteen-year-old friend, Robert Griffin, shot and killed a toddler while opening fire on a rival during a gang dispute. Bradbury had provided Griffin with the handgun he used.
After Bradbury was arrested, he spoke with police at length and changed his story a few times. At one point he even claimed that he was the shooter, but later reneged and said he was just protecting his friends. He also admitted his responsibility to other inmates.
At trial, Bradbury argued that he was innocent and tried to stop the shooting. Nevertheless, Bradbury was convicted and received an enhanced sentence of ninety years. This sentence was modified to sixty years following his direct appeal.
Bradbury then sought post-conviction relief alleging that his trial counsel was ineffective in various respects. The post-conviction court denied Bradbury's petition, and a split Court of Appeals appellate panel reversed. The majority focused on just two claims of ineffective assistance: 1) whether counsel was deficient for stipulating that Griffin was convicted of murder as the principal (thus conceding that Griffin had the requisite intent to kill); and 2) whether counsel was ineffective for failing to request that the jury be instructed on lesser-included offenses. The majority found that counsel should not have agreed to the stipulation and should have sought an instruction on lesser included offenses and that counsel's failures prejudiced Bradbury (but does not explain how).
Judge Vaidik dissented. She would affirm the trial court citing the standard of review and noting that while it is possible to read the record the way the majority did, she did not see it that way. She further noted that she agreed with the post-conviction court that counsel's decisions were strategic and noted evidence in the record not favorable to Bradbury that makes it less than clear that a new trial would produce a different result. For instance, there were multiple witnesses whose testimony supported Griffin's intent to kill and thus, not stipulating to it would not be helpful and further, given this evidence, a lesser included instruction would not be appropriate either.
The State petitioned for transfer which we now grant. Ind. Appellate Rule 58(A).
In order to obtain relief on post-conviction, a petitioner must show "that the evidence, as a whole, unmistakably and unerringly points to a conclusion contrary to the post-conviction court's decision." Wilson v. State , 157 N.E.3d 1163, 1170 (Ind. 2020) ; see also Ben-Yisrayl v. State , 729 N.E.2d 102, 106 (Ind. 2000). This Court has also stated that an appellate court should not reverse a denial of post-conviction relief unless "there is no way within the law that the court below could have reached the decision it did." Stevens v. State , 770 N.E.2d 739, 745 (Ind. 2002). A reviewing court accepts the post-conviction court's findings of fact unless they are "clearly erroneous." Davidson v. State , 763 N.E.2d 441, 443-44 (Ind. 2002). In that analysis, the post-conviction court is the "sole judge of the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses." Hall v. State , 849 N.E.2d 466, 468-69 (Ind. 2006).
To succeed on ineffective assistance of counsel claims, Bradbury must show: (1) counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness based on prevailing professional norms; and (2) the deficiency was so prejudicial as to create a reasonable probability the outcome would have been different absent counsel's errors. Hollowell v. State , 19 N.E.3d 263, 268-69 (Ind. 2014) (applying Strickland standard). Counsel is afforded considerable discretion in choosing strategy and tactics, and these decisions are entitled to deferential review. Weisheit v. State , 109 N.E.3d 978, 983 (Ind. 2018), reh'g denied. "The Sixth Amendment guarantees reasonable competence, not perfect advocacy judged with the benefit of hindsight." Yarborough v. Gentry , 540 U.S. 1, 8, 124 S.Ct. 1, 157 L.Ed.2d 1 (2003).
In order to convict Bradbury of murder as an accomplice, the State was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Bradbury , acting with the intent to kill his rival, knowingly aided, induced, or caused Griffin to commit the crime of murdering toddler J.S.1 Bradbury's counsel stipulated to the fact that Griffin was convicted of murder. Bradbury and the Court of Appeals majority fault counsel for this decision, believing it undercut Bradbury's case and made it easier for the State to meet its burden of proof regarding Bradbury.
At an evidentiary post-conviction hearing, Bradbury's lead trial counsel testified that he agreed to stipulate to Griffin's conviction even though he believed the evidence could have been kept out because he did not want the jury to believe that if Bradbury were acquitted "this child died without anybody facing the music." PCR Tr. Vol. 4 at 20. He further stated: Id. at 21. Cocounsel articulated another reason for the stipulation as well. That is, Bradbury had initially confessed that he was the shooter and thus, the stipulation served to show that it was a false confession. Id. at 58-59.
More importantly though, this stipulation does not speak at all to Bradbury's intent, which the State still had to prove. While certainly counsel did not have to stipulate to Griffin's intent, this stipulation did not relieve the State of the burden to prove Bradbury's intent. Bradbury asserts he tried to stop the shooting, and lead counsel testified emphatically and repeatedly that this was what he wanted to get across to the jury any way he could. The stipulation in no way forecloses or contradicts that theory of the case. Thus, we find the Court of Appeals majority's conclusion that the stipulation "wholly undercut" the defense is inaccurate in light of Bradbury wanting not just to get a lesser conviction/sentence, but not wanting to be convicted at all. It seems counsel's strategy was to put some daylight between Bradbury and the shooter and only in retrospect, when the shooter and Bradbury were both convicted, does that seem to not have been the ideal plan.
Nevertheless, counsel was not ineffective here. He articulated his thought process for agreeing to stipulate, and doing so was not illogical or absurd. Further, the standard of review requires that we affirm unless "thereis no way within the law that the court below could have reached the decision it did." Stevens , 770 N.E.2d at 745.
Further, as for prejudice, Bradbury "must show a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, the proceedings below would have resulted in a different outcome." Wilson , 157 N.E.3d at 1177. "A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." Strickland v. Washington , 466 U.S. 668, 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). As Judge Vaidik noted in her dissent, there is a quite a bit of evidence here to support a finding that Griffin had the intent to kill given that several witnesses, including the intended victim, testified about how Griffin shot many times at the intended victim. So even if Bradbury's counsel had not agreed to the stipulation, Griffin's intent likely would have been proven. Thus, there would be no difference in the outcome.
Bradbury also claims that his attorneys were ineffective for failing to seek lesser alternatives to a murder conviction. According to Bradbury, he would have been entitled to a jury instruction on reckless homicide as an accomplice to Griffin if his counsel had sought it. Further, he testified that counsel did not discuss the matter with him and had counsel done so, he would have wanted the instruction.2 Although lead trial counsel could not remember his exact thought process at the time of trial, he testified that he did not submit a lesser included instruction because he did not believe that it was supported by the evidence. He also testified that he typically would seek a lesser included instruction if it were warranted. But here, his theory of the case was that the State didn't sufficiently prove Bradbury's intent, and more importantly it was counsel's position that:
it was rogue action by Griffin that [Bradbury] did not contribute to and did not join and did not have any knowledge; if Griffin did have specific intent that [Bradbury] never had that intent beforehand because for Christ's sake he tried to stop it and the victim said that he did.
PCR Tr. Vol 4 at 28-29. Counsel expressed doubt that this theory was compatible with seeking a lesser included.
Defense counsel "enjoys ‘considerable discretion’ in developing legal strategies for a client, and this discretion demands deferential judicial review." Gibson , 133 N.E.3d at...
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